Dieppe Raid
In their articles on the Dieppe Raid, both Peter Henshaw and Brian Villa go to extreme lengths to recount the events that led up to the raid and the facts of how the raid played out. In his article “Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid”, Villa provides a very accurate recount of the events of the raid. However Henshaw’s article “The Dieppe Raid: A Product of Misplaced Canadian Nationalism?” goes a step further to reveal the pre-raid planning process and the chain of events that unfolded prior to the raid even being initiated. It is my opinion that Henshaw’s article is a more persuasive commentary on the failures of the Dieppe Raid because it addresses the root of the problem and provides specific examples of where the planning process failed.
Brian Villa’s article, “Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid” is, a factual recount of the events of the raid as they occurred. Throughout the article the author points out very few successes and many failures in the plan and as the raid progressed. Villa writes that the seed was planted for a plan to raid Dieppe when they realized that a number of small raids would not “scarcely satisfy the Soviet Union and the War Cabinet”. To compound the mistake, the 2nd Canadian Division was employed to form the majority of the attacking force. The Commander of the 2nd Canadian Division, J.H. Roberts, had served as a regimental commander in France. Neither he nor the men under him had seen combat and lacked the experience necessary to conduct the raid. Villa goes on to discuss the role of the Combined Operation Headquarters (COHQ) and the fact that it did not have the forces or the commanders for large operations. The COHQ was only one of many planners organizing the raid thus the plan became a “prescription for disaster.” The Canadian Commander relied on the “British advisors at COHQ and Home Force, whereas they thoroughly imbued with the principle of a commander’s veto, assumed that if Roberts
Brian Villa’s article, “Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid” is, a factual recount of the events of the raid as they occurred. Throughout the article the author points out very few successes and many failures in the plan and as the raid progressed. Villa writes that the seed was planted for a plan to raid Dieppe when they realized that a number of small raids would not “scarcely satisfy the Soviet Union and the War Cabinet”. To compound the mistake, the 2nd Canadian Division was employed to form the majority of the attacking force. The Commander of the 2nd Canadian Division, J.H. Roberts, had served as a regimental commander in France. Neither he nor the men under him had seen combat and lacked the experience necessary to conduct the raid. Villa goes on to discuss the role of the Combined Operation Headquarters (COHQ) and the fact that it did not have the forces or the commanders for large operations. The COHQ was only one of many planners organizing the raid thus the plan became a “prescription for disaster.” The Canadian Commander relied on the “British advisors at COHQ and Home Force, whereas they thoroughly imbued with the principle of a commander’s veto, assumed that if Roberts