the U.S. has other interests that require resources, it reacts to unfavorable and/or undesirable circumstances in a proportional manner.
The factors that explain the disparity between American capabilities and influence abroad are the limitations on displays of American power. The American public and current ideology of liberal internationalism restrain the U.S. government from committing to an aggressively authoritarian role in world affairs.
The role of the American public explains the disparity between American capabilities and influence abroad because the public worries more about domestic affairs than international affairs, thereby limiting the extent to which the U.S.
will commit resources to foreign wars and military presence. For example, after the Tet Offensive in 1968, public support of the war tanked. Therefore, in order to salvage public support and the offices of elected officials, Johnson and following presidents pulled back from the war. However, pulling back because of public opinion sent a message to the international community, a message that Middle Eastern states would later consider when testing the U.S. Later, Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator, suggested that the U.S. and American public could not handle losses and would not commit to long-term engagements in which large amounts military personnel are at risk. Although the U.S. had the largest military in the world, the message the American public sent to the international community was that the citizens of the U.S. did not want to use it. This message, among the many other mixed signals sent to Hussein by the U.S. government, would have had an impact on his decision to invade
Kuwait.
The current American ideology of liberal internationalism explains the disparity between American capabilities and influence abroad because this ideology is not compatible authoritarian displays of force. Moreover, the U.S. does not fully demonstrate its capabilities because, as a democracy, the U.S. is supposed to be peaceful. Therefore, when faced with a potential world power competitor, such as China, the U.S. hedges the ‘liberal bet’ in which the U.S. guides China towards interdependence and, hopefully, liberalization and democracy. Utilizing the U.S.’s homogony in military might to force China to stay weak would go against the ideals of liberal internationalism.
Since the end of the Cold War, this disparity between American capabilities and influence abroad has become more meaningful but no more or less important than before because this disparity will widen as other states push and test American power. The disparity is no more or less important because the U.S. still has the largest and most advanced military. But, on the other hand, as states see that the U.S. is not willing to commit troops and resources abroad, it is likely that states will not consider the U.S. as much as a threat as it is from a relative power standpoint. An example of this disparity becoming wider and more meaningful is Putin’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region. While the U.S. has a larger and better-equipped military than Russia, the U.S. did not react with the force it has at its disposal.