Defenses to Negligence

Defenses to Negligence

Eleven-year-old Neal Peterson collided into forty-three-year-old David Donahue on a Minnesota ski slope in February of 2000. Peterson was headed down the slope at a fast speed when he struck Donahue who was travelling at a slow speed across the slope toward the parking lot. In seeking compensation for his injuries, Peterson filed suit against Donahue alleging negligence. As both skiers claim to be experienced, understand the associated risks and collisions involved with skiing, and were traveling in different directions and at different speeds at the time of the incident, the negligence claim against Donahue must be thoroughly evaluated. In analyzing this case, I will research which type of defense Donahue is most likely to use, how the court will most likely apply that defense in this situation, and the reasoning behind my logic. As Shapo explains, “the dimensions of responsibility for injury generally, present constant challenges to lawyers, judges, and commentators” (2006, p. 1). In situations where negligence is claimed, defendants can claim one of three main defenses to negligence: assumption of risk, superseding cause, and contributory and comparative negligence, as well as applying special negligence doctrines including res ipsa loquitur, negligence per se, and the “danger invites rescue” doctrine (Miller & Jentz, 2012, p. 103). To begin with, it is easy to rule out the superseding cause defense in this case, as an unforeseeable intervening event did not occur. According to Chalat, ski law is state law; therefore any accidents that occur in Minnesota would be governed by Minnesota law (2009). Negligence per se can also be dismissed as a defense to negligence as there is no indication that Donahue violated a statute or ordinance that would have otherwise prevented the collision, as Minnesota does not have a ski safety statute (Chalat, 2009). In applying the contributory and comparative negligence defense to this case, it is possible that both the plaintiff and the defendant “failed to exercise a reasonable degree of care”, causing the collision (Miller & Jentz, 2012, p. 106). While Peterson filed the suit against Donahue, it is also likely that Donald may have suffered injuries as well. The case states that Donahue was knocked “out of his skis and down the slope ten or twelve feet” (Miller & Jentz, 2012, p.112). Under the comparative defense to negligence, both Peterson and Donahue’s negligence would be calculated along with the appropriate damages. While the comparative defense to negligence might be useful in this particular situation, I feel that there are missing facts, including the extent that both parties were injured and negligent in the situation, that would otherwise allow me to assume this defense is the best one for Donahue. For the same mentioned reasons, I feel like the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would not apply as I do not think the “facts speak for themselves” in this situation (Miller & Jentz, 2012, p.106). As the other defenses and doctrines do not seem appropriate for this case, I believe Donahue is most likely to enter an assumption of risk defense to negligence in response to Peterson’s claim. As American courts and legislatures continue to develop rules on responsibility, they will continue to apply “notions of personal responsibility to tort claimants who have been careless or who have voluntarily encountered certain types of risk” (Shapo, 2006, p.20). Assumption of risk includes scenarios in which plaintiffs voluntary enter into situations that involve risks, and therefore are not allowed to recover any damages that result from that risky situation. Shapo explains that while contributory negligence and some types of assumption of risk may be placed into comparative negligence, that there is variation among the states as to which defenses are available, how they are applied, and if they are against strict liability claims versus negligence claims (Shapo, 2006). In this case, Minnesota does not have any ski safety statutes in place, but it does list “common law negligence for skier/skier collisions and common law doctrine of primary assumption of risk” (Chalat, 2009). In this scenario, when Peterson acknowledges that he has been skiing most of his life, he acknowledges his assumption of the risks involved in skiing. Interactions among different skiers at different times and places on the slopes would be a risk normally associated with the activity of skiing, therefore, the assumption of risk defense is applicable. Further explained, it is reasonable to assume that any skier could face a collision with another person or object when they choose to go skiing. Having skied for at least nine years, Peterson should have been well aware of the risks involved, and his assumption of the risk precludes his negligence claim.

References

Chalat, J. H. (2009). Ski Safety: Cases, Issues, Trends. Chalat Hattan & Koupal PC. Retrieved August 23, 2011 from http://www.skisafety.com/lawSurveys/skiLawMinnesota.htm

Miller, R.L. & Jentz, G.A. (2012). Business Law Today. South-Western Cenage Learning: Mason, OH.

Shapo, M.S. (2006). Responsibility for injuries: Some sketches. Northwestern University Law Review. Special Issue, Vol. 100, p. 481-500.

References: Chalat, J. H. (2009). Ski Safety: Cases, Issues, Trends. Chalat Hattan & Koupal PC. Retrieved August 23, 2011 from http://www.skisafety.com/lawSurveys/skiLawMinnesota.htm Miller, R.L. & Jentz, G.A. (2012). Business Law Today. South-Western Cenage Learning: Mason, OH. Shapo, M.S. (2006). Responsibility for injuries: Some sketches. Northwestern University Law Review. Special Issue, Vol. 100, p. 481-500.