Did Desert Storm Represent a Revolution or Evolution in Air Power?
On the morning of 16 Jan 1991 images of precision strikes targeting Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime , brought the employment of airpower to the forefront of global consciousness . Concurrent with images of the attacks, the world’s media were broadcasting press briefings lauding the ‘revolutionary’ achievements of ‘surgical strikes’ conducted by F-117A Fighters; a capability that had only been publically acknowledged for the first time a year earlier .
The aim of this essay is to penetrate the superficial media-derived rhetoric, and seek to determine whether Op DESERT STORM represented an evolution or a revolution in the employment of air power. To achieve this it is necessary to examine air power across the entire spectrum of its employment – rather than just surveying the quantity of weapons and platforms employed . In order to provide a framework around which to construct the analytical argument, this paper will focus on three functional areas: A2 - Intelligence, A3 - Operations, and A5 – planning.
To ensure the analysis is conducted in a consistent doctrinal milieu, each functional area will be measured against extant UK doctrine. This approach provides a consistency of definition and aligns the discussion within contemporary narratives. However, before addressing the primary question, it is important to clearly define the key terms: ‘air power’, ‘revolution’ and ‘evolution’.
Air Power is characterised in AP3000 as: “the ability to project military force in the air or space by or from a platform or missile operating above the surface of the earth; air platforms are defined as any aircraft, helicopter or unmanned vehicle .
It has not been possible to determine a military definition of evolution or revolution from the NATO Joint Glossary or the UK’s terms, therefore the Oxford English Dictionary definition will be employed in that : “Evolution is the gradual development of something” which juxtaposes with revolution, which is defined as “a dramatic and
The aim of this essay is to penetrate the superficial media-derived rhetoric, and seek to determine whether Op DESERT STORM represented an evolution or a revolution in the employment of air power. To achieve this it is necessary to examine air power across the entire spectrum of its employment – rather than just surveying the quantity of weapons and platforms employed . In order to provide a framework around which to construct the analytical argument, this paper will focus on three functional areas: A2 - Intelligence, A3 - Operations, and A5 – planning.
To ensure the analysis is conducted in a consistent doctrinal milieu, each functional area will be measured against extant UK doctrine. This approach provides a consistency of definition and aligns the discussion within contemporary narratives. However, before addressing the primary question, it is important to clearly define the key terms: ‘air power’, ‘revolution’ and ‘evolution’.
Air Power is characterised in AP3000 as: “the ability to project military force in the air or space by or from a platform or missile operating above the surface of the earth; air platforms are defined as any aircraft, helicopter or unmanned vehicle .
It has not been possible to determine a military definition of evolution or revolution from the NATO Joint Glossary or the UK’s terms, therefore the Oxford English Dictionary definition will be employed in that : “Evolution is the gradual development of something” which juxtaposes with revolution, which is defined as “a dramatic and
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