certain that the protected characteristic motivated what occurred. If an employer hires only male bartenders, or refuses to promote African-Americans to managerial positions then that is prima facie direct evidence of discrimination. An employee must present a prima facie case through circumstantial evidence if there is no direct evidence of discrimination. However, it is much more difficult to establish a prima facie case with only circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court has laid out a four-part test for the employee’s prima facie case. The first test is whether the employee is a member of a protected class, such as being an African-American, being a female, or being over the age of 40. The second test is whether the employee was qualified to receive the job benefit, such as a promotion or being hired for the position. The third test is if the employee was denied the job benefit, which could be a firing, not being hired, or not being promoted. The last test is whether the benefit remains available or was given to someone else who is not in the protected class. For example, if an African American employee claims he was not hired promoted because of his race he can pass this part of the test by showing he was rejected for the job, the employer continued his search, and the position was filled by a similarly qualified employee of a different race. If the employer states a legitimate reason for the decision, the employee must prove that it’s a pretext for discrimination. It does not mean there must be absolute proof of an illegitimate motive, but rather some type of evidence that calls the employer’s motive into question and allows the jury to conclude the decision was really motivated by discrimination. There are a few ways to do this. If an employer has a history of making racist remarks, and there is a witness that can testify to this, then that could undermine the employer’s stated reason for the action. If an employer shifts justifications at any time for its decision then this could also be enough to prove pretext. For example, an employee is told she is being fired for poor performance first, then at trial the employer shifts his/her claim and says it was because they needed to layoff employees. When trying to prove a disparate treatment case, it is vital to know the differences disparate impact and disparate treatment so one does not argue the same thing. Disparate impact refers to policies, practices, or rules that appear to be neutral but result in a disproportionate impact on protected groups. This means there was no motive for discrimination, but an employment practice caused it to occur. An example of disparate impact would be utilizing an employment test and getting results that eliminate African Americans from consideration disproportionately. It is important for courts to distinguish between the two because they are not interchangeable. E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263 1283 concluded that if you allow a plaintiff who alleged disparate treatment to assert a disparate impact claim it “would unwisely conflate the distinct theories of disparate impact and disparate treatment.” In a disparate treatment case the question is whether the protected trait motivated the employer’s decision not to hire. A disparate impact claim targets an employment practice that has an adverse impact on protected groups, but is not necessarily deliberate. E.E.O.C. v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, No. 14-13482 is another case where the separate theories of disparate impact and disparate treatment crossed over. In E.E.O.C.
v. CMS, the plantiff sued the defendant because the company’s race-neutral grooming policy discriminated against her hairstyle, dreadlocks. The claims asserted by the EEOC included that the grooming policy fails to acknowledge “the critical disadvantagee at which the dreadlock ban places black applicants” and “the people most adversely and significantly affected by the dreadlock ban are African-Americans”. It is important to keep in mind that hairstyles, even dreadlocks, are mutable characteristics. Immutable characteristics, such as race and gender, are protected by Title VII, but mutable characteristics are not. It is clear both claims assert disparate impact and not disparate treatment because the grooming policy was not a deliberate attack on any race, but rather it unintentionally targeted people with dreadlocks. The EEOC argued for disparate treatment, but it was not effective because they failed to provide a valid argument. In the Supreme Court case Ricci v. DeStefano, 18 firefighters, seventeen white and one hispanic, alleged that the city discriminated against them in violation of Title VII. The city administered a test and the eighteen firefighters passed it, which would have entitled them to managerial positions. However, the city threw out the results when they learned a disproportionate amount of African-Americans had not passed the test. The plaintiffs argued that the city had engaged in disparate treatment because the test results were thrown out due to skin color. The scores were not certified because of the results of a protected race. The city argued that the test results were not thrown out because of race, but to avoid a lawsuit from African-Americans. The Supreme Court sided with the plaintiffs because disparate treatment discrimination was evident. The city violated Title VII by disregarding the test results to the detriment of the white firefighters that received the highest scores, which subjected them to disparate treatment
discrimination (Rhoads and Sinon). This was a difficult case for employers because it holds that the mere threat of a disparate impact lawsuit is not sufficient enough to condone intentional reverse discrimination. For a disparate treatment claim, there must be plausible evidence that an employer intentionally discriminated. An employee may do this with a prima facie case using either direct or circumstantial evidence