Does George Protect George's Interest In The Property?
Issue
The issue here was if Paul can evict George at will in any case. That is, does George retain an interest in the property? Does George retain a legal interest or an equitable interest? Or is George a licencee at best? It is clear-cut that George has no legal interest in the property as his name is not on the title deed since the house is registered in Rose and Paul’s joint names. Now that Rose has died, the title deed of the house vests solely in Paul’s name as the Right of Survivorship (‘Jus Accresendi’) applies. Since George does not retain a legal interest in the property, how do we determine if George retains an equitable interest in the property?
Rule/ Principle
When an occupier whose name does not appear on the title deed, that …show more content…
is appears ‘off the land register’, might have some interests in equity which is a concept of fairness, justice and good conscience, this is being referred to as an equitable interest. While the occupier may not hold a legal interest, this is where the law steps in to mitigate the harshness of the situation as on some instances, equitable ownership is enforceable by law.
Trust is a legal principle where the trustee would administer property on behalf of the owner for the beneficiary. This arrangement would prevent fraud and mismanagement of the properties.
Estoppel prevents parties from reneging on promise.
Licence is a mere permission to be on the land. Depending on the type of licence, in the event of an eviction, there may be monetary compensation. A ‘licence’ differs from an ‘interest’ in that it is not exactly a proprietary right to the property. There are various categories of licences which will be dealt with below.
Application
The question is if George holds an equitable interest on grounds of indirect contribution? On the facts, we are not told if George contributed to the purchase price of the house which is a direct contribution. However, we are told that Paul had used part of the proceeds of sale from George’s flat to redeem the mortgage on the house, which is an indirect contribution from George. On top of that, extension to the house has been built with proceeds of sale from his flat too. Although we are told that this is for George’s occupation, but this is within the compound of the property which means that he has contributed indirectly as well as it would increase the value of the property with the extension, ultimately to the advantage of Paul since he’s now the sole legal owner.
This is with reference to Williams & Glyn’s Bank v Boland [1981], where Mr Boland was the sole legal owner and Mrs Boland had made substantial contributions, both directly and indirectly, to the purchase price and mortgage payments of the house, thus she retains an equitable interest. When the property was seized by Williams & Glyn’s Bank, Mrs Boland successfully claimed an overriding interest.
In the case of Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1989], where Mr Rosset arranged for an overdraft facility with the bank, but later commences proceedings for possession when Mr Rosset exceeded the overdraft limit. However, Mrs Rosset successfully claimed for an overriding interest by claiming to be entitled to a beneficial interest due to her indirect contributions which include carrying out supervision of the work, the planning of the renovation works and contributing a substantial amount to the farm house’s redecoration.
With references to above two cases, George has also contributed indirectly to the property by means of mortgage redemption and paying for the extension building, thus he should hold an equitable interest in the property.
In the case of Birmingham Midshires Mortgage Services v Sabherwal [2000], although the mother’s interest was overreached, she was deemed to have an equitable interest in the house when the mortgagee sought possession of the house, overlooking how much she contributed.
Another question which we may ask is could Paul be holding the property on trust for George? If Paul is holding the property on trust for George, then Paul would be both the owner as well as a trustee. There may be a scenario whereby this trust is being arranged by Rose in case of her demise. However, the facts are silent as to whether or not there is a trust arrangement.
This is with reference to Eves v Eves [1975], where the plaintiff was in a relationship with the defendant and they purchased a house, registered solely in the defendant’s name, telling the plaintiff that it is because her age is too young to have her name on the legal deed. Both their names would be on the legal deed if not for her age. Although the plaintiff did not contribute directly to the purchase price of the house, she has carried out substantial work on it such as the redecoration of the place, breaking up the concrete and preparing the lawn for turfing, demolishing and building of a shed. With her physical labour as an indirect contribution, she was entitled to a quarter of the beneficial interest, under a constructive trust.
Similarly, in the case of Grant v Edwards [1986], the defendant had purchased a house, registered in his and his brother’s name. The defendant had told the plaintiff who was then pregnant with his child that her name is not on the title deed as it may affect her divorce. Although the plaintiff did not contribute directly to the purchase price of the house, she however did make substantial contributions to the housekeeping which allows the defendant to meet the mortgage instalments. This should be looked upon as an indirect contribution. As there was a common intention that she was to have a share in the property if not for her divorce, it was held that she was entitled to half of the beneficial interest as she had make substantial contributions to the household expenses which she would not have done so unless she believed that she would have an interest in the house.
The concept of estoppel according to Lord Kingsdown in his judgement in Ramsden v Dyson [1866] is promise, reliance, detriment and unconscionability.
On the facts, we are not given if Paul had made any representation to George. If Paul had made any statements similar to ‘this is mine as much as it is yours’, then Paul would be liable for this representation and therefore, the court would rule that he cannot evict George at will as there is a promise made to George, George relied on it, and when Paul had gone back to his words, George had suffered a loss as a result of this. The court would rule that this was unfair to George.
In the case of Ramsden v Dyson [1866], the defendant had granted the plaintiff a yearly tenancy. The defendant then proceeds to erect buildings on the land, spending a substantial amount on it. The defendant then gave notice to the plaintiff to cease the tenancy. The plaintiff had relied on the defendant’s agent’s assurances that he would be entitled to the possession of the land for as long as he paid his rent and that he could call on the defendant for the grant of a formal 60 year tenancy after that, and there is a right to renew the tenancy. Thus, he sought equitable relief on the basis that he had relied on the assurances that were given to him. Lord Kingsdown ruled that he would have given some relief and mentioned compensation for the expenditure spent on erecting the buildings on the land or an interest in the …show more content…
land.
Another case that is worth the discussion is Errington v Wood [1951]. Mr Errington had bought a house for his son and his daughter in law, paying a part of for them and the remaining amount with mortgage. The house was registered in Mr Errington’s name. There was a promise made by Mr Errington to them that for as long as they pay the mortgage, they are allowed to reside in the house, and after they have finished paying the mortgage installments, the house would be under their names. Mr Errington passed away and his son went on to move in with his mother, Mrs Errington. The wife refused to but continued to pay the mortgage installments instead and live in the house Mr Errington bought for them as a wedding gift. Mrs Errington sought possession of the house from her however; her claim was dismissed by the judge. The court held that the wife was entitled to remain in the house and pay off the mortgage payment as per the agreement between the father and them as it is binding. It would only cease to bind if the wife left it unperformed and uncompleted.
Contractual licence arises when there is an offer, acceptance, consideration and an intention to create legal relations.
In the case of Tanner v Tanner [1975], the defendant and the plaintiff had children and agreed that a house should be purchased for the defendant and their children. The plaintiff had later asked the defendant to leave the house and sued for possession. The defendant was awarded damages, as it was ruled that in all the circumstances, the licence was a contractual one, lasting until the children were of school-leaving age as the defendant gave up her rent controlled accommodation in return for a better home for the children.
A licence coupled with an interest is one that arises by means of a right held in land, an example would be mortgage. However, it does not appear to be so on the
facts.
Bare licence refers to permission given to a person to enter another's property for that person's benefit and it is not applicable on the facts.
Conclusion
The courts would, arguably, not allow Paul to evict George at will. However, the courts will ultimately arrive at a decision in the best interests of both parties in line with the ‘clean break’ principle. The ‘clean break’ principle is being defined by Lady Baroness that when a relations between two parties end, they should settle their affairs in such a way that it comes to an end too. Thus, the property might be sold and the proceeds of sale will be divided between George and Paul. However, the degree of shareholding from the proceeds of sale shall be at the ultimate discretion of the courts as in the case of Stack v Dowden [2007], where Ms Dowden and Mr Stack were co-habitees for almost 18 years and had four chidlren together. They purchased a house registered in their joint names, but no declaration was made regarding the degree of shareholding of the property. In such cases, it is assumed that both of them would hold equal shareholding. However, Ms Dowden had paid for the property by selling a house that was in her sole name, using her savings and a joint loan, which equate to her paying for 65% of the purchase price of the property. Both of them holds separate bank accounts and had separate investments. After the parties had separated, Mr Stack sought a declaration that the house was held upon trust by the couple as tenants in common and brought an action for its sale, distributing the proceeds from sale equally between them. The High Court declared that both of them owned the property in equal shares which Ms Dowden appealed. Lady Baroness had said that there cannot be many unmarried couples who have lived together for as long as both of them, who have had four children together, and whose affairs have been kept as rigidly separate as this couple's affairs were kept. This is an indication that they did not intend their shares, even in the property which was put into both of their names, to be equal. And, the Court of Appeal ordered that the net proceeds be divided 65 per cent to her and 35 per cent to Mr Stack.
The issue here was if Paul can evict George at will in any case. That is, does George retain an interest in the property? Does George retain a legal interest or an equitable interest? Or is George a licencee at best? It is clear-cut that George has no legal interest in the property as his name is not on the title deed since the house is registered in Rose and Paul’s joint names. Now that Rose has died, the title deed of the house vests solely in Paul’s name as the Right of Survivorship (‘Jus Accresendi’) applies. Since George does not retain a legal interest in the property, how do we determine if George retains an equitable interest in the property?
Rule/ Principle
When an occupier whose name does not appear on the title deed, that …show more content…
is appears ‘off the land register’, might have some interests in equity which is a concept of fairness, justice and good conscience, this is being referred to as an equitable interest. While the occupier may not hold a legal interest, this is where the law steps in to mitigate the harshness of the situation as on some instances, equitable ownership is enforceable by law.
Trust is a legal principle where the trustee would administer property on behalf of the owner for the beneficiary. This arrangement would prevent fraud and mismanagement of the properties.
Estoppel prevents parties from reneging on promise.
Licence is a mere permission to be on the land. Depending on the type of licence, in the event of an eviction, there may be monetary compensation. A ‘licence’ differs from an ‘interest’ in that it is not exactly a proprietary right to the property. There are various categories of licences which will be dealt with below.
Application
The question is if George holds an equitable interest on grounds of indirect contribution? On the facts, we are not told if George contributed to the purchase price of the house which is a direct contribution. However, we are told that Paul had used part of the proceeds of sale from George’s flat to redeem the mortgage on the house, which is an indirect contribution from George. On top of that, extension to the house has been built with proceeds of sale from his flat too. Although we are told that this is for George’s occupation, but this is within the compound of the property which means that he has contributed indirectly as well as it would increase the value of the property with the extension, ultimately to the advantage of Paul since he’s now the sole legal owner.
This is with reference to Williams & Glyn’s Bank v Boland [1981], where Mr Boland was the sole legal owner and Mrs Boland had made substantial contributions, both directly and indirectly, to the purchase price and mortgage payments of the house, thus she retains an equitable interest. When the property was seized by Williams & Glyn’s Bank, Mrs Boland successfully claimed an overriding interest.
In the case of Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1989], where Mr Rosset arranged for an overdraft facility with the bank, but later commences proceedings for possession when Mr Rosset exceeded the overdraft limit. However, Mrs Rosset successfully claimed for an overriding interest by claiming to be entitled to a beneficial interest due to her indirect contributions which include carrying out supervision of the work, the planning of the renovation works and contributing a substantial amount to the farm house’s redecoration.
With references to above two cases, George has also contributed indirectly to the property by means of mortgage redemption and paying for the extension building, thus he should hold an equitable interest in the property.
In the case of Birmingham Midshires Mortgage Services v Sabherwal [2000], although the mother’s interest was overreached, she was deemed to have an equitable interest in the house when the mortgagee sought possession of the house, overlooking how much she contributed.
Another question which we may ask is could Paul be holding the property on trust for George? If Paul is holding the property on trust for George, then Paul would be both the owner as well as a trustee. There may be a scenario whereby this trust is being arranged by Rose in case of her demise. However, the facts are silent as to whether or not there is a trust arrangement.
This is with reference to Eves v Eves [1975], where the plaintiff was in a relationship with the defendant and they purchased a house, registered solely in the defendant’s name, telling the plaintiff that it is because her age is too young to have her name on the legal deed. Both their names would be on the legal deed if not for her age. Although the plaintiff did not contribute directly to the purchase price of the house, she has carried out substantial work on it such as the redecoration of the place, breaking up the concrete and preparing the lawn for turfing, demolishing and building of a shed. With her physical labour as an indirect contribution, she was entitled to a quarter of the beneficial interest, under a constructive trust.
Similarly, in the case of Grant v Edwards [1986], the defendant had purchased a house, registered in his and his brother’s name. The defendant had told the plaintiff who was then pregnant with his child that her name is not on the title deed as it may affect her divorce. Although the plaintiff did not contribute directly to the purchase price of the house, she however did make substantial contributions to the housekeeping which allows the defendant to meet the mortgage instalments. This should be looked upon as an indirect contribution. As there was a common intention that she was to have a share in the property if not for her divorce, it was held that she was entitled to half of the beneficial interest as she had make substantial contributions to the household expenses which she would not have done so unless she believed that she would have an interest in the house.
The concept of estoppel according to Lord Kingsdown in his judgement in Ramsden v Dyson [1866] is promise, reliance, detriment and unconscionability.
On the facts, we are not given if Paul had made any representation to George. If Paul had made any statements similar to ‘this is mine as much as it is yours’, then Paul would be liable for this representation and therefore, the court would rule that he cannot evict George at will as there is a promise made to George, George relied on it, and when Paul had gone back to his words, George had suffered a loss as a result of this. The court would rule that this was unfair to George.
In the case of Ramsden v Dyson [1866], the defendant had granted the plaintiff a yearly tenancy. The defendant then proceeds to erect buildings on the land, spending a substantial amount on it. The defendant then gave notice to the plaintiff to cease the tenancy. The plaintiff had relied on the defendant’s agent’s assurances that he would be entitled to the possession of the land for as long as he paid his rent and that he could call on the defendant for the grant of a formal 60 year tenancy after that, and there is a right to renew the tenancy. Thus, he sought equitable relief on the basis that he had relied on the assurances that were given to him. Lord Kingsdown ruled that he would have given some relief and mentioned compensation for the expenditure spent on erecting the buildings on the land or an interest in the …show more content…
land.
Another case that is worth the discussion is Errington v Wood [1951]. Mr Errington had bought a house for his son and his daughter in law, paying a part of for them and the remaining amount with mortgage. The house was registered in Mr Errington’s name. There was a promise made by Mr Errington to them that for as long as they pay the mortgage, they are allowed to reside in the house, and after they have finished paying the mortgage installments, the house would be under their names. Mr Errington passed away and his son went on to move in with his mother, Mrs Errington. The wife refused to but continued to pay the mortgage installments instead and live in the house Mr Errington bought for them as a wedding gift. Mrs Errington sought possession of the house from her however; her claim was dismissed by the judge. The court held that the wife was entitled to remain in the house and pay off the mortgage payment as per the agreement between the father and them as it is binding. It would only cease to bind if the wife left it unperformed and uncompleted.
Contractual licence arises when there is an offer, acceptance, consideration and an intention to create legal relations.
In the case of Tanner v Tanner [1975], the defendant and the plaintiff had children and agreed that a house should be purchased for the defendant and their children. The plaintiff had later asked the defendant to leave the house and sued for possession. The defendant was awarded damages, as it was ruled that in all the circumstances, the licence was a contractual one, lasting until the children were of school-leaving age as the defendant gave up her rent controlled accommodation in return for a better home for the children.
A licence coupled with an interest is one that arises by means of a right held in land, an example would be mortgage. However, it does not appear to be so on the
facts.
Bare licence refers to permission given to a person to enter another's property for that person's benefit and it is not applicable on the facts.
Conclusion
The courts would, arguably, not allow Paul to evict George at will. However, the courts will ultimately arrive at a decision in the best interests of both parties in line with the ‘clean break’ principle. The ‘clean break’ principle is being defined by Lady Baroness that when a relations between two parties end, they should settle their affairs in such a way that it comes to an end too. Thus, the property might be sold and the proceeds of sale will be divided between George and Paul. However, the degree of shareholding from the proceeds of sale shall be at the ultimate discretion of the courts as in the case of Stack v Dowden [2007], where Ms Dowden and Mr Stack were co-habitees for almost 18 years and had four chidlren together. They purchased a house registered in their joint names, but no declaration was made regarding the degree of shareholding of the property. In such cases, it is assumed that both of them would hold equal shareholding. However, Ms Dowden had paid for the property by selling a house that was in her sole name, using her savings and a joint loan, which equate to her paying for 65% of the purchase price of the property. Both of them holds separate bank accounts and had separate investments. After the parties had separated, Mr Stack sought a declaration that the house was held upon trust by the couple as tenants in common and brought an action for its sale, distributing the proceeds from sale equally between them. The High Court declared that both of them owned the property in equal shares which Ms Dowden appealed. Lady Baroness had said that there cannot be many unmarried couples who have lived together for as long as both of them, who have had four children together, and whose affairs have been kept as rigidly separate as this couple's affairs were kept. This is an indication that they did not intend their shares, even in the property which was put into both of their names, to be equal. And, the Court of Appeal ordered that the net proceeds be divided 65 per cent to her and 35 per cent to Mr Stack.