Descartes Conceivability Argument And Cartesian Dualism

us which logical possibility correctly describes reality; and as property dualism is just as logically possible as substance dualism, the latter cannot be the right account of the mind and body. What Descartes needs to show (to secure the success of his argument, i.e. demonstrate that the mind and the body are separate substances) is that it is logically impossible for the mind and body to be the same substance; but, as he fails to do this, I must reject his conceivability argument, and Cartesian dualism in general as the right account of mind and body.

A further criticism of substance dualism asks how one can conceptually reconcile the interaction between the physical (the body) and the non-physical (the mind). This can be demonstrated by
If dualism is true, then the mind is not in space and cannot exert any physical force. Therefore, either dualism is false, or the mind cannot cause the body to move. But, it is intuitive that our minds have causal power over our physical bodies. Thus to the extent that we can trust our intuition, Cartesian Dualism is false.

Despite the plausibility of this argument, it does not conclusively demonstrate that something non-physical can cause something physical to occur (Kim). However, the incompatibility of mind-body causation with physical laws does conclusively prove that the Cartesian dualist account is incoherent.

The concept of mind-body causation contradicts basic physical laws such as the conservation of energy - in order for a bicycle to be ridden energy must be exerted but a ghost is not capable of exerting physical energy so either a ghost cannot ride a bicycle or some basic scientific laws are wrong. Similarly, I cannot will for the chair in front of me to levitate, I must exert energy in order to lift the chair. Because the mind is non-physical, if I could move chairs just by thinking then the scientific law concerning the conservation of energy would be broken. If interactionism were the case then the level of energy in the universe could not be constant because the total level of energy in the universe would be increasing or
However, both assertions can be refuted, thus undermining his argument and substance dualism in general. It can be argued that minds are divisible functionally rather than spatially; evidenced in certain mental conditions such as dissociative identity disorder. Someone with this condition has two or more distinct identities which alternately control the individual, each having its own separate history, self-image and character traits. There is evidence to suggest that the distinct personalities are sometimes unaware of each other, and therefore can be interpreted as separate centers of consciousness. If the same, unified mind performs each of the various mental functions and personality is among them, then why would different personalities be unaware of each other? If the mind can become two (or more) centers of consciousness, then it is clearly divisible. This renders Descartes’ indivisibility argument redundant, and as such, substance dualism cannot be the right account of mind and