Dictatorship Democracy and Dev
Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development
Mancur Olson
STOR
®
The American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No.3 (Sep., 1993),567-576.
Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28199309%2987%3A3%3C567%3ADDAD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H The American Political Science Review is currently published by American Political Science Association.
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American Political Science Review
Vol. 87, No.3 September 1993
DICTATORSHIP, DEMOCRACY, AND DEVELOPMENT
MANCUR OLSON University of Maryland nder anarchy, uncoordinated competitive theft by "roving bandits" destroys the incentive to invest and produce, leaving little for either the population or the bandits. Both can be better off if a bandit sets himself up as a dictator--{l "stationary bandit" who monopolizes and rationalizes theft in the form of taxes. A secure autocrat has an encompassing interest in his domain that leads him to provide a peaceful order and other public goods that increase productivity. Whenever an autocrat expects a brief tenure, it pays him to confiscate those assets whose tax yield over his tenure is less than their total value. This
Mancur Olson
STOR
®
The American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No.3 (Sep., 1993),567-576.
Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28199309%2987%3A3%3C567%3ADDAD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H The American Political Science Review is currently published by American Political Science Association.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR ' s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://uk.jstor.org/aboutlterms.html. JSTOR 's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://uk.j stor .org/j ournals/apsa.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.
For more information on JSTOR contactjstor-info@umich.edu. ©2003 JSTOR
http://uk.j stor.org/ Fri Nov 14 11:11:51 2003
American Political Science Review
Vol. 87, No.3 September 1993
DICTATORSHIP, DEMOCRACY, AND DEVELOPMENT
MANCUR OLSON University of Maryland nder anarchy, uncoordinated competitive theft by "roving bandits" destroys the incentive to invest and produce, leaving little for either the population or the bandits. Both can be better off if a bandit sets himself up as a dictator--{l "stationary bandit" who monopolizes and rationalizes theft in the form of taxes. A secure autocrat has an encompassing interest in his domain that leads him to provide a peaceful order and other public goods that increase productivity. Whenever an autocrat expects a brief tenure, it pays him to confiscate those assets whose tax yield over his tenure is less than their total value. This
References: Olson, Mancur. 1993. "From Communism to a Market Democracy." Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector. Typescript. Sandler, Todd. 1992. Collective Action: Theory and Applications. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press September 1993