Descartes Res Cogitans, Res Extensa, God

Recalling the distinction made earlier between primary objects of perception (objects of mathematics) and secondary objects of perception (apparent objects formed from observer-dependent sensory properties), Descartes investigates whether material objects exist by asking two questions: (1) do primary objects exist? and (2) do secondary objects exist? In answering the first question, Descartes draws on a distinction between imagining primary objects and conceiving of primary objects. He notes that he conceives of primary objects (such as triangles) clearly and distinctly, but this in no way means that such objects actually exist. It only means that they might exist since the idea contains no contradiction. (See the discussion of possible existence in the treatment of Meditation 5 above.) In addition to conceiving of primary objects, though, Descartes says that he can imagine many primary objects as well. We can, for example, intellectually conceive of a chiliagon (a thousand sided figure) although we cannot imagine one (i.e., visually picture one in our minds). At best, we would imagine a sort of vaguely many-sided object. Moreover, the mental acts involved in conceiving and in imagining are recognisably different kinds of mental effort. These analyses show, Descartes claims, that conceiving and imagining are fundamentally different. This leads him to a further claim: that, while conception is a necessary attribute of humans, imagination is not. Lacking imagination, I would still be 'me' as a thinking entity. Thus, Descartes reasons, the imagination seems to have something to do with my body which, since I can even doubt its existence, is also not an essential part of me and is obviously bound up with the kind of things (extended and material objects) the imagination represents. In imagination, he writes, the mind 'turns towards the body' (II, 51). However, it would follow from this that if the mind can imagine, then there must exist body. Descartes believes this