Diagnosing the Needs for Change in the Aftermath

The loss of the space shuttle Columbia prompted an investigation to determine the factors that contributed to the accident. Essential to the investigation was collecting and analyzing data associated not only with the Columbia accident, but that of the 1987 loss of the space shuttle Challenger. Evidence from the investigation indicated that lessons learned from the Challenger were not necessarily applied to the shuttle program and may have been instrumental in the loss of the Columbia. It was determined that several factors outside of the technical and systemic systems were associated within the NASA organization and contributed to the loss of the shuttles. Addressed here are some of the factors that contributed to the tragedies. This analysis will be conducted using the Tushman-O’Reilly Congruence Model. An examination will be conducted using the building blocks of the model and the external forces that affected the performance and safety of NASA and contributed to the horrendous accidents of both previously mentioned space shuttles. Further, this paper will discuss the analysis of the data that was collected by the investigation board as it applied to the diagnosis for change. Lastly, this paper will assess the utility and relevance of the Tushman-O’Reilly Congruence Model as applied to this case. The analysis will be supported by the background information, the required readings and personal research.
The Facts: Hauntingly Similar While there were several differences between the two accidents, there were also organizational factors which were the same. The following chart indicates that there were uncanny similarities within the organizations at the time of the accidents. A review of the chart will indicate that some of the factors, such as communication and safety system, are aligned against more than one of the model’s consideration. This is due to the fact that these factors are required tasks that operate in systems that are affected by the

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