Destruction Of The Mammin Research Paper

The Meaning of theMaine: Causation and the Historiography of the Spanish-American War

At 9:40 p.m. on February 15, 1898,the U.S. battleship Maine exploded in Havana harbor.The explosion occurred in the forwardpart of the vessel, near the port side, and almostdirectlyunder the enlistedmen's quarters.The loss of life was staggering:out of a complementof 354 officers and a totalof 266 perished in the explosion. men, The destruction theMaine had immediateinternational of These were troubledtimesbetweenthe United repercussions. Statesand Spain, a period of increasingtensionsand deterioratingrelationsduring whichmutual suspicionswere becomas ing at least as much a source of estrangement conflicting national interests.In the United States officialimpatience
with Spain's conduct of the war in Cuba was increasing. So was popular support for Cuba Libre. For almost three years public officials and public opinion had acted upon one another in such a fashion as to make the rebellion in Cuba one of the more controversialissues of domesticpolitics. In this they were very much aided by the excesses of "yellow in abouttheCuban journalism," whichsensationalnewsstories withgratitude helpfulcomments The authorwishesto acknowledge the provided by JulesR. Benjamin,Thomas P. Dilkes, Nancy A. Hewitt,RobertP. and RebeccaJ.Scott. Ingalls,M. FraserOttanelli,
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had become the stockin trade of the circulation insurrection Journal rivalrybetweenWilliam Randolph Hearst's New York and Joseph Pulitzer's New York World.Anti-Spanish sentiin ment was on the rise--withinthe government, the press, the public. Only one week beforethe destructionof among the Maine, ill-will toward Spain flared anew when a private letter writtenby Spanish ambassador Enrique Dupuy de PresidentWilliam McKinley as a "cheap L6me, characterizing was purloined and subsequentlypublished in the politician," New York Journal. But the impact of the Maine was not only a matterof timing.The explosion was also a question of circumstances. That the vessel exploded inside Havana harbor,watersnominally under Spanish jurisdiction, invited immediate and obvious conclusions. "The Maine was sunk by an act of dirty on treachery the part of the Spaniards,"Theodore Roosevelt the concluded the day after tragedyl--asuspicionthatgained in many quarters. widespread currency Events moved quickly afterFebruary 15. On the following day PresidentMcKinleyconveneda naval courtofinquiry to investigatethe cause of the explosion. Two weeks later Congress appropriated $50 million forwar preparations.On March 25, the naval courtof inquirycompleted its investigation and released its findingsthree days later. Two explosions were responsible for the loss of the Maine, the naval court of inquiry concluded. An initial external explosionone that"could have been produced only by the explosion of a mine situatedunder the bottomof the ship"--detonated a secondinternal blast"oftwoor moreoftheforward magazines."2 The naval reportdeclined to fix responsibility the tragfor edy, but the conclusion that the firstexplosion originated attributed externally, explicitlyto a submarinemine, invited one of twocorollaryconclusions:the explosion was the result
Elting E. Morison, ed., The Lettersof Theodore Roosevelt(8 vols., Cambridge,

1. Theodore Rooseveltto Benjamin Harrison Diblee, Feb. 16, 1898,in

Mass., 1951-1954), 775. I, 2. "Message fromthe Presidentof the United StatesTransmitting the of Report of the Naval Court of Inquiry Upon the Destruction the United StatesBattleship Maine in Havana Harbor,February 1898,Together with 15, 55 theTestimony TakenBefore Court," Cong.,2 sess., the Sen.Doc.207(1898), 281.

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of criminal negligence or the work of malicious intent.In eithercase, the implicationwas clear: Spain was responsible.3 On April 11, President McKinley forwardedthe war resolution to Congress; ten days later the United Statesand Spain declared themselvesin a stateof war. formally I The destructionof the Maine has long served as one of the central thematicelements of the historiographyof the and circumstances Spanish-AmericanWar.4The mysterious unforeseenconsequences ofthe incidenthave provided more than ample material to contemplate the imponderables of 1898: a presumed random casus bellz, unverifiableif not of unknown origins, seeminglyan instance of bad timingat a bad place, and of such momentousconsequences. These are some of the subplots thathave made the Maine the object of such enduringappeal: a fortuitous eventto whichis attributed the cause ofa war thatalteredthe course ofAmericanhistory. The actual "weight"given to the Maine as a cause of the Spanish-AmericanWar,to be sure,no less than the means by which it served to precipitate the war, remain subjects of views. Although the notion divergentand oftenconflicting of historical causality has tended generally to fall into of desuetude, ifnot disrepute,the specificconstruct theMaine as a causal factor the Spanish-American of War has remaineda and prominentelementofthehistoricalliterature.5 persistent
3. An investigation 1976 directedby Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, in under the auspices of the Naval HistoryDivision of the Department the of the Navy,concludedthat,in "all probability, Mainewas destroyed an acciby dentwhichoccurredinsidetheship,"and thata firein a coal bunker was "the primarysource of the explosion...[and] caused a partial detonationof the otherforward The studyconcluded:"There is no evidencethata magazines." mine destroyed the Maine." See Hyman G. Rickover, How theBattleship "Maine"

wasDestroyed D.C., 1976),91, 104. (Washington, 4. For a general discussionof the historiography 1898,see Walter of Texas "That'SplendidLittle War'in HistoricalPerspective," LeFeber, Quarterly, "WilliamMcKinleyand the ComXI (Winter1968),89-98;and JosephA. Fry, War:A StudyofBesmirching Redemption and of ingoftheSpanish-American an HistoricalImage,"Diplomatic III History, (1979),77-79. 5. The discourseon historical of causationhas produceda literature vast Some of the more rangingdiscussions are foundin William H. proportions. Dray, Philosophy History of (Englewood Cliffs,N.J., 1964), 41-58; Maurice

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To the Maine has been variouslyattributed, and oftenat one time,the principal and immediate cause of the war,the neccause; the Maine has been essary as well as the sufficient as having made war at once possible and inevitarepresented ble. Opinion differs, too, on whether it was one of many causes or chiefamong all; whether precluded an obtainable it or simplyaccelerated an inevitablewar. peace For the most part, however,differences have been ones not of kind but of degree and emphasis, largely variations upon a common theme. Taken togetherthey forma larger consensus about the origins of the Spanish-AmericanWar and the part played by the Maine and fromwhichhave been derived the principal explanations of 1898.A vast and otherwise diverse literature, spanningnearly a hundred yearsand from specialized studies to textbooks,has usually ranging relied on theMaine as the principal causal explanation of the war. The argumenthas assumed fully the properties of an articleoffaithand earlybecame one oftheenduringtenetsof the Spanish-AmericanWar historiography. This consensushad its origins in the eventsof 1898,with policymakersand political leaders among the firstto proclaim the causal role of the Maine. Theodore Roosevelt was categorical: "When the Maine was blown up in Havana harbor,war became inevitable.""I have no doubt at all," Senator
Mandelbaum, The ProblemofHistoricalKnowledge(New York, 1938), 203-272; R. F. Atkinson, Knowledge and Explanationin History(Ithaca, N.Y., 1978), 140-187;

Consciousness (New York, 1968), 128-170;Robert F. John Lukacs, Historical AlistaireMacIntyre, in "Causalityand History," JuhaManninen and Raimo

Berkofer, A Behavioral (New York, 1969), 292-321; ApproachtoHistorical Jr., Analysis

Studiesin theFoundations Tuomela, eds., Essayson Explanationand Understanding: of Humanities and Social Sciences(Dordrecht, Holland, 1976), 137-158; Michael and History(New York, 1966), 193-213; Michael Scriven, ed., Philosophical Analysis

"HistoricalContinuity and Causal Analysis," WilliamH. Dray, in Oakeshott,

in and in W.
"Causes,Connections Conditions History," ibid., 238-264; H. Walsh, "HistoricalCausation,"in Ronald H. Nash, ed., Ideas ofHistory (New York, Milic Capek, "Towarda Wideningof the Notionof Causality," 1969),234-252; of XXVIII (Winter 1959),63-90;E. J.Tapp, "Some Aspects Causation Diogenes, in History," IL Journal Philosophy, (1952),67-79; Samuel H. Beer, "Causal of and Theory, (1963), III Explanationand ImaginativeRe-enactment," History and XIII (1974), 6-29; Paul K. Conkin,"CausationRevisited," History Theory, and Causal Importance," 1-20;RaymondMartin, "Causes,Conditions, History and Theory, XXI (1982),53-74;AndrusPork,"Assessing RelativeCausal Importancein History," and XXIV (1985),62-69. History
Theory,

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Shelby M.
Cullom wrote later, "that war would have been avertedhad not theMaine been destroyedin Havana harbor." the Champ Clark characterized Maine as "thestrawthatbroke the camel's back"; Secretary War Russell A. Alger believed of that the incident "swept away forever"all likelihood of a L. to peaceful settlement; WhiteBusby,privatesecretary RepresentativeJoe Cannon, wrote that the "destructionof the Maine precipitatedmatters."6 Contemporary historical accounts of 1898 also emphasized the causal prominenceof theMaine."The sinkingofthe Maine meant war between the United States and Spain," Richard R. Titherington wrote in 1900. Horace E. Flack argued that"it was largelydue to theMaine thatintervention took place" and that,"in all probability,there would have been no war, had our battleship not been destroyed."For Theodore E. Burton "peace mighthave been obtained had it the not been forthe blowing up of the... Maine."After Maine, Trumbull White insisted,"the logic of eventswas irresistibly drawingthe countrytowardwar withSpain."'7 War depart Subsequentaccountsofthe Spanish-American first at frominterpretations formulated the turn only slightly of the century.The Maine persists as an event of singular importanceand principal cause of the war,oftenproclaimed in terms as categorical as those used by contemporaries. William A. Robinson insisted that "the explosion shattered the hope ofpreserving peace as completelyas it had shattered the vessel itself." "On the night of February
15," William E. asserted,"came the terribleblow whichended Leuchtenburg all real hope for peace." "The Maine incident,"wrote A. E.
Cullom, FiftyYearsofPublic Service(Chicago, 1911), 283-284; Champ Clark, My QuarterCenturyofAmericanPolitics(2 vols., New York, 1920), I, 401; Russell A. War(New York, 1901), 4; L. White Busby, UncleJoe Alger, The Spanish-American Cannon: The Storyofa Pioneer American(New York, 1927), 186. 7. Richard R. Titherington, A Historyof theSpanish-American Warof 1898 (New York, 1900), 70; Horace Edgar Flack, Spanish-American DiplomaticRelations Sherman (Boston, 1906), 412; Trumbull White, United Statesin War withSpain

6. Theodore Roosevelt, (New Autobiography York,1924),212; ShelbyM.

the John Preceding Warof1898(Baltimore,1906),46, 83; Theodore E. Burton, RankinYoung,History Our WarWith (Chicago,1898),36. See also James of Spain in of (N.p., 1898),66; F. W. Holman George,"The Destruction theMaine," The

War:A Historyby the WarLeaders (Norwich, Conn., 1899), 92. American-Spanish

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similarto Theodore Roosevelt's Campbell in termsstrikingly

"Had President phrasing,"made war all but inevitable."
McKinley not sent the battleship Maine into Havana harbor...," Elmer Plischkecontended,"thewar withSpain might not have broken out." "If any one event was responsible for the Spanish-AmericanWar,"wrote Charles S. Campbell, "it was not the mere destruction theMaine but her destruction of by an outside explosion as attestedby a responsible board of inquiry.""An affairof tremendous importance,"argues Herman Reichard Esteves,"the disasterwas unquestionably firstamong the immediate causes of the Spanish-American War." For Thomas A. Bailey the destructionof the Maine "was by farthe most importantsingle precipitantof the war withSpain."8 II From the outset, thus, the Maine functionedas a vital element in the logic of explanatoryconstructs 1898.Interof of the Spanish-AmericanWar have differed, and pretations often a so, markedly but almostall derivefrom commoncausal functionattributedto the Maine. If there is general agreement about the end resultof the Maine,however,there is no comparable consensus about the specific manner in which
Heritage,VIII (Feb. 1957), 38; A. E. Campbell, GreatBritainand the UnitedStates,

"The Needless War with Spain," American 360; William E. Leuchtenburg,

8. William A. Robinson, ThomasB. Reed, Parliamentarian (New York, 1939),

1865-1900 (New York, 1976), 256; Herman formation AmericanForeignRelations, of A DiplomaticHistoryoftheAmericanPeople (7th ed., New York, 1964), 458. These

1895-1903 Conn., 1960), 32; Elmer Plishke, Conduct American (Westport, of (3rd ed., Princeton, Diplomacy N.J.,1967),116; CharlesS. Campbell,The TransReichardEsteves, "The UnitedStates, or Spain, and theMaine, theDiplomacy of Frustration," Interamericana,(1973),555; Thomas A. Bailey, II Revista/Review viewsare variously American sharedbyRobertH. Ferrell, A Diplomacy, History "Cuba, the Philippines, (2nd ed., New York,1969),389; Richard Hofstadter, in and Manifest in The Destiny," Richard Hofstadter, Paranoid Style American

The Makers Wallace (2nd ed., New York,1964),80; Arthur Josephson, President to Harrison Harding vols.,New York,1922),I, 236; David Burner, Dunn, From (2 ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,1978),431; JohnEdward Weems,The Fateofthe "Maine"(New York,1958),167; FosterRhea Dulles, The ImperialYears (New Little (New York,1958),12. War York,1956),122; FrankFreidel,TheSplendid
Robert D. Marcus, and Emily S. Rosenberg, America:A Portrait History(2nd in

Politicsand OtherEssays(New York, 1967), 156; Elbert J. Benton, International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-AmericanWar (Baltimore, 1908), 76; Matthew

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the Maine acted as a causal agent. In particular,the effects proceeding from one incident have become the subject of diverse and oftendivergentinterpretations. Indeed, thatsuband frequently incompatible versions of stantiallydifferent 1898 are derived froma common causal argumentsuggests some of the more anomalous aspectsof the historiography. The mostprominentcausal explanations of 1898turnon the relationship drawn between the Maine and public opinion. The notion of public opinion has itselfundergone sevin eral transfigurations the course of nearly a hundred years of historicalwriting.So has the way it has been measured. Whateverelse may separate the varietiesofusage ofthe term "public opinion," however, the literatureis all but unaniin mous thatmass sentiment figuredprominently the coming of the war.9According to the conventionalhistoriographical of wisdom,the destruction the Maine served to arouse public wrath,therebycreating a climate of opinion in which war became an acceptable if not inevitable course of action. This but argumenthas passed throughseveral formulations, over timeremainssubstantially constant:"thedisasteroftheMaine was but a matchtouchedto thepowder ofpublic sentiment";1o "an unparalleled wave of horrorand indignationsweptover the United States";" "the explosion oftheMaine was matched by an explosion of public opinion";12"the American public was profoundlyshocked and outraged to hear thatthe battleship Mainehad been sunk";'3"thesinkingoftheMainearoused the public to a fighting temper."14
Thomas A. Bailey, The Man in theStreet:The Impacton ForeignPolicy(New York, 1948); Gabriel A. Almond, The AmericanPeople and ForeignPolicy(2nd ed., New York, 1960); John E. Mueller, War Presidentsand Public Opinion (New York, 1973); Barry B. Hughes, The Domestic Contextof AmericanForeignPolicy (San

9. For a general discussionof public opinion and foreignpolicy,see

Francisco, 1978).For a dated but stillusefuldiscussionof public opinion and the Spanish-American War,withparticular emphasison thepress,see Marcus
M. Wilkerson, Public Opinion and theSpanish-American War(New York, 1932). 10. Charles Morris, The War withSpain: A CompleteHistoryof the War of 1898Betweenthe UnitedStatesand Spain (Philadelphia, 1899), 124. 11. Russell H. Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the UnitedStates, 1900-1935(Menasha, 12. Bailey, The Man in theStreet, 79.

Wisc.,1935),22.

13. George F. Kennan,American 1900-1950 (Chicago,1951),14. Diplomacy,
14. Daniel M. Smith, The American (Boston, 1972),206. Experience Diplomatic

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By implication,the destructionof the Maine introduced the electorateinto the decision-making process,transforming an issue of foreignpolicy into a question of domesticpolitics. Not only did the public passivelyresignitselfto the possibility of war,it also activelydemanded the prosecutionof war. Implicit in this argumentis the propositionthatonce public opinion began to influencethe course of events,the driftto war became irreversible. The "effect the Maine disasteron of the Americanpublic opinion,"David E Healy wrote, "seemed to make war inevitable."The incident"so affected American opinion," George Kennan argues, "thatwar became inevitable with the sinking of the Maine. From that time on no peaceful solution was really given serious consideration in the American government." Dexter Perkins stated the argument succinctly:"Never was there a clearer case of a war broughtabout by public opinion."15 The linkage of public opinion to the destructionof the Maine,fromwhichare derived a numberofexplicitcorollary generalizations,serves several functions--someconceptual, some theoretical, some methodological.Public opinion allows fora plausible causal claim to be imputed to the Maine without much necessityof explanation or evidence. Accordingly, the onset of the war is portrayedas a functionof an aroused public opinion, which,as commonlyacknowledged,need not be rational, and therefore need not be explained. The inference is inescapable: the United Statesis propelled to war by an aroused citizenry, inflamedby the destruction theMaine, of overcome by stirredpassions, and at the brinkof mass hysteria. Public opinion is viewed as a powerful undercurrent, thatonce aroused force, operatingas an unseen and relentless assumed an inexorable logic of its own, one that could be calmed by nothing less than war. Responsibilityfor war is attributed the aroused masses, whom, it is suggested,had to taken collective leave of their senses. The literatureis rich with such characterizations:"an ungovernable outburst of
Coletta, ed., ThresholdtoAmericanInternationalism: Essayson theForeignPolicy of William McKinley(New York, 1970), 81; Kennan, AmericanDiplomacy,15; Dexter Perkins, The EvolutionofAmericanForeignPolicy (2nd ed., New York, 1966), 41.

15. David F. Healy, "McKinley as Commander-in-Chief," Paolo E. in

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popular emotion";16 "war hysteria swept the country";17 "public opinion outran... soberjudgment";'8the "lid was now American masses"; 19"the off"as a result of "the unthinking the nation had gone mad";20 "pressuregeneratedby the ensuing emotionaloutburst sweptawayall reasonand hesitation";21 seized upon a large part ofthe Americanpeople";22 "hysteria "in response to the clamorous war spiritaroused by the sinking of Maine in the harbor of Havana, the United Stateswas about to go to war withSpain";23the United States"resorted to war for subjective and emotional reasons";24"across the thousandsgave themselvesup to emotional excesses country, like those of tent-meeting revivals";25"the people, acting out of powerfulirrationalimpulses, dictated the decision of April 1898."26 War is thusrepresentedas the resultof spontaneousemotional reaction to a random incident-armed retribution broughton by thecaprice ofpublic opinion anxious to avenge the Maine. Indeed, it is the public clamor forrevenge thatis seen to galvanize popular sentimentand drives the country inexorably into war. "It cannot be denied," Alexander K. McClure and Charles Morrisargued in 1901,"thatthisunparalleled outrage intensified war feverin the United States, the and thousands were eager for the opportunity to punish The destruction theMaine, of Spanish crueltyand treachery." Charles Morris wroteelsewhere,"gave rise to a natural feelwith 16. David F. Trask,The War (New York,1981),474. Spainin 1898 17. T. HarryWilliams, A RichardN. Current, FrankFreidel, History and

of the UnitedStates(New York, 1965), 255. 18. Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the UnitedStates, 22. 19. Kennan, AmericanDiplomacy,457.

20. Donald BarrChidsey, TheSpanish-American (New York,1971), War 62.

Relations (Chicago,1953),43. 22. John the 577. Richard Alden,Riseof American (NewYork, 1963), Republic
23. Dulles, The Imperial Years,113. 24. Kennan, AmericanDiplomacy,22.

21. Robert Endicott Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest American Foreign in

States (New York,1968),250; Sheldon Appleton,United (Boston, Foreign Policy York,1954),41.
1968), 64; Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise to WorldPower 1898-1954(New

Perkins and Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The UnitedStatesofAmerica:A History

25. ErnestMay,Imperial (New York,1961),142. Democracy 26. Trask,War Spain, Similarcharacterizations foundin Dexter with 59. are

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in ing ofresentment themindsoftheAmericanpeople, which for of quicklydeepened to a thirst revenge.""The destruction the Maine,"suggested Oscar D. Lambert, "created a storm for retribution." "People nearly went out of their heads in a wave of patriotic feeling," Charles E. Chapman noted, "thatwas mingled with a call for vengeance against Spain." John A. S. Grenville and George B. Young indicated that "patrioticfervornow demanded vengeance for the Maine." "The American people were calling forblood," wroteJames A. Henretta, W. Elliot Brownlee, David Brody, and Susan Ware. E. Berkeley Tompkins similarly suggested that the whileJohnM. Dobson asserted public "clamoredforrevenge," thatthe public "considered avenging the American deaths a matterof national honor."27 III The linkage betweentheMaine and public opinion is not, without attributed however, problems,and thecausal function to both is not alwaysconvincingor conclusive. In some cases, in differences interpretation sufficiently are great to suggest a disregardforaccuracyifnot evidence. There are, in fact, at least two substantially different and irreconcilableaccounts of the timingand characterof public reaction,both of which appear to share a congenial and untroubled coexistence in the historiography. one version,public opinion is depicted In as having been aroused immediately after and in direct response to the explosion, that is, on or about February 15.
27. Alexander K. McClure and Charles Morris, The Authentic of William Life McKinley (Philadelphia, 1901), 229; Morris, The War withSpain, 120; Oscar D. Lambert, StephenBentonElkins(Pittsburgh, 1955), 235; Charles E. Chapman, A Historyof the Cuban Republic (New York, 1927), 87; John A. S. Grenville and and American Diplomacy: Studies in George Berkeley Young, Politics,Strategy, ForeignPolicy,1873-1917(New Haven, 1966), 255; James A. Henretta, W. Elliot Brownlee, David Brody, and Susan Ware, America'sHistory (Chicago, 1987), in 638; E. Berkeley Tompkins, Anti-Imperialism the UnitedStates:The GreatDebate, 1890-1920 Ascent:The United (Philadelphia, 1970), 89; John M. Dobson, America's StatesBecomes a GreatPower,1880-1914(DeKalb, Ill., 1978), 105. See also Irwin 1896-1917 Unger and Debi Unger, The VulnerableYears:The UnitedStates, (New York, 1978), 50; Arthur Link, Stanley Coben, Robert V. Remini, Douglas Greenberg, and Robert C. McMath, Jr., The American People: A History(2nd ed., Arlington Heights, Ill., 1987), 502.

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This formulation best representedby FosterRhea Dulles: is When it mysteriously blew up...an already worked-up public wentwild. There wereoccasionalcautionary voices urgingthat judgementshould be withhelduntil an officialinvestigation could determine cause of theMaine's destruction, they the but were scarcelyheard in the noisy clamor demanding immediate retaliationagainstSpain as without questionbeing responsible forthe disaster.28 Other accounts agree: "an already war-consciousAmerican aroused when, on February public opinion was still further the 15,1898, Maineblewup.... When wordofthisblastreached the United States it seemed thatwar mightbe only minutes "the countrywas at once stirredfromone end to the away";29 The popular impulse was to rushintowar";30 "wave a other.... of belligerent enthusiasm...swept at once throughoutthe "indignationwas extremeon learning of the tercountry";31 rible event."32 A second version, however,describes a public reaction in substantiallydifferent chronology and character.In this account the public remained calm during the days following February 15, and not until March 28, when the naval court findingsimplicate Spain in the explosion, was public wrath aroused. "There was no violentdemand forvengeance," Harry T. Peck maintains."The gravityof the situationgave steadiness and poise to public opinion. The nation displayed a universal willingnessto suspend judgment until a full and vigorous inquiry should be made. The tone of the press was admirable."Thomas A. Bailey writes throughthe country thatit was "to the creditof the American people, thaton the
28. Foster Rhea Dulles, Prelude to WorldPower: AmericanDiplomaticHis1869-1900(New York, 1965), 171. tory, 29. Hollis W. Barber, ForeignPolicies of the UnitedStates(New York, 1953), 31. Walter Millis, The MartialSpirit: Studyof Our Warwith A Spain (Boston,

259-260. 30. Samuel W. McCall, TheLife Thomas Brackett (Boston,1914),232-233. of 1931),109. 32. Morris,The Warwith Spain,119. Otherswho subscribeto this view

include Roger D. Masters, The Nation Is Burdened: AmericanForeignPolicy in a Changing World(New York, 1967), 298-299; John A. Garraty,Henry CabotLodge: A Biography(New York, 1953), 185; and Alden, Rise oftheAmericanRepublic,577.

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whole theywere inclined to suspend judgment.... This factis all the more remarkablewhen one considersthe surcharged Other accountsconcur: "public judgmentwas atmosphere."33 "most of the public withheldjudgment pendrestrained";34 ing the findingsof the officialinquiry,"afterwhich "the cry forwar rose over the land";35"Americanpublic opinion was "therewas no instantaneousand restrainedand dignified";36 unanimous outcry for war";37 "the American public had was "when suspendedjudgmentuntiltheinvestigation over";38 of inquiry reported that the explosion was caused the court was thrownaside and the demand for by a mine, all restraint war was overwhelming.""39 Discrepancies of thistypesuggestambiguitiesof another sort.The linkage of the Maine with public opinion and the connectionofbothto the comingofthe war,a causal sequence that has driven many explanations of 1898, stand as one of the more problematicalconstructs the historicalliterature. of The connection drawn between the Maine and public opinion, on one hand, and the coming of the war,on the other, serves to set in sharp reliefthe degree to whichexplanations of 1898 tend oftento operate independentlyof the requirement forevidence. It is a causal propositionwhose plausibility is derived more fromnormativedemocratictheorythan
33. Harry T. Peck, Twenty YearsoftheRepublic,1885-1905 (New York, 1907), 542; Bailey, DiplomaticHistoryof theAmericanPeople, 456-458.

34. Margaret Leech,In theDaysofMcKinley (New York,1959),168.

1985),237.

35. James MacGregor Burns, The Workshopof Democracy (New York,

York,1928),69. York,1978),42.

36. Alfred L. Dennis, Adventuresin American Diplomacy,1896-1906(New 37. William Appleman Williams, Americans in a Changing World (New

War (Indianapolis,1912),14.

38. Lewis A. Harding, The Preliminary Diplomacy of theSpanish-American 39. John Holladay Latane, A Historyof AmericanForeignPolicy (Garden

Authentic Lifeof William McKinley,229; Louis Martin Sears, A HistoryofAmerican ForeignRelations(New York, 1927), 438; Everett Walters,JosephBenson Foraker: AmericanDiplomaticHistory:Two Centuries ChangingInterpretations of (Berkeley, Relations(Baltimore, 1983), 78; James Morton Callahan, Cuba and International War and PresidentMcKinley 1899), 481; Lewis L. Gould, The Spanish-American

City,N.Y., 1927), 506. Similar accountsare found in McClure and Morris,

An Uncompromising (Columbus,Ohio, 1948),149; JeraldA. Combs, Republican

Kan., 1982)438. (Lawrence,

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from a body of verifiable evidence. A vast literature has evolved around argumentsforwhichadequate verification is either incompleteor impossible,or both. Explanation relies of freelyifonly implicitlyon the theoreticalfunctions public in a political democracy:the electorate,fromwhich opinion emanates political legitimacyand to which elected officials are perforceresponsible,is representedas dictatingthe pace of eventsand the course of policy. The Maine-public opinion constructthus implicitlyadvances the notion of the war as a functionof democratic process,mandated bypolitical considerationsand sanctioned as injunction.Attributed it is to the will of by constitutional the people, war servesas a metaphorfortriumphof popular of the democracy.Accordingly, destruction the Maine creates forwar to which elected officials obliged are public pressure to acquiesce, perhaps against their betterjudgment if not against their will. The argument suggests an element of choicelessnesson thepart ofelected officials who presumably had no alternativeand forwhom war becomes the means by which to dischargetheirconstitutional to responsibilities the electorate.An unwilling Congress and a reluctantPresident to appear thrownon the defensive,resorting war to meet the demands of an aroused citizenry. These propositions were firstadvanced by elected officials themselves,many of whom subsequentlyjustified the war resolution as the expression of popular democracy."It was thispublic sentiment," wroteSenatorHenry Cabot Lodge one year later, "that drove Congress forwardto meet the popular will, which members and Senators very well knew could be fulfilled war and in no otherway.""Thousands of by came to Congressdemandingwar,"recalled L. White petitions was being forced Busby.And he concluded: "the Government into war." Senator Joseph B. Foraker later explained that was "public sentiment so aroused thatitwas impossiblelonger to delay positive action to put an end to the trouble,"while Champ Clark recalled that "the American people cried out with one accord for vengeance and forced the gentle and kind-heartedPresident's hand." Senator Shelby M. Cullom was no less equivocal: "I have no doubt at all that war would

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have been averted had not the Maine been destroyed in forcedus into it after appallHavana harbor.The country the ing catastrophe."'4 These propositionsentered the mainstreamofthe historhave variations, iographyearly and, withsome interpretative flourishedas the principal thematicstaples of subsequently the Spanish-AmericanWar scholarship. "All well-meaning were brushed aside by the rude hand of a popular sophistries demand forreprisal,"wroteHenry Watterson, "and Congress was admonished thatit disobeyed the summonsat its peril." The "verdictrenderedby a public opinion [was] so strong, so "that unanimous,so earnest," agreed RichardR. Titherington, no officialauthority, however anxious to avoid a conflictso long as an honourable way of escaping it was to be found, could restrain voice ofnational indignation." the The "temper of the people" was so "distinctly wroteHarry T. belligerent," Peck, that it was "obvious to those in power that war could not be long averted." "Afterthe Maine episode," T. Harry and FrankFreidelassert, "there Williams,RichardN. Current, was littlechance the government could keep the people from war."41 The correlation betweentheMaineincident and an aroused public opinion has also served to explain the actionsof President McKinley. Accordingly,McKinley confrontedmounting pressurefroman aroused public and a bellicose Congress, both demanding war to avenge the Maine. The White House is portrayedas a bastion of reason in a time of irrationality but, in the end, it too was obliged to capitulate to the will of the people and the demands of theirelected representatives. "Leftalone," Randolph GreenfieldAdams wrote,"McKinley
Uncle Joe Cannon, 186; Joseph Benson Foraker, Notes of a Busy Life (2 vols., Cincinnati, 1917), II, 20; Clark, Quarter Centuryof American Politics,I, 401; YearsofPublic Service,283-284. Cullom, Fifty 41. Henry Watterson, A History of the Spanish-American War (PhiladelWar,70; Peck, phia, 1898), 42; Titherington, History of the Spanish-American TwentyYearsof the Republic,544; Williams, Current, and Freidel, Historyof the

40. HenryCabot Lodge, The War with Spain(New York,1899),32; Busby,

United 255. States, Variationsof thisview are foundin Carl Russell Fish, The PathofEmpire (New Haven, 1919),108; Samuel Flagg Bemis,ed., TheAmerican
Secretaries Stateand Their Diplomacy (11 vols., New York, 1927-1963), IX, 75; of and Chapman, Historyofthe Cuban Republic,84.

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would probablyhave avoided a war,as he was a peaceful and gentle man who had imaginationenough to count the frightful cost ofwar as fewof his associatesdid. Congressnevertheless was bent on war and the populace clamored forwar.The will of the masses overbore the judgment of the President and had its way." "He was forced to make war," asserted Margaret Leech. James A. Henretta, W. Elliot Brownlee, David Brody,and Susan Ware agreed: "PresidentMcKinley did not seek war. He had no stomachfor the martial spirit sweeping the country.... But, in the end, McKinley had no choice." "The destructionof the Maine,"John S. Bassettconcluded, "increasedthefeelingagainstSpain and strengthened the hands of those who were tryingto press McKinley into "The administration unable to stemthe tide which was war."42 both the Congress and the country was making for war," Herbert Croly insisted.He continued: the to Up to thelastmoment President sought findsomemiddle He soughtto placate Americanpublic opinion by actground. in on ing energetically behalfofAmericancitizens Cuba, and by to improveitsconductofthewar and to redress pressingSpain If thegrievances itsCuban subjects. theMainehad notblown of he mighthave succeeded.... As it was,the Presidentrisked up, his popularityand confidence the country his reluctance of by to abandon a peacefulsolution.43 There are variations on these themes, and not all are favorableto McKinley. Indeed, McKinley's role in the events of 1898 has been one of the more controversialissues in a literatureotherwise noteworthy for the virtual absence of The debate originates from commonly a disputation. scholarly shared assumptionthatthe destruction theMaine createda of climateof opinion in whichpolicy optionswere reduced to a difficult few.In the more sympathetic account, McKinley is as personally committedto peace, but in the end portrayed acquiesces to eventsbeyond his control.He emerges in most
42. Randolph GreenfieldAdams, A History theForeign of Policyof the United States 274; Leech,In the 189; (New York,1926), DaysofMcKinley, Henretta, Brownlee, Brody, and Ware, America's 638; John Spencer Bassett, History, and 1889-1926 (New York,1926),75. Expansion Reform, 43. HerbertCroly,Marcus AlonzoHanna: His Lifeand Work (New York, 1912),277-278.

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accounts as a pragmaticpolitician, attentiveto political considerations,and mindfulof the need to defendconstitutional prerogatives of the executive branch of government. He understoodtoo thathe could not long ignore public opinion at least,withoutcalamor resistcongressional pressure--not, itous political consequences or a monumentalconstitutional in crisis,or both. McKinley foundhimself an impossiblesituation, and in the end bowed to the inevitable. The Maine produced an "extraordinaryoutburstof public opinion to antiwhich a strugglingPresident could find no effective dote," argued David F. Trask. McKinley was "desperate to avoid hostilities"but was "ultimately responsiveto the voice ofthe people"; what"compelled [McKinley] to act againsthis deepest desire forpeace was the irresistible popular demand welling up everywherein America afterthe destructionof the Maine.""44 the spring of 1898," asserted Thomas A. "By Bailey, "the pressure of herd hysteriahad become so overwhelmingthatit could not have been stemmedby any ordinary mortal." Richard E. Welch, Jr.,contended that the destructionof the Maine "not only heightenedthe war hysteria in certain sectionsof the American press and public but persuaded McKinley thateventshad overtakenthe possibility of putting an end to the strugglein Cuba by means of Spanish reformsand limited autonomy.""McKinley could not resist the growing pressure to intervene,"wrote Irwin Unger,while Oscar Handlin believed that"McKinley had to act, much as he was reluctantto do so." "PresidentMcKinley was personally in favor of peace," Henry Bamford Parkes argued, "but he also wanted to be re-electedin 1900 and was not disposed to stickto his private convictionsin defianceof the growingpressure for war."D. A. Graber suggested that the"Presidentfelt could no longerresist public demand he the for war withoutwreckinghis party's and his own political fortunes." George B. Tindall speculatedthatMcKinley "might have defied Congress and public opinion, but in the end the political risk was too high," while John D. Hicks, George E. and RobertE. Burke argued thatMcKinley "believed Mowry,
44. Trask, WarwithSpain, 58-59, 474.

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thatonly by yielding to the popular clamor forwar could he be certainof holding his partytogether."45 That McKinley resisted pressure for war as long as he did, the argumentconcludes, is in itselfno small tributeto the President's leadership ability."It would be easy to condemn McKinley fornot holding out againstwar,"contended William E. Leuchtenburg,"but McKinley showed considerable courage in buckingthe tide.""McKinley... exhibitedcomasserted Richard W. Leopold.46 "After mendable restraint," this disasterat Havana," wroteRobert H. Ferrell in defense of the President,"it is doubtfulifMcKinley or anyone could have checked the course of events.The argumentfrequently advanced, thatMcKinley could have defied the war hawksof 1898 in Congress, does not seem plausible, for Congress in such a case would likely have voted a declaration of war and overridenhim."47 Not all agree, however. Other assessmentsof 1898 question the inevitabilityof war and deny that McKinley was the of choices.Certainly destruction theMaine without entirely in "WilliamMcKinley:Reluctant CautiousImperialist," Norman Warrior, Jr., and Values:AmericanDiplomacy,1865-1945 A. Graebner, ed., Traditions (Landham, Handlin, The Historyofthe UnitedStates(2 vols., New York, 1968), I, 257; Henry Bamford Parkes, The UnitedStatesofAmerica:A History(New York, 1963), 524; Policiesand Practices D. A. Graber, CrisisDiplomacy:A Historyof U.S. Intervention 45. Bailey, DiplomaticHistory theAmerican of People, 463; Richard W. Welch,

States Md., 1985), 37; Irwin Unger, These United (Boston, 1978), 603; Oscar

see Akira Iriye, FromNationalismtoInternationalism (London, 1977), 133; Dulles, America'sRise to WorldPower,41; Thomas A. Bailey and David M. Kennedy,

A D.C., 1959), GeorgeBrown Tindall,America: Narrative 78; History (Washington, and (2 vols.,New York,1984),II, 877;JohnD. Hicks,GeorgeE. Mowry, Robert E. Burke,TheAmerican Nation (4thed., Boston,1965),277.For similarversions,

TheAmerican Mass.,1987),II, 603; Ronald J.Caridi, (2 Pageant vols.,Lexington, 20th American Century Foreign Policy (EnglewoodCliffs, N.J.,1974),17; J.Roger The Hollingsworth, Whirligig Politics of (Chicago,1963),135-136. 46. Leuchtenburg,"The Needless War with Spain," 95; Richard W.
Leopold, The GrowthofAmericanForeignPolicy (New York, 1965), 172. See also Samuel Flagg Bemis, A DiplomaticHistoryofthe UnitedStates(5th ed., New York,

Titherington,History theSpanish-American 69-70; Dorothy Canfield Fowler, of War, John Coit Spooner,Defender of Presidents(New York, 1961), 226-227; H. Wayne Morgan, WilliamMcKinleyand His America(Syracuse, 1963), 361; and Grenville and and Young, Politics, Strategy AmericanDiplomacy,265-266.

1965),p. 447. 47. Ferrell,American 389. Diplomacy, These viewsare also advanced by

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created difficultcircumstances.But that McKinley capitulated to public pressure,the inflammatory press,and jingoes in Congress,criticscharge, says more about the characterof on the Presidentthan the constraints his options. By implicawar became possible because of a weak and ineffectual tion, Presidentwho, at a decisive momentin the deepening crisis, failed to assertexecutiveleadership. "Possiblya strongPresident might have headed off the rush to war by openly assertedT. Harry denouncing the clamor for intervention," Williams, Richard N. Current, and Frank Freidel, "but McKinley was not a strongexecutive."The Maine so emboldened the jingoes, suggested Wayne S. Cole, that it "would have required a strongerPresident than McKinley to resist their warmaking influence."McKinley "had not the nerve and power to resistthe pressureforwar,"argued JamesFord Rhodes, and Frederick Merk suggeststhat "moral courage ...was not part of the kindly make-up of this President." "McKinley exhibitedneitherthe determinedleadership nor the moral courage that might possibly have restrainedhis impatient war-minded countrymen,"insisted Foster Rhea Dulles. "His failuredid not lie in thefieldofdiplomacy... but in national leadership at home."48"In a period of acute national crisisthe executive was paralyzed,"assertedGerald F. Linderman. Ruhl Bartlettwrites of "a weak President," while Charles A. and Mary R. Beard wroteof McKinley as "A being perceived as "weak-kneed." kindly soul in a spineless body," charged Samuel Eliot Morison, while Leland D. Baldwin wrote:"McKinley,had he been a strong leader,might have won his ends by diplomaticends.""Congress conceivably wanted war,"Harold U. Faulkner indicated,"and McKinley was not the man to resist."49 In still another explanation of 1898, the relationship
S. Cole, An Interpretative HistoryofAmericanForeignRelations(Homewood, Ill. 1968), 271; James Ford Rhodes, The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, 1897-1909 (New York, 1927), 64; Frederick Merk, Manifest Destinyand Mission in AmericanHistory(New York, 1963), 251; Dulles, Prelude to WorldPower,181. Bartlett,Policyand Power: Two Centuries AmericanForeignRelations(New York, of

48. Williams, and Current, Freidel,History theUnited States, Wayne 255; of

49. Gerald F. Linderman, TheMirror War (Ann Arbor, 1974),31; Ruhl of

1963),126;CharlesA. Beard and MaryR. Beard,NewBasicHistory theUnited of States (2nd ed., New York,1960),322; Samuel Eliot Morison,The Oxford History

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betweenthe destruction the Maine and public opinion, on of one hand, and Congress,the President,and the decision for into a propowar,on the other,is modified and transformed different sition fromwhich significantly causal correlations are derived. With a slightchange of sequence and a shiftof emphasis, the Maine incident is represented as a contrived pretext for war rather than a chance precipitant. Accordingly,public ire was not so much a spontaneous response to the destructionof the Maine as it was the resultof deliberate and cynical manipulation by pro-war elements,principally the yellow press and expansionistpoliticians,who seized the occasion to advance larger policy goals. "Whipped on by unscrupulous journalists," Samuel Flagg Bemis wrote,"the public hostility held Spain responsible for the vengeful of destruction an Americanwarship." JamesP. Warburgstated that the "yellow press held Spain responsible and whipped while Louis Martin Sears suggestedthatpublic up a frenzy," "succumbedto the artsofyellowjournalism.""Public opinion sentimenthad been worked up by the sensational press,frequentlycalled the 'yellowpress,'" wroteJamesFord Rhodes; "it had manipulatedthe real news,spread unfoundedreports, puttingall beforetheirreaders withscare headlines."Joseph E. Wisan was categorical:"the Spanish-AmericanWar would not have occurred had not the appearance of Hearst in New York journalism precipitated a bitterbattle for newspaper circulation."And Richard W. Leopold carried the argument one step further: "Popular indignationwas kept at a boiling an irresponsiblepress whose disgracefulpractices point by were not confinedto any one city."5 oftheAmerican 1965),799;Leland D. Baldwin,TheStream of People (NewYork, American (2nd ed., 2 vols.,New York,1957),II, 331;Harold U. Faulkner, History and Politics, (New York, 1900), 232. Similar views are Reform, Expansion,1890-1900 Leuchtenburg, The Growthof theAmericanRepublic (7th ed., 2 vols., 1980), II, 603. 251; and Unger, These UnitedStates, 50. Bemis, Diplomatic Historyof the UnitedStates, 445; James P. Warburg, The United Statesin a Changing World(New York, 1954), 196; Sears, Historyof AmericanForeignRelations, 439; Rhodes, McKinley and RooseveltAdministrations, 54-55; Joseph E. Wisan, The Cuban Crisis as Reflectedin the New York Press (1895-1898)(New York, 1934), 458; Leopold, GrowthofAmericanForeign Policy, 638. History,

and WilliamE. expressedin Samuel Eliot Morison,Henry Steele Commager,

176.For a similaraccount, Henretta, and Ware,America's see Brownlee, Brody,

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The destruction the Maine is also portrayedas an inciof dent exploited by expansionistpoliticiansto mobilize public opinion in behalf of a policy territorialaggrandizement.It was not an aroused public that pressured unwilling politicians into war but, on the contrary, unscrupulous politicians who manipulatedthe unsuspecting public intowar.The Maine simply played into the hands of expansionist elements in wrote "Our government," Congress and the administration. Horace Edgar Flack, "had practicallydecided on war...the Maine question was considered the best thingto arouse popular enthusiasm." "The shockingdisasterwas a strokeof good for fortune America'sinterventionists," insistedWalterKarp. characterized DeL6me letterand theMaine Ruhl Bartlett the as the "fortunatecircumstancesand events" that increased "the influenceof those who wanted war withSpain forimperialisticreasons."He continued: "thereexisted a small, influential group of politicians with imperialisticambitionswho seized an opportunitythey partly created to furthertheir designs. D. A. Graber described the Maine as one of the incidents "used by the yellow press and by expansionistAmericans such as Senator [Henry Cabot] Lodge and Assistant Secretaryof the Navy Theodore Roosevelt to inflamepublic opinion." William Appleman Williams similarlyargued that the Maine incident "significantly increased the tension and did encourage those, like Roosevelt, who had been hoping and working ardently to bring about our interferencein Cuba." "Pro-annexationists the Administration," in Philip S. Foner suggested, "could not let such an opportunitypass withouttakingas much advantage of it as possible."51 This interpretation also requires a substantially different assessment of McKinley. No longer is he characterizedas weak and ineffectual, buffeted forceshe neithercontrols by nor comprehends. On the contrary, this new incarnation in the expansionistemergesas calculatingand clever, McKinley
51. Flack, Spanish-American 45; DiplomaticRelations, Walter Karp, The Politicsof War: The Storyof Two Wars WhichAlteredForever the PoliticalLife of the American Republic (1890-1920)(New York, 1979), 88; Bartlett, Policy and Power, 126; Graber, CrisisDiplomacy,78; Williams, Americansin a Changing World,42; and the Birth of American Philip S. Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-American-War

(2 Imperialism vols.,New York,1972),I, 239.

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steadfastlypursuing clear policy objectives, and skillfully eventto embarkupon an expansionist exploitinga fortuitous war. With the naval court report completed, Karp writes, were over." It was only now necesMcKinley's "difficulties to "bring diplomacy with Spain to a crisis-never very sary in difficult dealing witha fifth-rate power."Karp concludes: "Had McKinley been seekinga peacefulsolution,the Spanish concessions certainly provided the basis for one. Instead, release ofthe McKinley rejectedthe offer....Withthe official Maine reporton March 28, he now had overwhelming popular supportforarmed intervention."52 To the Maine is thus attributed one more causal function. The incident facilitatesthe ascendancy of expansionist elementsby providing the moral basis and quasilegal justification forwar.Whetheror not Spain was in factresponsiblefor the destruction the Maine was a question only of marginal of of importance.Indeed, the justification war was not related to a determinationof Spanish guilt. That the explodirectly sion occurred at all raised issues at least as large as the question of Spanish complicity,and offeredno less compelling grounds to undertake war as an appropriate response. The need to establish Spanish guilt was not necessary,even if possible-and particularlybecause it was not. It was enough to hold Spain responsiblefortolerating conditionsthatled to the loss of American lives and property,therebyjustifying the expulsion by arms of an unsettlingSpanish presence so in near to the United States.The "conditionof affairs Cuba was a constant menace to our people," argued MarrionWilcox. He continued: The destruction theMaine,by whatever of exterior cause,was a in patentand impressive proofofa stateofthings Cuba thatwas intolerable. That conditionwas thusshownto be such thatthe could not assure safety and security a to Spanish Government vessel of the Americannavy in the harbourof Havana on a missionofpeace and rightfully there.53 "The feelingin the United States,"wroteJamesM. Callahan,
52. Karp, The Politicsof War 91-92. 53. Marrion Wilcox, A Short History of the War withSpain (New York,

1898),73.

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"was strongthatit was time to remove medievalismfromour frontdoors, so that our ships could safely enter Havana." Expelling Spain fromCuba hence "appeared to be a necessary act of duty forthe health of civilization."Callahan concluded: "If Cuba had been in other hands the Maine might have been safe,and the blood of Americancitizensmightnot have caused the foul watersof Havana to blush withshame." The destructionof the Maine, Willis F. Johnson similarly of argued,was "proofofthe worthlessness the Spanish administrationand was an additional reason forturningit out, bag and baggage." Robert L. Jonescontended thatthe "American governmenttook the position that Spain failed to exercise proper police supervision in the harbor and was therefore culpable," while Nelson Manfred Blake and Oscar Theodore "Even were carriedthe argumentone step further: Barck,Jr., never proved, many Americans argued Spanish complicity thatthe explosion had demonstratedSpain's inabilityto protect foreign lives and property.Did the United States not thereforehave an obligation to intervene on behalf of the civilized world?" "Most certainlySpain was blamed," wrote Charles S. Campbell, "not because she had ordered the deed, but because her crumbling authorityin Cuba had made it in possible. No nation had the rightto claim sovereignty an area where its controlhad disappeared, where disorder had become chronic, whereithad no chanceofregaining control."54 More than providing moral justification declare war, to the destruction the Maine is also creditedwithcreatingthe of political consensus to wage war. "The loss of the Maine,"
America's Relations vols., New York,1916),II, 251; RobertL. Jones, (2 Foreign
Historyof the Foreign Policy of the United States(New York, 1933), 322; Nelson Relations(New York, 1960), 386; Campbell, Transformation AmericanForeign of Rappaport, A HistoryofAmericanDiplomacy (New York, 1975), 194; Alexander 54. Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, 485; Willis Fletcher Johnson,

in ManfredBlake and Oscar Theodore Barck,Jr.,The United States Its World

257. A are Relations, Similararguments suggested JuliusW. Pratt, History by of United States N.Y. 1972),200; Armin (2nd ed., EnglewoodCliffs, Policy Foreign
313-314; Karp, The Politicsof War, and Campbell, GreatBritainand the United 88; See Alger, Spanish-American 4-5; Foraker, Notes ofa Busy Life,II, 19; Lodge, War, WarwithSpain, 32.

DeConde, A History Foreign of Policy(3rd ed., 2 vols., New York, 1978), I,

32. was in States, This line ofreasoning also adoptedbykeypublicofficials 1898.

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suggestedTrumbell White,"had focusedAmerican attention upon the Cuban situationas it had never been before,and... people began to realize as they had not before,the horrors "Prior to this," thatwere being enacted at theirthresholds." wrote David F. Trask, "the Cuban question had been but one of a number of public issues of interestto the American people; but after the Maine went down the fate of Cuba dominated the public consciousness."55 The destructionof the Maine thus is representedas having forged a popular consensus for war, thereby making political opposition to war untenable. Differencesbetween Republicans and Democrats,expansionistsand anti-imperialists, northernersand southerners,administrationfoes and friendsare set aside in the face of the national crisis. The resultwas the popular supportand partisanconsensusnecesof sary to make war a politically acceptable instrument for"Whatever results the sinking of the Maine eign policy. possibly brought about," John E. Weems argued, "it did beyond a doubt unifyAmericansforwar."Weems suggested that the incident "also served to unify,at least temporarily, the North and the South, whose Civil War differences were still apparent." No less important,he suggested,the Maine also had the net effect neutralizingopposition to war.After of March 28, "the voice of the pacifist was generallystilled.""An had become improbablewhen the ultimatepacificsettlement Americanworld was startledby the blowingup oftheMaine," wrote Elbert J.Benton. "It only required such an event as that in Havana harbor and the recriminations which grew out of it to fix the waveringconvictionsof both parties and render diplomacy impotent."'

IV
War Explanations ofthe originsofthe Spanish-American have persistedalmostunchanged since 1898.Causal generalizations firstformulatedat the turn of the centuryhave dis55. White, UnitedStatesin WarwithSpain, 37; Trask, WarwithSpain, 474. 56. Weems, Fate of the "Maine," 168; Benton, International Law and Diplo76. macyof theSpanish-American War,

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played remarkablelongevityand many continue to serve as the principal signposts of the historiography.The continuities have persisted across schools, fromthe Progressive of to historiography the 1920sand 1930s, liberalhistoriography in the 1950sand early 1960s,to the New Leftliterature the of late 1960s and 1970s. The functionattributedto the Maine and has, to be sure, been subjectto periodic reinterpretation of revision,out ofwhichhave evolved causal arguments some But larger explanations of the war have for the diversity. most part adhered to the larger argumentslong associated withthe Maine. That arguments drivenby theMaine have persistedforso and with such prominence, underscores some of the long, more enduring characteristicsof the historical literature. Historiographical advances have been conspicuously few, of largely as a result of reinterpretation what was already known rather than the introductionof new evidence. Conceptual formulationsof 1898 have remained substantially unchanged and unchallenged. Verificationhas relied often on contradictory and inconclusive evidence. Indeed, causal claims advanced for the Maine have been far easier to proThe importanceoftheMaine has pound than to demonstrate. been presumed self-evidentand self-explanatory, derived more from the historiographythan from historical events. Causal relationshipshave oftenbeen drawn by supposition, deduced by inference, and advanced by implication.On occasion, theyeven assumed the propertiesof metaphysicalmusings. Why does the Maine explode at thattime,at thatplace, G. J. A. O'Toole asks rhetorically: "The answerto such questions lies beyond the realm of chemistry, physics,or naval architecture. Each mustfindit withinhis own personal understandingofthe universe.However,thereseem to be but three answersto choose among: God, chance,or the impatient hand of destiny."57 The endurance of theMaine stemsin large measure from its capacity to support plausibly a number of different and often conflictingversions of 1898. The Maine incident has
57. G. J.A. O'Toole, The Spanish An War: American Epic,1898(New York, 1984),400.

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been the mainstayof a vast literature,invoked regularlyin a variety of forms,to discharge various historiographical in functions. ways Directlyand indirectly, several substantial and many lesser ones, the Maine has been at the center of virtually every explanation of the Spanish-AmericanWar since 1898.58 These factorsalone do not explain the enduring appeal of the Maine,however.That the Maine incidenthas persisted as the principal explanation of the Spanish-AmericanWar is in large measure related to larger underlying assumptions about 1898. The connection between the Maine and public opinion, for example, makes for an appealing causal construct several counts.It provides plausible explanation for on a war that otherwiseappears to lack both clear reason and compelling national purpose. A war thatotherwiseappears to many as senseless and irrational,described variously in the literature as "unfortunate,"59 "unnecessary,"60 "totally and for unnecessary,"61 "needless,"62 which"the United States had no just cause,"63is thus rendered comprehensible.The explanation for policy behavior that fails to conform to preconceivedand generallyimplicitnormsofpolitical rationalityis found in the recklessnessof the public. It was not the heads of statewho failed,or theirpolicies thatfell short,but the body politic thatwas derelict. Public opinion as a prime a moverin thisinstanceinvitesin itssubtext moral ofanother kind: a statement how mass politicsundercutsenlightened on policy choices. War "did not take place because of the failure
58. Among the exceptionsare JuliusW. Pratt,The Expansionists 1898 of (Baltimore, 1936); Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation Ameriof can Expansion,1860-1898(Ithaca, N.Y., 1963); and H. Wayne Morgan, America's Road to Empire: The War withSpain and OverseasExpansion (New York, 1965), detailed explanationsof the circumstances who, in otherwise leading to the attention thedestruction to of War,accordonlyperfunctory Spanish-American the Maine. 59. Kennan, AmericanDiplomacy,15. 60. Rhodes, McKinley and RooseveltAdministrations, 67. 61. Dulles, Prelude to WorldPower 180.

Henry Steele Commager, A ShortHistoryofthe UnitedStates(5th ed., New York, maticRelations,1, 41-82. 63. Bartlett,Policy and Power,125.

62. Leuchtenburg, "The NeedlessWarwithSpain,"32; Allan Nevinsand

is 1966),413. A similarargument advanced by Flack,Spanish-American Diplo-

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of American diplomacy," wrote John D. Hicks, George E. Mowry,and Robert E. Burke. "War came in spite of the complete success of American diplomacy,and primarilybecause the American people wanted war."The people "were determined to have theirwar...," assertedThomas A. Bailey,"and they got it." And Bailey elsewhere: "In 1898 the war-mad massesforcedthenationintoan unnecessary clash withSpain, in spiteofMcKinley,Mark Hanna, and Big Business." William E. Leuchtenburgsuggestedthatthe United States"stumbled headlong into...a war in which no vital American interest was involved, and withoutany concept of its consequences." He concluded: "The Americanpeople were not led into war; they got the war they wanted." George B. Tindall made a similarargument:"The ultimateblame forwar,ifblame must be levied, belongs to the American people forlettingthemselves be whipped into such a hostile frenzy."64 The role attributed the mass public as an explanation to of 1898, is itself derivativeofgenerallyimplicit notions further, about the nature of political democracy. The proposition works,typicallywithoutmuch need of verification, precisely because it is drawn inferentially from shared assumptions about democratic theory and implicitly corroboratesprevailing views about democraticpractice. Public opinion influenced public officials because it is supposed to. The normativelyderived influence of public opinion validates corroboratedprincipallyby the beliefsystemof which itself, it is a product. The proposition was stated explicitly by Thomas A. Bailey and David M. Kennedy:McKinley"believed in the democraticprinciple thatthe people should rule, and he hesitated denytheAmericanmasseswhattheydemanded to -even if it was not good forthem."65 These causal constructs suggest assumptionsof another kind. Indeed, theyreston a larger belief systemthatall but
7-8; Leuchtenburg, Historyof theAmericanPeople, 464; Bailey, Man in theStreet,

64. Hicks, Mowry, and Burke,American Nation, 278; Bailey,Diplomatic

in Diplomatic History of the United States,450; Tompkins, Anti-Imperialism the UnitedStates, Henretta, Brownlee, Brody, and Ware, AmericanHistory, 638. 92;

"The NeedlessWarwithSpain,"95; Tindall,America,Narrative a II, History, 877. For similarviews,see Bailey and Kennedy, American II, 603; Bemis, Pageant, 65. Bailey and Kennedy, American II, Pageant, 603.

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makes inadmissable the propositionof war by design. Political leaders are presumed innocent of willing war and, by implication, absolved of responsibility for war. That the Spanish-AmericanWar is presumed irrationaland political leaders are considered rationalservesto fixthe sourcesofthe war more in the realm of chance than thatof choice. The discussionoftheMaine,moreover, takesplace within in a larger conceptual framework which the meaning of the Spanish-AmericanWar itselfserves as the indirectobject of discourse. The limitationsof many explanations of the origins of the war are due in large part to a lack of a coherent and explicit account of the war. To a remarkabledegree, the historiographyof 1898 and specificallythe larger explanaof tionsofthe war are themselvesa function and fashionedby to constraints the causal role attributed theMaine. imposed by Indeed, the very constructof the Maine as cause serves to advance larger if unstatedassumptionsabout the war. That the Maine has enjoyed enduring historiographicalpreeminence underscoresthe conceptual appeal of treatingthe war as a functionof chance, and not choice. War with Spain is representedas the result of an "incident,"and aberration,a chance event--a random occurrencethatjust as easily could a not have happened. The Maine is thus refractory, convenient means throughwhich to create a usable past thatserves at once to reflect and reinforce generallyshared assumptions about the beneficienceof the American purpose. By implicatransformed tion,hence, the war is itself simplyinto the final chance element in a series of random events,one in which the United States was overtakenby events it could not control.A war thathappens also to serve as a means ofterritorial aggrandizementis an accident,and newly acquired colonial are territories portrayedas an incidental and wholly fortuitous outcome of this accident-not the product of policy calculations, and certainly not the continuation of political relations othermeans.There is no place forClausewitz here. by withtheMaine as the basis forexplanations Preoccupation of 1898 has exercised a decisive influence on the structure and substance of the literature.Historiographical advances have tended disproportionately favorthe development of to

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new and different explanationsof the waystheMaine precipitated the war.This preoccupationwiththe Maine,in fact,has and perhaps acted to discourage considerationof alternative, more fundamental,issues related to the war. The literature itselfhas acquired a distinctivetenor.There are exceptions, has long to be sure, but the traditionof the historiography tended to treatthe war witha mixtureof levityand derision. The "splendid littlewar" motifhas endured. And withsimi"It lar effect, has Theodore Roosevelt's characterization: so wasn't much of a war, but it was the best war we had."66 have long served as the principal Parody and belittlement literarymodes to characterizethe Spanish-AmericanWar: a with"comic opera over"remoteand picturesqueconflict";67 it "smacked of a Gilbert and Sullivan operetta";69 tones";68 "an exhilarating experience";70"it was all very thrilling";71 "a "a colorful war" and "glorious adventure";72 grand, disa "dazzling venture";74 shortand glori"a organized coup";73 ous war";75 "though short,[it] provided more than its quota of thrills";76 "in essence the Spanish-AmericanWar was a kind of giganticcoming-outparty."77 That the war is attributed such improbable and wholly to as the destructionof the Maine has in no fortuitous origins small way served to set the tone and determinethe function of the discourse. It has also tended to obscure related historical issues and obstructalternativehistoriographicalapproaches. The war has been portrayed as a conflictforced upon the nationby an accident,or by Spanish "medievalism," or by the aroused masses-and just as often,by all three.Or
66. In Hicks, Mowry, and Burke, AmericanNation,279. 67. Kennan, AmericanDiplomacy,22. 68. Smith, AmericanDiplomaticExperience, 210. 69. Leopold, Growth AmericanForeignPolicy,177. of 70. Ferrell, AmericanDiplomacy,382. 71. Dulles, Prelude to WorldPower,179. 72. Harry J. Carman, Harold C. Syrett,and Bernard W. Wishy,A History oftheAmericanPeople (3rd ed., 2 vols., New York, 1967), II, 294, 296. 73. Sidney Lens, The ForgingoftheAmericanEmpire(New York, 1971), 174. 74. Robert H. Wiebe, The Searchfor Order, 1877-1920 (New York, 1967), 241. 75. Louis M. Hacker and Benjamin B. Kendrick, The UnitedStatesSince 1865(4th ed., New York, 1949), 292. 76. Bailey, DiplomaticHistoryof theAmericanPeople, 468. 77. Bailey and Kennedy, AmericanPageant,II, 612.

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if the war is portrayedas undertakendeliberately,it is usually as a magnanimousgesturein behalfof Cuban independence. This certainlyis whatAmericansin 1898believed. That these views prevail nearly a hundred years later is nothing less than remarkable. The Maine incidentfitswell into a larger idealized view of a political universe. It lends itselfeasily to the service of validating normativedemocratictheory.It adds credence to commonlyshared values ofthe national mission.This indeed maybe a centralifunspokenelementofmuch ofthehistoriography and the larger ideological role of the Maine: a plausiof of ble denial oftheproposition waras an instrument policyin short,deliberate and by design, for the purpose of war, territorial expansion. In conjunctionwithother elementsin the historiography, the Maine provides the final operative element foran explanation of war thatis thus rendered as a mission of noble intentionsor, minimally,good intentions thwarted fate.War in 1898is portrayedas a selflessunderby takingto liberate an oppressed people frominiquitous colonial rule and only afterthe aberrantMaine incident.Ignoble means were used justifiablyto obtain a noble end, and only afterthe tragicaccident leftthe nation no otherchoice. Cuban historiography, the otherhand, as an example on of an alternativeapproach, has in the past thirty years come at these questions from an entirely different perspective. in Cuban scholarshipargues thatthe U.S. intervention 1898 was neither fortuitous nor well-intentioned, that it was the logical outgrowthof a policy with antecedentsearly in the nineteenth and whose objectivehad been consistently century the seizure ofthe island. In Cuban accountsthe Maine hardly of figuresat all, forwar is rendered as a function policy.78 By its presence--or its absence--the historiographical functionof the Maine raises larger issues. The Maine moved early into a central position in the historiographyof the Spanish-AmericanWar and neitherthe passage oftimenor a
Por su propio esfuerzo conquist6el pueblo cubano su independencia(Havana, 1957); Cuba no debe su independenciaa los Estados Unidos (3rd ed., Havana, 1960), and Los Estados Unidos contraCuba Libre (Havana, 1960). See also Ram6n de Armas, La revoluci6n pospuesta(Havana, 1975).

78. See, forexample,the threebooks by Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring,

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successionofschoolsofhistoricalinterpretation dislodged has the incidentfromthe centerof the explanations of 1898.It is not merelythatthe approaches to 1898have takenthe Maine for granted and as a given. Rather, it is the opposite. The Maine has served a vital corroboratingfunctionin all explanations thatadvance the propositionof "war as accident," and fromwhich the largerconceptual framework 1898has of been derived. Recent efforts replace the "accident" thesis to of 1898 with more coherent explanations have encountered resistance,and predictablyit is the Maine thatis invoked as "proof."First among the "failings"that James A. Field, Jr., attributedto recent historiographicaldevelopments is that the "approach is too rational."Field added: "Chance (or the a unexpected),whichplays so important part in the lifeofthe seems unacceptablein the lifeofthe nation: these individual, authors simply will not remember the Maine.""79 This, preis meant to end the debate. sumably, It may be thatthe usefulnessof the Maine as an explanation of the Spanish-American War has reached its limits,and indeed that arguments formulatedfirstat the turn of the centuryhave themselvesbecome obstaclesto a betterunderstandingof 1898.In many ways,the causal complex thathas developed around the Maine has itself acted to obstruct substantive and sustained historiographical advances. To move beyond this point may well require a new kind of historiographical epistemology. Certainly it will require a reconceptualizationof the Spanish-AmericanWar, one that reexamines the role of the Maine in 1898 no less than the functionof the Maine in the historiography 1898. In the of end the meaning assigned forthe Maine is itselfa function of the meaning attachedto the war.