Drones And The Boundaries Of The Battlefield Summary

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Drones and the Boundaries of the
Battlefield
MICHAEL W. LEWIS
SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 294
I.

DRONE USE IN A COMBAT ENVIRONMENT ...................................................... 296
A. Capabilities................................................................................................... 296
B. Limitations ................................................................................................... 298
C. Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield ........................................... 299

II.

COMPETING VIEWS OF THE SCOPE OF IHL ......................................................
301
A. Strict Geographical Limitations: Internal Non-International Armed
Conflicts ....................................................................................................... 301
B. Traditional Boundaries of the Battlefield: International Armed
Conflicts ....................................................................................................... 302
C. Neutrality Law: The Graf Spee Incident .................................................. 304
D. Transnational Armed Conflicts .................................................................. 306

III.

HOW THE LEGALITY OF DRONE STRIKES IN TRANSNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICTS RELATES TO THE CORE PRINCIPLES OF IHL ............................... 308
A. Legal Challenges to Drone Strikes in Transnational Armed Conflicts .. 308
B. Core Principles of IHL ............................................................................... 309
C. Applying Strict Geographical Limits on the Scope of IHL to
Transnational Armed Conflicts Rewards Groups like Al-Qaeda ........... 312

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 314

 Associate Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law. I would like to thank the members of the Texas International Law Journal for creating an excellent Symposium to discuss the Air and Missile Warfare Manual and all of the participants at the symposium for their comments and suggestions concerning this essay. In discussing the capabilities, limitations, and near-term uses of drones,
I draw upon my experience flying F-14s for the U.S. Navy from 1989 to 1993.

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INTRODUCTION
The military use of drones or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and
Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs)1 in combat operations is one of the more legally controversial issues confronting international humanitarian law (IHL)2 as we move into the second decade of the twenty-first century. The legality of drones has been questioned for a variety of reasons, some more grounded in fact than others, but in spite of these criticisms there is little question that the use of drones in surveillance and combat roles is on the rise. The next decade will undoubtedly see their continued use by an increasingly large number of nations, particularly in counterinsurgency operations. The panel of experts that created the Manual on
International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (AMW Manual) recognized this emerging technology and ensured that the Manual addressed the laws applicable to such aircraft. Unfortunately, the most prominent legal issues confronting the use of drones are somewhat beyond the Manual’s scope.
The AMW Manual generally treats drones in the same way as manned aircraft.
It equates UCAVs with other military aircraft for the purposes of conducting attacks3 and requires that the same level of precautions be taken before initiating an attack with UCAVs as would be required when employing manned aircraft.4 It also states that civilians controlling drones are directly participating in hostilities, giving them the same status that civilians would have if they were to fly a military aircraft.5 This legal equivalence between manned and unmanned aircraft is broadly accepted by commentators.6 In spite of the Terminator-like creepiness associated with machines

1. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY & CONFLICT RESEARCH, MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR & MISSILE WARFARE r. 1(dd)-(ee), 6 (2009) [hereinafter AMW MANUAL]
(differentiating between UAVs and UCAVs on the basis of whether the vehicle can carry or control a weapon). 2. International Humanitarian Law is the term given to the body of law that governs armed conflicts.
It is also referred to as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and encompasses the Geneva and Hague
Conventions, the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, and the customary law that has developed around these treaties.
3. AMW MANUAL, supra note 1, r. 17(a).
4.
Id. r. 39.
5. Id. r. 29(vi).
6. See, e.g., Rise of the Drones II: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. & Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong.
32 (2010) [hereinafter Drones II] (prepared statement of David W. Glazier, Professor of Law, Loyola Law
School L.A.), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2010_hr/drones2.pdf (warning that “CIA personnel are civilians, not combatants, and do not enjoy any legal right to participate in hostilities”); Rise of the Drones II, supra at 20 (prepared statement of Mary Ellen O’Connell, Robert and Marion Short
Chair in Law, Univ. of Notre Dame) (arguing that unmanned drones are “battlefield weapons,” and as such should not be used outside of “combat zones”); Rise of the Drones II, supra at 44–46 (prepared statement of William C. Banks) (describing how legal authority for use of drones in targeting can be found in existing law governing armed conflict but urging modernization of policy and law); Rise of the Drones
II, supra (statement of Michael W. Lewis, Professor of Law Ohio N. Univ. Pettit College of Law), available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/pdfs/LewisDrones.doc (“In
circumstances where a strike by a helicopter or an F-16 would be legal, the use of a drone would be equally legitimate.”);
Rise of the Drones: Unmanned Systems and the Future of War: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec.
& Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 3 (2010) [hereinafter
Drones] (written testimony of Kenneth Anderson, Professor of Law, Washington College of Law Am.
Univ. and Member, Hoover Task Force on Nat’l Sec. & Law), available at http://oversight.house.gov/ images/stories/Hearings/pdfs/20100323Anderson.pdf (noting that “use of drones . . . on traditional battlefields . . . . is functionally identical to the use of missile fired from a standoff fighter plane”).

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seemingly7 making war on human beings, there is nothing legally unique about using unmanned drones as a weapons delivery platform that requires the creation of new or different laws to regulate their use. As with any other attack launched against enemy forces during an armed conflict, attacks launched from UCAVs are governed by IHL and must meet its requirements of military necessity and proportionality if those attacks are to be considered legal. But it is not this view that manned and unmanned aircraft are legally equivalent that is being challenged.
While drones have been criticized for causing a disproportionate number of civilian casualties8 or for merely sending the wrong message about American power,9 the most serious legal challenges to the use of drones in the modern combat environment involve questions of where such unmanned aircraft may be legally employed.10 It is contended that drone strikes in places like Yemen and Pakistan violate international law because there is currently no armed conflict occurring in these nations.11 Although theoretically the limitations imposed by this view of the boundaries of the battlefield are not specifically directed at the use of drones and

7. In actuality, of course, UCAVs are under human, albeit remote, control. During his presentation at the Symposium, Professor Anderson discussed the more disturbing idea that someday UCAVs may be disconnected from their human remote controllers, allowing them to make independent targeting determinations based upon pre-programmed decision trees for launch/no launch decisions. Kenneth
Anderson, Remarks at the Texas International Law Journal Symposium: The 2009 Air and Missile
Warfare Manual: A Critical Analysis (Feb. 11, 2011). Should such technology become a reality, the legal equivalence between manned and unmanned aircraft would be at an end and a new group of provisions specifically applicable to unmanned aircraft would become necessary.
8. See, e.g., Murray Wardrop, Unmanned Drones Could Be Banned, Says Senior Judge, THE
TELEGRAPH (July 6, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/5755446/Unmanned-dronescould-be-banned-says-senior-judge.html (quoting Lord Bingham, a former Law Lord, who cited civilian casualties as a possible justification for banning the use of armed drones); Kenneth Anderson, Am I
Arguing a Strawman About Drones and Civilian Casualties?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 27, 2011, 9:51
AM),
http://volokh.com/2011/04/27/am-i-arguing-a-strawman-about-drones-and-civilian-casualties
(arguing that the recent acknowledgement by many human rights advocates of the superior target discrimination of drones does not alter the fact that many of the early criticisms of drones were related to excessive civilian casualties). The author’s experiences at a variety of events in which the legality of drones was discussed were similar to that of Professor Anderson in that, until recently, many—if not most—of the criticisms of drones were based upon civilian casualties.
9. David Ignatius, Drone Attacks in Libya: A Mistake, WASH. POST: POST PARTISAN (Apr. 21, 2011,
4:52 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/post/drone-attacks-in-libya-a-mistake/2011/
03/04/AFtZrRKE_blog.html.
10. See, e.g., Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2010) (describing the plaintiff’s contention that because Anwar al-Aulaqi was located in Yemen he was “outside the context of armed conflict”); see also Mary Ellen O’Connell, Combatants and the Combat Zone, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 845,
860–64 (2009) (describing a geographically limited zone of combat in which IHL applies); Civil Liberties and National Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 103–04 (2010) (testimony of Mary Ellen O’Connell,
Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_101209
.html (stating that drone strikes in Pakistan are illegal under international law because they are occurring outside the zone of combat); Human Rights Watch, Letter from Kenneth Roth, Exec. Dir., Human Rights
Watch, to President Barack Obama (Dec. 7, 2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/12/07/ letter-obama-targeted-killings [hereinafter HRW letter] (urging the Obama Administration to reject the concept of a “global battlefield”); Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
Addendum, Study on Targeted Killings, para. 86, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip
Alston) [hereinafter Alston Report] (stating that there “are very few situations” where the legal standards for use of drones could be met when a state deployed them “[o]utside its own territory (or in territory over which it lacked control) and where the situation on the ground did not rise to the level of armed conflict”).
11. Id.

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apply with equal force to any use of the tools of armed conflict, from a practical standpoint the view that the boundaries of the battlefield are strictly defined by geopolitical lines has a particularly significant impact on the use of drones.
This Article briefly discusses drone use in the combat environment and explains why the debate about the boundaries of the battlefield is of particular importance to the employment and development of drones. It will then describe the geographically limited scope of IHL proposed by commentators critical of drone use in areas like
Pakistan and Yemen. This view of the boundaries of the battlefield will be compared with the historical understanding of where the laws of armed conflict apply in international armed conflicts and the role that geography has traditionally played in restricting IHL’s scope. It concludes by arguing that the more traditional view of
IHL’s scope of application should apply with even more force to transnational armed conflicts because any other interpretation threatens to undermine the basic theoretical underpinnings upon which IHL is constructed.

I.

DRONE USE IN A COMBAT ENVIRONMENT12

A. Capabilities
The driving force behind the western militaries’ development of drone technology was to minimize the number of human lives placed at risk to collect intelligence and to deliver small amounts of ordnance with some degree of precision.
However, it is the relatively low cost of drones compared to that of modern combat aircraft that will drive the proliferation of drones over the next decade. More basic drones cost less than 1/20th as much as the latest combat aircraft and even the more advanced drones that feature jet propulsion and employ some stealth technology are less than 1/10th the cost.13 With defense budgets around the world under increasing pressure, drones will be seen as an attractive alternative to manned aircraft for certain types of missions.
However, the value of drones cannot be measured solely in lives and dollars saved. Operationally, drones provide a couple of significant advantages over manned aircraft that make them particularly valuable in certain types of modern armed conflicts. Their biggest advantage is their very long endurance: over thirty

12. Some of the following analysis is based upon the author’s experience in naval aviation from 1989 to 1993.
13. Predator drones cost approximately $5 million per aircraft. Factsheets: MQ-1B Predator, U.S.
AIR FORCE (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=122. Reaper drones, the armed version of the Predator, cost approximately $10–15 million per aircraft. Factsheets:
MQ-9 Reaper, U.S. AIR FORCE (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet. asp?id=6405. The Avenger, a more advanced drone with jet propulsion and some limited stealth technology, is projected to cost $13–17 million per aircraft. See W.J. Hennigan, Air Force Buys an
Avenger, Its Biggest and Fastest Armed Drone, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2011), http://articles. latimes.com/2011/dec/31/business/la-fi-stealth-drone-20111231 (discussing the advantages of the Avenger compared to earlier drones and noting the $15 million purchase price). In contrast, the cost of an F-22 has risen to nearly $412 million per aircraft and the continually rising cost estimates for the proposed F-35 now approach $150 million per aircraft. W.J. Hennigan, Sky-High Overruns, Safety Ills Plague Jet, L.A. TIMES,
(Aug. 7, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/07/business/la-fi-fighter-jets-grounded-20110807; Bob
Cox, Defense Department Says F-35 Fighter Program’s Costs to Significantly Rise, FORT WORTH STARTELEGRAM, Apr. 7, 2010, at C1. The B-2 stealth bomber costs over $1.2 billion per aircraft. Factsheets:
B-2 Spirit, U.S. AIR FORCE (Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=82.

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hours for the Predator B and twenty hours for the Predator C (Avenger).14 This gives drones more than ten times the endurance of unrefueled manned aircraft,15 enabling them to observe and track a target for many hours at a time before deciding whether to employ ordnance. For manned aircraft to achieve the same loiter time extensive airborne refueling support would be required.
To achieve the same unbroken surveillance of a potential target offered by a single drone, multiple manned aircraft would be needed to avoid losing track of the target when the aircraft left its station to refuel. This makes drones an ideal surveillance and striking weapon in counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations, where the targets are usually individuals rather than objects.16
Another operational advantage that drones provide is greater legal compliance with IHL’s requirements of military necessity and proportionality. Although many of the early criticisms of drones were directed at their allegedly indiscriminate nature, which purportedly resulted in disproportionate civilian casualties,17 the reality of drone strikes is that they provide many more opportunities for disproportionate attacks to be halted prior to weapons employment. For manned aircraft both the target identification and the final proportionality decision are left in the hands of one or two crewmembers whose attention is divided between flying the aircraft, looking for (and possibly evading) surface-to-air missiles and ground fire, identifying the target, assessing the proportionality of the attack, and accurately delivering
the weapon.18 In contrast, the longer loiter time of drones allows for a much higher level of confidence that the target has been properly identified, thereby meeting the

14. Predator B UAS, GENERAL ATOMICS AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS INC., http://www.ga-asi.com/ products/aircraft/predator_b.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2012); Predator C Avenger UAS, GENERAL
ATOMICS AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS INC., http://www.ga-asi.com/products/aircraft/predator_c.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2012).
15. See, e.g., The F-16 Fighting Falcon, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/programs/ ssp/man/uswpns/air/fighter/f16.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2012) (observing that the F-16’s average combat endurance is only two hours and ten minutes); see also F/A-18 Hornet, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/uswpns/air/fighter/f18.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2012) (observing that even the most modern variant of the F-18 can only stay airborne for two hours and fifteen minutes before requiring refueling).
16. In more traditional inter-state wars many airstrikes are directed at fixed targets such as communications links (headquarters buildings, microwave relays, radio transmitters), transportation infrastructure (bridges, road or rail networks), combat support facilities (ammunition dumps, fuel depots, munitions factories), or air defense systems (radars, surface-to-air missile sites, airfields). Other attacks may be directed at mobile targets (concentrations of troops, aircraft, artillery, or armor) but they seldom involve the individualized targeting that underlies most of the strikes being conducted in the current conflict with al-Qaeda.
17. See Anderson, supra note 8 (noting that many of the early reports of high civilian casualties were a result of the uncritical assessment of casualty figures provided by the Taliban or local Pakistani media); see also Farhat Taj, Drone Attacks: Challenging Some Fabrications, DAILY TIMES (Jan. 2, 2010), http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C01%5C02%5Cstory_2-1-2010_pg3_5 (proposing that the U.S. and Pakistani media do not accurately report civilian casualties caused by drone strikes); C.
Christine Fair, Drones Over Pakistan—Menace or Best Viable Option?, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 2, 2010,
9:56
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/c-christine-fair/drones-over-pakistan----m_b_666721.html (arguing that reports by U.S. and Pakistani media exaggerate civilian casualties caused by drones).
18. The multitasking that goes on in the cockpit at the moment of weapons delivery can perhaps best be understood by analogizing the divided attention of the aircrew to that of a driver who is texting while driving. The human instinct for self-preservation being what it is, this divided attention problem becomes all the more pronounced when the aircrew is flying in an environment where ground fire and surface-to-air missile fire are occurring or anticipated.

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military necessity requirement. Even more critically, the drone’s sensors allow many sets of eyes, including those of JAG lawyers trained to assess proportionality, to make a proportionality determination at the time of weapons release. Even if the drone is evading fire at the time of weapons release, those making the final decision to carry out the attack are not dealing with the decision-impairing effects of mortal fear. Although the sanitary environment of the drone control room has been criticized for making war too much like a video game,19 it undoubtedly leads to much sounder proportionality determinations.
B. Limitations
Like any weapons system drones have significant limitations in what they can achieve. Drones are extremely vulnerable to any type of sophisticated air defense system. They are slow. Even the jet-powered Avenger recently purchased by the
Air Force only has a top speed of around 460 miles per hour,20 meaning that it cannot escape from any manned fighter aircraft, not even the outmoded 1970s-era fighters that are still used by a number of nations.21 Not only are drones unable to escape manned fighter aircraft, they also cannot hope to successfully fight them. Their airto-air weapons systems are not as sophisticated as those of manned fighter aircraft,22 and in the dynamic environment of an air-to-air engagement, the drone operator could not hope to match the situational awareness23 of the pilot of manned fighter aircraft. As a result, the outcome of any air-to-air engagement between drones and manned fighters is a foregone conclusion. Further, drones are not only vulnerable to manned fighter aircraft, they are also vulnerable to jamming. Remotely piloted aircraft are dependent upon a continuous signal from their operators to keep them flying, and this signal is vulnerable to disruption and jamming.24 If drones were

19. See Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
101, 133 (noting the ethical concerns arising out of the comparison between operating a drone and playing a video game).
20. Hennigan, supra note 13.
21. See Unmanned Military Aircraft: Attack of the Drones, THE ECONOMIST: TECH. Q. (Sept. 3,
2009), http://www.economist.com/node/14299496 (“Small and comparatively slow UAVs are no match for fighter jets . . . .”). In December 2002 a Predator drone was shot down by a 1970s era MiG-25 fighter over
Iraq. See Pilotless Warriors Soar to Success, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2003/04/25/tech/main551126.shtml (describing drones’ success against ground targets as well as the MiG-25 shoot-down). I am unaware of any situation in which a drone has shot down a manned fighter aircraft.
22. Compare Factsheets: MQ-9 Reaper, supra note 13 (listing no air-to-air weapons systems among the armament of one of the Air Force’s most advanced armed drones), with Factsheets: F-22 Raptor, U.S.
AIR FORCE (Nov. 25, 2009), http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=199 (describing the
Air Force’s most advanced manned aircraft’s armament as consisting of at least two air-to-air missiles and a 20-millimeter cannon for use in air-to-air combat).
23. “Situational awareness” is the term used to describe a pilot’s understanding of the tactical positioning of all the aircraft in an engagement. Knowing where all the aircraft are relative to one another and projecting which aircraft will be vulnerable and which will pose an imminent threat several seconds in the future is critical to surviving an air-to-air engagement. Drone operators’ ability to assess and react to the changing situation would be seriously impaired by their remote location and sensor limitations. Cf.
Jason S. McCarley & Christopher D. Wickens, Human Factors Concerns in UAV Flight, FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 1, available at www.hf.faa.gov/docs/508/docs/uavFY04Planrpt.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2012) (noting that accident rates are higher in UAVs than manned aircraft in part because, in addition to the normal problems of flight, UAV operators and the aircraft are not in the same place).
Their delayed reactions would be decisive in an engagement against any trained military pilot.
24. See Brendan Gogarty & Meredith Hagger, The Laws of Man over Vehicles Unmanned: The Legal
Response to Robotic Revolution on Sea, Land and Air, 19 J.L. INF. & SCI. 73, 138 (“This link [between the

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perceived to be a serious threat to an advanced military, a serious investment in signal jamming or disruption technology could severely degrade drone operations if it did not defeat them entirely.25
These twin vulnerabilities to manned aircraft and signal disruption could be mitigated with massive expenditures on drone development and signal delivery and encryption technology,26 but these vulnerabilities could never be completely eliminated. Meanwhile, one of the principal advantages that drones provide—their low cost compared with manned aircraft27—would be swallowed up by any attempt to make these aircraft survivable against a sophisticated air defense system. As a result, drones will be limited, for the foreseeable future,28 to use in “permissive” environments in which air defense systems are primitive29 or non-existent. While it is possible to find (or create) such a permissive environment in an inter-state conflict,30 permissive environments that will allow for drone use will most often be found in counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations.
C. Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield
The legal determination of what constitutes “the battlefield” has particular significance for the use of drones, particularly armed drones. This is because “the battlefield” is used to effectively define the scope of IHL’s application.31 In situations outside the scope of IHL, international human rights law (IHRL)32 applies. For the
UAV and the controller] is a prime target for interception, jamming, and ‘digital warfare.’”).
25. An “arms race” between drone controllers and signal disrupters would be similar to the contests across the radar frequency spectrum. One side finds a way to disrupt certain radar frequencies; the other side develops radar that uses a different frequency band, or multiple frequencies, until those are compromised, etc. Such a contest would also share similarities with the cyberwar contest between data encryption and data interception and hacking.
26. See Declan McCullagh, U.S. Warned of Predator Drone Hacking, CBS NEWS (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504383_162-5988978-504383.html (reporting on Predator vulnerability to hacking and the high costs of encryption).
27. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
28. Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) could one day allow for the use of “untethered” drones that would execute their missions based upon preprogrammed parameters. Because this would mean that the proportionality assessment done at weapons release would be performed by the AI chip in the drone, such developments would require the creation of new IHL provisions specifically addressing such weapons systems and their performance. See supra note 7.
29. Limited to ground fire or shoulder launched surface-to-air missiles.
30. The United States was able to eliminate the Iraqi air defense systems fairly rapidly at the beginning of the 2003 war, which allowed for some drone use prior to the time that the conflict became a counterinsurgency operation. See Michael R. Gordon, After the War: Preliminaries; U.S. Air Raids in ‘02
Prepared for War in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 20, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/20/world/after-thewar-preliminaries-us-air-raids-in-02-prepared-for-war-in-iraq.html (discussing use of air raids to weaken
Iraqi air defenses and the early use of drones in the war).
31. See infra Part II.
32. See JEFF A. BOVARNICK ET AL., LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK 207 (Gregory S. Musselman ed., 2011) http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LOW-Deskbook-2011.pdf [hereinafter LAW OF WAR
DESKBOOK] (“Traditionally, human rights law [IHRL] and the [law of war (IHL)] have been viewed as separate systems of protection. This classic view applies human rights law and the [law of war] to different situations and different relationships respectively.”). IHRL includes international treaties such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.
Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, at 52 (Mar. 23, 1976), subject-specific international treaties such as the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

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purposes of this Article, the salient difference between these two bodies of law lies in their disparate provisions regarding the use of lethal force. IHL allows for lethal force to be employed based upon the status of the target.33 A member of the enemy’s forces may be targeted with lethal force based purely on his status as a member of those forces.34 That individual does not have to pose a current threat to friendly forces or civilians at the time of targeting.35 In contrast, IHRL permits lethal force only after a showing of dangerousness.36 Under IHRL (the law enforcement model), lethal force may only be employed if the individual poses an imminent threat to law enforcement officers attempting arrest or to other individuals.37 Further, IHRL requires that an opportunity to surrender be offered before lethal force is employed.38 Because drones are incapable of offering surrender before utilizing lethal force, armed drones may not be legally employed in situations governed by IHRL.39 This absolute prohibition does not apply to other forces commonly used in counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations, such as special forces units, because it is possible for them to operate within the parameters of IHRL. Although the use of special forces in law enforcement operations has the potential to be legally problematic,40 appropriately clear and restrictive rules of engagement that include the requirement of a surrender offer can allow special forces to operate under an IHRL regime.41 Similarly, almost any other part of the armed forces, from regular army units to military police to Coast Guard and naval forces, can adapt their operating procedures to comply with IHRL’s requirements. Armed drones cannot.

Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, regional human rights treaties such as the
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, 9 I.L.M. 99, as well as the customary international law that has developed around such treaties.
33. See infra notes 92–99 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 92–99 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 92–99 and accompanying text.
36. Alston Report, supra note 10, para. 32.
37. See NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 101 (2008) (explaining that a deprivation of life violates IHRL “when the use of potentially lethal force as such is not ‘strictly unavoidable’ or ‘strictly necessary’ to protect any person, including the law enforcement officials themselves, from imminent death or serious injury, to effect an arrest or prevent the escape of a person suspected of a serious crime, or to otherwise maintain law and order or to protect the security of all”)
(footnotes and emphasis omitted). Lethal force could be employed against a violent criminal suspect even if he drops his weapon and attempts to flee because his escape poses a foreseeable threat of harm to future victims. 38. Alston Report, supra note 10, para. 75.
39. See id. para. 85 (“A targeted drone killing in a State’s own territory, over which the State has control, would be very unlikely to meet human rights law limitations on the use of lethal force.”).
40. See McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 39 (1995) (finding that the United
Kingdom’s use of Special Air Service special forces to attempt the arrest of three Irish Republican Army
(IRA) terrorists in Gibraltar foreseeably led to the IRA members’ deaths, thus violating the European
Convention on Human Rights).
41. Some have even gone so far as to argue that the killing of Osama bin Laden by special forces was a law enforcement operation outside the scope of IHL, although this view is not widely shared. See Mary
Ellen O’Connell, The Death of bin Laden as a Turning Point, OPINIO JURIS (May 3, 2011, 3:10 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/05/03/the-death-of-bin-laden-as-a-turning-point (O’Connell argued that the killing was a law enforcement operation, but comments following the post indicated that this characterization of the operation was not widely shared. That disagreement, however, was based upon the facts of the operation, not on the ability of special forces units to conduct operations in accordance with
IHRL).

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As a result, the debate about what constitutes the legal boundaries of the battlefield has a particularly significant impact on the use and development of drones. Because their operational limitations prevent drones from being employed outside of the permissive environments found in counterterrorism or counterinsurgency operations, their usefulness as a weapons system is strongly tied to the scope of IHL’s application. If the strict geographic approach to defining IHL’s scope (described in more detail below) is accepted, then drone use would be considered illegal everywhere outside Afghanistan.

II.

COMPETING VIEWS OF THE SCOPE OF IHL

A. Strict Geographical Limitations: Internal Non-International Armed Conflicts
Advocates of strict geographical limitations on the scope of IHL often summarize their position by stating that the concept of a “global battlefield” is
“contrary to international law.”42 The laws of armed conflict cannot apply in a place where there is no armed conflict, and the determination of whether an armed conflict exists is based upon the intensity of the violence occurring there and the organization of the forces involved, as laid out in the Tadic opinion.43 If the minimum threshold of violence that defines an armed conflict is met, then IHL applies within that geographical area. If the Tadic threshold is not met, the laws of armed conflict do not apply there. In IHL’s absence IHRL would apply, as would the law enforcement restrictions on lethal force, including the requirement of a surrender offer. This would preclude any use of armed drones within the geographical area governed by
IHRL, regardless of whether the state whose territory was involved consented to their use.
This argument—that the conditions on the ground at the place where the strike occurs is the determining factor in whether IHL applies to that strike, or whether it is instead governed by IHRL—has a number of supporters.44 Because the Tadic factors are broadly accepted, their absence at the location of the strike is viewed as dispositive as to the question of which body of law controls. If the Tadic factors are not met, then IHRL controls. If IHRL does not control, it is argued, then nothing would prevent the United States from conducting drone strikes in London, nor

42. HRW letter, supra note 10, at 2; see also Drones, supra note 6, at 5 (describing the legal view held by some that the “legal rights of armed conflict are limited to a particular theatre of hostilities”; outside of this geographic area, ordinary human rights law would apply, including the prohibition against extrajudicial execution).
43. The idea that an armed conflict may only exist when a minimum threshold of violence has been met is widely accepted. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia enunciated factors for determining the existence of an armed conflict, including its intensity and the organization of the forces involved. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, paras. 561–62 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997) (“[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.”).
44. See supra note 10; see also Kevin Jon Heller, Rebuttal: Judge Bates’ Infernal Machine, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. PENNUMBRA 183, 183 (2011), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/Targeted_Killing.pdf
(arguing that in the absence of combat that is “sufficiently protracted or intense” IHL cannot apply to authorize targeted killings and that, instead, IHRL governs).

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would anything prevent other nations from employing drones in this country, resulting in an “escalating spiral of unconstrained violence.”45
This view that the Tadic factors determine whether an armed conflict is occurring within a particular geographical area makes sense in the context of an internal non-international armed conflict. Internal armed conflicts usually occur in portions of a state where control is disputed or where the opposition’s actions and forces are concentrated. Applying IHL throughout the entire country and thus relaxing the IHRL restrictions on lethal force outside the areas in which the Tadic factors are met would likely lead to unnecessary loss of life and improper deprivation of liberty. However, the fact that this view is appropriately applied to internal armed conflicts does not mean that it can be universally applied. As demonstrated below, the coherence of this view begins to break down when it is applied to more traditional international armed conflicts.
B. Traditional Boundaries of the Battlefield: International Armed Conflicts
If the strict geographical view can be summarized with the phrase “the whole world cannot be a battlefield,” the more traditional view of the boundaries of the battlefield might be encapsulated by the statement “the law of armed conflict goes where the participants in the armed conflict go.” I term this the “traditional” view because it is the how the boundaries of the battlefield have long been understood in international armed conflicts which, until very recently, have been considered the paradigmatic way that armed conflicts are thought about. The 1949 Geneva
Conventions applied almost exclusively to international armed conflicts, addressing conflicts “not of an international character” in a single article.46 By 1977, noninternational armed conflicts were prevalent enough to warrant a separate protocol, although it was still much shorter and less detailed than its companion, which addressed international armed conflicts.47
Commentators have suggested that the scope of IHL in international armed conflicts is also subject to increasingly strict geographical restrictions. Although these proposed restrictions are not specifically related to the Tadic factors, those advocating such restrictions describe them in terms of proximity to the current “area

45. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed
Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 724 (2004); see also HRW letter, supra note 10, at 2
(arguing that the Obama Administration’s use of drones for targeted killings “sets a dangerous precedent for abusive regimes around the globe”).
46. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva I]; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the
Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva II]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
[hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 3, August 2, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
47. Compare Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I] (addressing international armed conflicts), with Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (1987) [hereinafter
Additional Protocol II] (addressing non-international armed conflicts).

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of operations” where active fighting is occurring.48 Christopher Greenwood opined that “it cannot be assumed—as in the past—that a state engaged in an armed conflict is free to attack its adversary anywhere in the area of war.”49 As an example, he claimed that it would have been legally problematic for a British warship to attack an
Argentine warship during the Falklands War if they encountered one another in the
Pacific Ocean, far from the disputed islands.50 Similarly, Mary Ellen O’Connell has claimed that the shooting down of Admiral Yamamoto’s plane over Bougainville by
U.S. fighter aircraft during World War II would today be considered illegal because it occurred “far from [the] battlefield.”51
The claim that there are legal restrictions on the employment of combat force during an international armed conflict based solely upon the distance from the “front lines” finds no support in practice. This is because no nation in the world would ever accept such blanket limitations upon its military’s ability to act. Success in warfare at any level, from single combat to global military strategy, is based upon the ability to strike your opponent in places where he is vulnerable and in ways he does not expect. The history of warfare since the adoption of the Geneva Conventions is replete with examples of combat force being employed far from the “front lines.”
Early in the Korean War General McArthur directed an amphibious assault by
U.N. forces on Inchon, more than 150 miles from the fighting that was going on near
Pusan, and thereby changed the course of that conflict.52 The 1991 Persian Gulf War opened with a thirty-eight-day air campaign by Coalition forces against targets throughout Iraq and Kuwait.53 Strikes on targets in northern Iraq occurred more than 550 miles from Kuwait City, and the command and control targets in Baghdad were well over 300 miles from the “front lines” of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border.54 When the ground campaign began, the jumping off point for the French 6th Light Division on the left flank of the advance into Iraq was almost 300 miles from Kuwait City and more than 200 miles from the nearest Kuwaiti territory.55 Most recently, after the
U.N. Security Council authorized the use of force against Libya, many airstrikes and cruise missile strikes conducted on the first day of the military intervention targeted

48. Christopher Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 39, 53 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1st ed. 1995).
49. Id.
50. Christopher Greenwood, Self-Defence and the Conduct of International Armed Conflict, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABTAI ROSENNE 273, 277
(Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1989) [hereinafter Greenwood, Self-Defence]. While the Royal
Navy voluntarily created a naval exclusionary zone outside of which Argentine warships would not be subject to attack, IHL did not require them to do so.
51. Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Choice of Law Against Terrorism, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y
343, 361 (2010).
52. Hanson W. Baldwin, M’Arthur Success in Korea Analyzed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1950, at L3;
Michael Hickey, The Korean War: An Overview, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/ coldwar/korea_hickey_01.shtml (last updated Mar. 21, 2011).
53. See Michael W. Lewis, The Law of Aerial Bombardment in the 1991 Gulf War, 97 AM. J. INT’L L.
481, 481–96 (2003) (discussing the Coalition air campaign against Iraq).
54. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 133–34 (Apr. 1992) (describing attacks in northern Iraq during the Persian Gulf War, including airstrikes in Mosul against nuclear facilities); Map of Troop Movements from Desert Storm, U.S. ARMY
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY, http://www.history.army.mil/reference/DS.jpg (depicting the location of forces and geography of the region).
55. See Map of Troop Movements from Desert Storm, supra note 54 (depicting location of attacks).

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facilities near Tripoli, more than 400 miles from the fighting that was occurring between the Libyan Army and rebel forces near Benghazi.56
These examples of state practice during U.N.-authorized military operations make it clear that the use of combat force far from the location of the fighting is not only considered to be legal, but is also regarded as a routine part of any international armed conflict. Any claim that shooting down a military aircraft flown by military pilots carrying a senior military officer would be considered illegal under international law today because the fighter aircraft involved in the mission had to fly approximately 450 miles from its base to complete the mission is wholly without support.57 C. Neutrality Law: The Graf Spee Incident
This is not to say that there are no geographic limitations on the scope of international armed conflicts. The law of neutrality clearly prohibits the use of armed force by participants in an armed conflict on the territory of neutral states.58
Neutrality law applies to both land and naval warfare,59 and the AMW Manual includes several articles applying neutrality law to aircraft.60
Neutrality law imposes restrictions on both belligerents and neutrals.
Belligerents are enjoined from sending their armed forces across neutral territory, from recruiting combatants on the territory of a neutral, or from setting up communications stations or military installations on neutral territory.61 Belligerent warships are not permitted to stay in neutral ports for more than twenty-four hours and may only prolong their stay because of damage or bad weather.62 Belligerents are also “prohibited in neutral territory . . . [from using] such territory as a sanctuary.”63 Conversely, a neutral power is prohibited from allowing any of these acts by a belligerent on its territory and is required to intern any members of a belligerent armed force found on its territory.64

56. See Devin Dwyer & Luis Martinez, U.S. Tomahawk Cruise Missiles Hit Targets in Libya, ABC
NEWS (Mar. 19, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/International/libya-international-military-coalition-launchassault-gadhafi-forces/story?id=13174246#.TzYKsbHeAz5 (describing the initial coalition attacks on the
Qaddafi regime, which focused primarily on Tripoli and other targets in the west of the country, far from the “rebel stronghold of Benghazi”).
57. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. Bougainville was approximately 450 miles from the
U.S. base at Henderson Field, where the fighters that shot down Yamamoto’s plane were launched.
Daniel Lagan, Operation Vengeance, MILITARYHISTORY.ORG (July 2, 2009), http://www.militaryhistory. org/2009/07/operation-vengeance. 58. See Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land arts. 1–5, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310 [hereinafter Hague V] (establishing the inviolate nature of neutral territory for belligerents).
59. See generally id. (detailing neutrality rights and duties in land war); Hague Convention
Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415
[hereinafter Hague XIII] (detailing neutrality rights and duties in naval war).
60. AMW MANUAL, supra note 1, § X (Neutrality).
61. Hague V, supra note 58, arts. 2–4.
62. Hague XIII, supra note 59, arts. 12, 14.
63. AMW MANUAL, supra note 1, r. 167(a).
64. Hague V, supra note 58, arts. 5, 11; Hague XIII, supra note 59, art. 24; AMW MANUAL, supra note 1, r. 168(a), 170(c).

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An illustration of both the use of armed force far from the “front lines” of an armed conflict and the application of neutrality law in an international armed conflict can be found in the Graf Spee incident that occurred at the beginning of the Second
World War. The Admiral Graf Spee was a German Panzerschiff65 that engaged in commerce raiding throughout the South Atlantic during the autumn of 1939, more than 6,000 miles from the British and German coasts.66 On the morning of December
13, the Graf Spee encountered three British cruisers, Exeter, Ajax, and Achilles.67
After an exchange of gunfire that lasted a little more than an hour, the Graf Spee turned and headed for the neutral port of Montevideo in Uruguay.68 She reached
Montevideo on the evening of December 13 and a diplomatic battle over the duties of Uruguayan neutrality ensued.69 The British and French ministers demanded that the German warship be required to leave port quickly or be interned for the balance of the war in accordance with articles 12, 14, and 24 of the Hague Convention
Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War.70 The German captain, Langsdorff, requested that the Graf Spee be allowed to stay for fourteen days in order to complete the necessary repairs to make the ship seaworthy.71 During these intense and high-stakes negotiations the Uruguayan Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Dr. Guani, insisted that Uruguay would uphold its responsibilities as a neutral nation and bridled at what he perceived to be threats from the French and
British diplomats if Uruguay did not do so.72
Uruguayan technicians examined the warship and determined that it would require seventy-two hours for her to be made seaworthy and Langsdorff was informed that he would be required to depart Montevideo on December 17.73 He then received instructions from Berlin ordering him to either attempt a breakout or to scuttle the ship and stressing that internment in Uruguay be avoided at all costs.74
Langsdorff chose to scuttle the ship on the 17th and he shot himself shortly thereafter.75 His crew was interned for the balance of the war.76

65. See RICHARD WOODMAN, THE BATTLE OF THE RIVER PLATE: A GRAND DELUSION 4–7
(Christopher Summerville ed., 2008) (describing the construction of the Panzerschiffs, or “Armored
Ships,” which were derisively referred to as “pocket battleships” by the Royal Navy. Constructed by the
German Navy during the interwar years in order to remain in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, they were smaller and carried lighter armaments than the battleships of the time.).
66. Id. at 12–54.
67. Id. at 88–90.
68. Id. at 92–114.
69. Id. at 109–14.
70. See SIR EUGEN MILLINGTON-DRAKE, THE DRAMA OF THE GRAF SPEE AND THE BATTLE OF
THE PLATE: A DOCUMENTARY ANTHOLOGY 1914–1964, at 288–95 (1964) (explaining that the initial
British insistence that the Graf Spee be forced to leave immediately changed when the British cruiser commander urged a delay to allow the cruiser Cumberland to join his force awaiting the Graf Spee’s departure). 71. See id. (noting that this would have allowed German submarines enough time to get to the River
Plate and help the Graf Spee break out through the group of British warships gathering at the mouth of the river).
72. Id. at 288–90.
73. Id. at 305–07, 325.
74. Id. at 321–23.
75. WOODMAN, supra note 65, at 135–40.
76. Id. at 140–41.

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This is the manner in which geography limits the scope of IHL during international armed conflicts. As long as Uruguay maintained its neutrality, IHRL governed the conduct of all parties within Uruguay unless or until Uruguay ended its neutrality and chose to support one side or the other. The British Navy was not permitted to fire upon the damaged Graf Spee in Uruguayan waters, but the German warship was not permitted to use the Uruguayan port as a sanctuary. As a sovereign nation Uruguay could have chosen to permit the British Navy to sink the Graf Spee within Uruguayan waters, but that would have been considered a belligerent act against Germany, and Uruguay would have forfeited her status as a neutral. IHL would have applied on Uruguay’s territory from the time she changed her status to that of British ally and the Graf Spee could have opened fire on Uruguayan naval vessels or port facilities once Uruguay declared herself to be a British ally. Likewise,
Uruguay could have chosen to offer the Graf Spee sanctuary in the port of
Montevideo, but this would have been considered a belligerent act against the
British, making Uruguay a German ally. Had Uruguay made this choice IHL would have applied on Uruguayan territory and the British Navy could have fired upon the
Graf Spee or upon Uruguayan forces from the moment Uruguay declared herself to be a German ally. Instead, Uruguay chose to uphold her responsibilities as a neutral nation by neither forcing the Graf Spee to depart before she could be made seaworthy, nor allowing her to improperly use the neutral port of Montevideo as a sanctuary until help could arrive. It is through neutrality law that geography limits the scope of IHL during international armed conflicts.
If the absence or existence of Tadic factors within a given geography determines the scope of IHL during internal armed conflicts and neutrality law determines IHL’s scope during international armed conflicts, how should the boundaries of the battlefield be determined in transnational armed conflicts?
D. Transnational Armed Conflicts
For over half a century the choice for classifying armed conflicts has been binary. Armed conflicts were categorized either as international armed conflicts or non-international armed conflicts. International armed conflicts triggered the application of IHL through Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, which applied the entire Conventions to such conflicts.77 Such conflicts were those occurring between “two or more of the High Contracting Parties.”78 Noninternational armed conflicts triggered the application of IHL through Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which itself set minimum standards of conduct for conflicts taking place on “the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties”
(emphasis added).79
As these two choices were defined, however, they were not collectively exhaustive, potentially leaving room for a third choice that IHL left unaddressed.
The scope of international armed conflicts was fairly straightforward, being any
77. Geneva I-IV, supra note 46, art. 2.
78. Id. Every nation on earth is now a party to the Geneva Conventions. INT’L COMM. RED CROSS
[ICRC], ANNUAL REPORT 2010: STATES PARTY TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THEIR
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS 547 (2010), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/annual-report/current/icrcannual-report-2010-states-party.pdf. Hence, the term “High Contracting Party” is now synonymous with
“state” or “nation.”
79. Geneva I-IV, supra note 46, art. 3.

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conflict between two or more states. The meaning of non-international armed conflicts was also well established. The drafting history of the Geneva Conventions supported the widely held belief that the provisions governing non-international armed conflicts were directed at internal armed conflicts and civil wars taking place inside a single state.80 More than forty-five years later, that understanding retained its place as black-letter IHL. The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law in
Armed Conflicts stated that “[a] non-international armed conflict is a confrontation between the existing governmental authority and groups of persons subordinate to this authority, which is carried out by force of arms within national territory and reaches the magnitude of an armed riot or a civil war.”81
The problem with these definitions of international and non-international armed conflict is that collectively they did not describe all the types of armed conflicts that might exist. It was possible for an armed conflict to satisfy neither of these definitions. The United States’ conflict with al-Qaeda could not be an international armed conflict because al-Qaeda was not a “High Contracting Party” to the Geneva Conventions.82 Yet it was also clearly not a non-international armed conflict as defined above because it was not internal to the United States. The existence of this purported “gap” in IHL’s coverage was felt most immediately by detainees in the conflict between al-Qaeda and the United States.83 Justice Stevens foreclosed the Bush Administration’s argument that such a gap existed by redefining the term “non-international armed conflict” to include all conflicts not deemed to be
“international armed conflicts,” thus reaffirming the binary approach to classifying armed conflicts.84
While this reinforcement of the binary approach may have been necessary to prevent compliance avoidance by the United States, its expansion of the definition of non-international armed conflicts erased important distinctions between purely internal conflicts, such as civil wars, and more complex transnational armed conflicts, like the conflict with al-Qaeda or the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in
Lebanon.85 In order for IHL to continue to act as a coherent body of law, these

80. See 3 ICRC, COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS OF WAR 28–29 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) (“[T]he Red Cross has long been trying to aid the victims of civil wars and internal conflicts, . . . [b]ut in this connection particularly difficult problems [of extending Red Cross assistance] arose.”); 2-B FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF
GENEVA OF 1949, at 40–43 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 2004) (1949) (discussing application of the
Geneva Conventions to civil wars). There are two significant sources for the drafting history of the
Geneva Conventions. These are the four volume FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF
GENEVA OF 1949 and the COMMENTARIES that were produced by a number of attendees and edited by
Jean Pictet, who was appointed Director of the ICRC in 1946 and took charge of the preparatory work that led to the adoption of the 1949 Conventions.
81. Greenwood, Scope of Application, supra note 48, at 47.
82. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628–29 (2006) (discussing al-Qaeda’s status as a non-High
Contracting Party).
83. See id. at 628–33 (ruling that an al-Qaeda detainee in Guantanamo Bay could not be properly tried by a military commission because the proposed commission failed to provide the procedural safeguards required by the Geneva Conventions).
84. See id. at 630 (“The term ‘conflict not of an international character’ is used here in contradistinction to a conflict between nations.”).
85. See Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: The Need to
Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 295, 310 (2007) (discussing
Hamdan and the “regulatory gap” “spawned” by Common Articles 2 and 3).

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distinctions that were understood to exist for more than fifty years should not be replaced with a monolithic understanding of “non-international armed conflicts” that applies the same rules to all conflicts within this greatly expanded category of conflict. Whether through the creation of a hybrid category of IHL86 or merely a more compartmentalized understanding of the law applicable to “non-international armed conflicts,” the legal distinction between internal civil wars and transnational armed conflicts (defined as conflicts between states and non-state actors that cross international boundaries) must be maintained.

III.
HOW THE LEGALITY OF DRONE STRIKES IN
TRANSNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS RELATES TO THE
CORE PRINCIPLES OF IHL
A. Legal Challenges to Drone Strikes in Transnational Armed Conflicts
An illustration of why this distinction between internal civil wars and transnational armed conflicts must be maintained can be found in a recent lawsuit brought by the ACLU against the Obama Administration. The ACLU attempted to enjoin drone strikes directed against Anwar al-Aulaqi, a prominent member of alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).87 Although the ACLU conceded that strikes targeting al-Aulaqi would be governed by IHL if they were conducted in
Afghanistan,88 they maintained that such strikes would be occurring “outside the context of armed conflict” if they were directed against al-Aulaqi in Yemen.89 Using the reasoning that underlies the strict geographical limitations on the scope of IHL described above, the ACLU argued that the absence of an armed conflict in Yemen foreclosed the application of IHL to anyone in Yemeni territory. Instead, the use of lethal force was governed by IHRL and might only be employed when al-Aulaqi presented a “concrete, specific, and imminent threat of death or serious physical injury” to others.90 Because the ACLU conceded that al-Aulaqi was targetable under
IHL in Afghanistan, the legal basis for their claim was based upon where al-Aulaqi was rather than upon who he was.

86. See id. at 311 (discussing the need for a “hybrid category” of armed conflict); see also Geoffrey S.
Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A “Principled” Approach to the Regulation of
Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42 ISR. L. REV. 46, 50 (2009) (setting out the need for the law of armed conflict to evolve to address the “emerging category” of “transnational armed conflict”).
87. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief of Plaintiff at 2–3, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-01469) [hereinafter Complaint]. This suit was subsequently dismissed.
See infra note 91 and accompanying text. After the submission of this Article, al-Aulaqi was killed by a
U.S. drone strike in Yemen in September 2011. Erika Solomon & Mohammed Ghobari, CIA Drone Kills
U.S.-born Al Qaeda Cleric in Yemen, REUTERS, Sept. 30, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/ article/2011/09/30/us-yemen-awlaki-idUSTRE78T0W320110930. 88. Both Ben Wizner and Arthur Spitzer—two of the ACLU lawyers who filed the lawsuit, whom I debated separately in New York and Washington, D.C. last year—both stated that if al-Aulaqi were in
Afghanistan, he could be targeted. See Michael W. Lewis and Ben Wizner, Predator Drones and Targeted
Killings, FEDERALIST SOCIETY (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/predator-drones
-and-targeted-killings-podcast (Wizner stating that if al-Aulaqi was fighting with the Taliban in
Afghanistan, he would not be due any process prior to being targeted for killing).
89. See Complaint, supra note 87, at 2–11 (containing, in its eleven pages, seventeen instances of the phrase “outside of armed conflict” or a similar phrase).
90. Id. at 2.

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Although this lawsuit was dismissed on standing and political question grounds,91 if the court had accepted the ACLU’s position that strict geographical limitations apply to transnational armed conflicts such as the conflict between the
United States and al-Qaeda, it would have seriously undermined the core principles that IHL is founded upon. To understand why that is, it is necessary to understand what IHL seeks to protect and how it classifies individuals in order to further that goal. B. Core Principles of IHL
IHL considers all people to be civilians unless or until they take affirmative steps to change that status.92 Civilians are immune from attack and may not be targeted unless they take actions to change their status and forfeit that immunity.93
From a legal standpoint, the most advantageous way for a civilian to change his or her status is to become a combatant. This cannot be done by merely picking up a weapon, however. To become a combatant, an individual must become a member of the “armed forces of a Party to a conflict.”94 To qualify as an “armed force” an organization must be “subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.”95 The status of combatant is legally advantageous because combatants are entitled to the “combatants’ privilege,” which allows combatants to participate in an armed conflict without becoming subject to prosecution for violating domestic laws prohibiting the destruction of property, assault, murder, etc.96 The combatant’s conduct is therefore regulated by IHL rather than domestic law and a combatant may only be criminally charged with conduct that violates the laws of war.97 There is, however, a disadvantage to achieving combatant status as well. While becoming a combatant bestows the combatant’s privilege on the individual, it also subjects that individual to attack at any time by other parties to the conflict. Because targeting of combatants is based upon their status as combatants and not upon their
“dangerousness,” combatants may be lawfully targeted regardless of whether they pose a current threat to their opponents, whether or not they are armed, or even

91. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 35, 52 (D.D.C. 2010).
92. Additional Protocol I, supra note 47, art. 50(1) (defining “civilian” as persons who are not members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict under Article 43 or otherwise eligible for prisonerof-war status under Article 4(A)(1), (2),(3), and (6) of Geneva III, supra note 46, and providing that “in case of doubt” a person is presumed to be a civilian). Although the United States has not ratified
Additional Protocol I, it recognizes much of Additional Protocol I as descriptive of customary international law. LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK, supra note 32, at 21–22.
93. Additional Protocol I, supra note 47, arts. 51(2)–(3).
94. Id. art. 43(2).
95. Id. art. 43(1).
96. See ROBERT K. GOLDMAN & BRIAN D. TITTEMORE, UNPRIVILEGED COMBATANTS AND THE
HOSTILITIES IN AFGHANISTAN: THEIR STATUS AND RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, 1–4 (2002) (describing the history of recognition of the “combatant’s privilege”). 97. Id. at 2.

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awake.98 The only situations in which IHL limits the right to attack a combatant are when that combatant has surrendered or been rendered hors de combat.99
While there is some disagreement about whether “combatant status” should be recognized in non-international armed conflicts,100 that dispute is irrelevant when it comes to questions concerning the status of members of al-Qaeda or other terrorist organizations. Because combatant status is based upon membership in a group that organizationally enforces “compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict,”101 groups such as al-Qaeda, whose means and methods of warfare include deliberately targeting civilians, cannot claim combatant status for their members. It should be emphasized that the behavior of an individual al-Qaeda member cannot confer combatant status. No matter how strictly an individual member of a non-privileged group adheres to IHL or how scrupulously they distinguish between civilian and military targets, they are never entitled to the combatant’s privilege and may therefore be criminally liable for attacks on members of an opposing armed force.102 Al-Qaeda does not, as some have suggested, have a
“basic right to engage in combat against us” in response to our attacks.103
If al-Qaeda members are not combatants, then what are they? Like all people,
IHL treats them as being presumptively civilians who, as a general rule are immune from targeting104 unless they take affirmative steps to forfeit that immunity.105 There are two ways that civilians may forfeit their immunity—one temporary and one more permanent. The temporary forfeiture occurs when a civilian directly participates in hostilities (DPH).106 While the exact contours of what constitutes DPH are not clearly established, it is generally associated with a discrete act.107 Picking up a gun or

98. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
99. Geneva I, supra note 46, art. 12; Geneva III, supra note 46, art. 13.
100. Additional Protocol I only applies to international armed conflicts and there are no provisions in
Additional Protocol II (which supplements Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and is applicable to “all armed conflicts which are not covered by [Additional Protocol I]”) for combatant status.
However, much of Additional Protocol I has been recognized as customary international law and may apply to Additional Protocol II conflicts. See, e.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 632–35 (applying Additional
Protocol I Article 75 to a “conflict not of an international character”); Geoffrey S. Corn, Thinking the
Unthinkable: Has the Time Come to Offer Combatant Immunity to Non-State Actors?, 22 STAN. L. & POL.
REV. 253 (2011) (arguing that combatant status should be afforded to non-state actors meeting Additional
Protocol I’s Article 43 criteria).
101. Additional Protocol I, supra note 47, art. 43(1).
102. There is debate about whether the source of criminal liability for such an attack is the law of armed conflict or domestic criminal law. Because military commissions deal with IHL violations, the U.S. position has been that violations committed by unprivileged belligerents are war crimes. See, e.g., United
States v. Khadr (Mil. Com. Oct. 25, 2010) (Plea Agreement), ROBERT CHESNEY’S NATIONAL SECURITY
LAW LISTSERVE ARCHIVE (Oct. 25, 2010, 6:01 PM), http://jnslp.wordpress.com/2010/10/25/ nationalsecuritylaw-united-states-v-khadr-mil-com-oct-25-2010-plea-agreement (describing Omar Khadr’s agreement to plead guilty to, inter alia, “murder in violation of the law of war [and] attempted murder in violation of the law of war”). Alternatively Khadr could have been tried for murder under the domestic laws and procedures of either the United States or Afghanistan.
103. Drones II (prepared statement of David W. Glazier), supra note 6, at 32.
104. Additional Protocol I, supra note 47, arts. 50(1), 51(2).
105. Id. art. 51(3).
106. Id.
107. See generally NILS MELZER, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 90 INT’L REV. RED
CROSS 991, 1031–33 (2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-reportsdocuments.pdf [hereinafter INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE]. It should be noted that the ICRC document does

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planting a bomb as part of an attack are examples of direct participation that result in a temporary forfeiture of immunity for such time as the civilian continues the participation. After putting the gun down and disengaging from the attack, the civilian regains immunity.
The more permanent forfeiture of civilian immunity occurs when a civilian takes on a “continuous combat function” within an organized armed group of a nonstate actor. The International Committee of the Red Cross’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International
Humanitarian Law states that “individuals whose continuous function involves the preparation, execution, or command of acts or operations amounting to direct participation in hostilities assume a continuous combat function.”108
This
classification is designed to deal with the “farmer by day, fighter by night” tactic that a number of organized armed terrorist groups have employed to retain their civilian immunity from attack for as long as possible.109 The Israeli Supreme Court confronted this tactic in its 2006 opinion on targeted killings.110 While the Court reaffirmed the “for such time as” language related to DPH, recognizing that forfeiture of immunity was not generally intended to be continuous, it did indicate that those who organize, plan, and direct operations were legitimately targetable on a continuous basis because of the continuous nature of their participation.111
Continuous combat functionaries can only reacquire their civilian immunity by disavowing membership in the organized armed group and ceasing any operations with that group.112
IHL classifies individuals in this way in order to better achieve its goals. One of its principal goals is to spare the civilian population and members of the military that have surrendered or are hors de combat from the ravages of warfare.113 To this end it insists on proportionality and military necessity for all attacks, it requires the

not have the force of law and can only become customary international law if its parameters are accepted by a number of states. Because military reaction to the Interpretive Guidance has contended that the definitions offered are too narrow (i.e., that the ICRC considers that fewer people and fewer actions constitute direct participation in hostilities than the military might), the Interpretive Guidance should be viewed as a baseline description of behavior that inarguably constitutes direct participation in hostilities while the actual state of the law remains less clear. See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct
Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. INT’L L. &
POL. 769 (2010) (criticizing the ICRC’s approach to direct participation in hostilities in Part IX of the
Interpretive Guidance).
108. INTERPRETATIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 107, at 1007. It should be noted that the level of involvement with an organized armed group necessary to trigger continuous combat function (CCF) status is much greater than that required to trigger domestic criminal liability for the material support of terrorism. Hence the use of military force against those who have forfeited their immunity by acquiring
CCF status would not significantly diminish the extensive role that law enforcement continues to play in the conflict with terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda.
109. Id. at 993.
110. HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel 53(4) PD 459 [2006], available at http://www.icj.org/IMG/Israel-Targetedkilling.pdf.
111. Id. paras. 34–40.
112. Id. paras. 39–40; INTERPRETATIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 107, at 996.
113. See Philip Spoerri, Dir. of Int’l Law, ICRC, The Geneva Conventions of 1949: Origins and
Current Significance, Address at Ceremony to Celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions
(Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/geneva-conventions-statement120809.htm (asserting that the Geneva Conventions contain “the essential rules protecting persons who are not or no longer taking a direct part in hostilities”).

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acceptance of surrender, it ties the availability of the combatant’s privilege to organizational respect for IHL, and it removes civilian immunity from those participating in an armed conflict either temporarily for such time as they directly participate in hostilities or more permanently for those who perform a continuous combat function. IHL rewards organizations that enforce the laws of war by conferring the combatants’ privilege on members of those organizations. At the same time it discourages organizations like al-Qaeda that target civilians and blend in with the civilian population, thereby placing the civilian population at greater risk, by denying them the combatants’ privilege and removing civilian immunity from its members. C. Applying Strict Geographical Limits on the Scope of IHL to Transnational
Armed Conflicts Rewards Groups like Al-Qaeda
The legal support for applying strict geographical limitations on the scope of
IHL to all non-international armed conflicts, rather than just internal civil wars, is based upon a misapplication of the Tadic test. As explained earlier, consideration of the Tadic factors makes sense in internal conflicts and civil wars where the violence is often episodic and geographically concentrated in one area of the country.114 Broadly applying the laws of war throughout a nation during a time of rebellion is often unnecessary and likely to lead to improper deprivations of life and liberty, which has led courts to resist such sweeping applications of the laws of war.115 However, applying the Tadic factors to determine whether IHL applies to a transnational armed conflict within a given geographical area is nonsensical.
The existence of an armed conflict between, for example, al-Qaeda and the
United States, or between Hezbollah and Israel, should be based upon the degree of violence exchanged between those two parties, not on the level of violence that exists between al-Qaeda and the nation of Afghanistan where it resides, or between
Hezbollah and Lebanon where it is based. Yet it is this latter test that is being proposed by the ACLU and commentators supporting strict geographical limitations on the scope of IHL.116
Such an application of the Tadic factors to determine whether IHL applies in a given geographical area to transnational armed conflicts confers a tremendous strategic advantage upon the very same organizations that IHL otherwise strongly disfavors. By limiting IHL to territory on which the threshold of violence for an armed conflict is currently occurring, IHL would effectively create sanctuaries for terrorist organizations in any state not currently involved in a domestic insurgency in which law enforcement is known to be ineffective. Nations such as Yemen,117

114. See discussion supra Part II.A.
115. See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 4 (1866) (requiring that even during time of rebellion civilian courts be utilized instead of military commissions in geographical areas where the courts were functioning). 116. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text.
117. The recent instability in Yemen has probably now reached the threshold necessary to be considered an internal armed conflict, but it had not done so at the time the United States began targeting al-Aulaqi on Yemeni territory. SUSAN BREAU, MARIE ARONSSON & RACHEL JOYCE, DISCUSSION
PAPER 2: DRONE ATTACKS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE RECORDING OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES OF
ARMED CONFLICT 9 (2011), available at http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/ORG
%20Drone%20Attacks%20and%20International%20Law%20Report.pdf.

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Somalia, Sudan, and the FATA-area of Pakistan, in which law enforcement actions against organizations like al-Qaeda are either ineffective or intentionally not pursued, would become safe havens if IHL were not applied there.118 Al-Qaeda members fulfilling a continuous combat function could effectively reacquire their civilian immunity by crossing an international boundary rather than being required to disavow al-Qaeda, IHL’s preferred result.
This limitation on IHL’s scope in transnational armed conflicts would effectively cede the initiative119 in a conflict between a state actor that abides by IHL and a non-state terrorist organization, which IHL disfavors in every other way because of its conduct during an armed conflict, to the terrorist organization.
Members of the disfavored terrorist organization would be able to remain in these safe areas beyond the reach of law enforcement and immune from any attack that employed the tools of armed conflict, while they continued training, recruiting, and planning their next attack. They alone would be allowed to decide the next battlefield’s location, whether it is New York, London, Madrid, Washington, D.C.,
Mumbai, Detroit, or Bali, and when the next confrontation would take place. IHL should not be read to privilege such a group that it actively disfavors in so many other ways. Employing neutrality law to determine IHL’s scope and the boundaries of the battlefield in transnational armed conflicts is the best way of avoiding such an anomalous interpretation of IHL.120
Significantly, neutrality law (or something very much like it) has already been employed in the conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda. After the attacks of September 11, Afghanistan was put to much the same choice as Uruguay was in
1939:121 Become an ally of the United States in the conflict with al-Qaeda and allow the use of force against al-Qaeda on Afghan territory. Maintain neutrality in the conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda by prohibiting U.S. action against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan while ensuring that al-Qaeda leaves Afghanistan and does

118. See Eric Schmitt & David E. Sanger, Some in Qaeda Leave Pakistan for Somalia and Yemen,
N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/12/world/12terror.htm (describing al-Qaeda presence in Somalia and Yemen); Nicholas D. Kristof, Al Qaeda in Darfur, N.Y. TIMES: ON THE GROUND
(July 10, 2006, 9:32 PM), http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2006/07/10/al-qaeda-in-darfur (describing alQaeda presence in Sudan).
119. The “initiative” in an armed conflict is the ability to decide when, where and how that conflict is conducted. Every officer and senior non-commissioned officer is taught the value of gaining and maintaining the initiative at both the tactical and the strategic level, because determining when, where, and how a conflict is conducted confers a tremendous advantage on the side that holds the initiative. See
U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-0, OPERATIONS, at 3-11 (2008) (“All Army operations aim to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results. Operational initiative is setting or dictating the terms of action throughout an operation.”).
120. Resolving the question of where IHL applies in transnational armed conflicts should not be interpreted as definitively determining that drone strikes are legal in Pakistan and Yemen. The issues of whether an armed conflict does indeed exist between the United States and al-Qaeda, whether AQAP is sufficiently related to al-Qaeda to be considered part of that armed conflict, whether those nations have properly assented to the use of force on their territory, or whether the predicate requirements for the employment of preemptive self-defense are met might all be the basis for questioning the use of drones outside Afghanistan. However, the mere fact that drones are being employed outside Afghanistan should not be viewed as a violation of international law.
121. See discussion supra Part II.C; see also Patrick Wintour et al., It’s Time for War, Bush and Blair
Tell Taliban, THE OBSERVER (Oct. 7, 2001), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/07/politics. september11 (describing the diplomatic situation between Afghanistan and the United States just after the attacks of September 11, 2001).

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not use Afghan territory as a sanctuary. Or, become an enemy of the United States by refusing to uphold its duties as a neutral nation by allowing al-Qaeda to use
Afghan territory as a sanctuary.122 Afghanistan chose the third option and the United
States and its NATO allies used force against both Afghan and al-Qaeda forces in
Afghanistan with broad international support.123

CONCLUSION
The AMW Manual makes it clear that drones are legitimate weapons platforms whose use is effectively governed by current IHL applicable to aerial bombardment.
Like other forms of aircraft they may be lawfully used to target enemy forces, whether specifically identifiable individuals or armed formations, if they comply with
IHL’s requirements of proportionality, necessity, and distinction.
Because drones are only able to operate effectively in permissive environments, the most significant legal challenges facing their development and employment have been based upon where they may be employed. Attempts to apply the strict geographical restrictions that govern the scope of IHL in internal non-international armed conflicts to all non-international armed conflicts, including transnational armed conflicts, threaten to significantly limit the usefulness of drones.
When IHL’s core principles are considered, it becomes clear that the application of strict geographical limitations on IHL’s scope in the context of transnational armed conflicts cannot be defended. The determination of whether the
Tadic threshold for an armed conflict is met on the territory of a non-party to the conflict should have no bearing on whether IHL may be applied to the parties to the conflict. In other words, the fact that there is no local violence occurring in Yemen or Somalia should not be used to provide a sanctuary for non-state actors who are involved in an armed conflict with another state.
The answer for how the boundaries of the battlefield and the scope of IHL’s application can be properly determined is found in neutrality law. This is historically how geographical limitations have been imposed upon IHL’s scope in international armed conflicts. It was applied in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, with at least tacit international approval, to the situation involving the United States, al-Qaeda, and
Afghanistan. Its application is checked by the consent of the sovereign states involved, making an escalating spiral of violence less, rather than more, likely. And perhaps most importantly, neutrality law’s application to transnational armed conflicts does not lead to the anomalous results that are produced when strict geographical limitations are applied to transnational armed conflicts in which IHL is read to favor its otherwise most disfavored groups.

122. See David Hughes, Blair: It’s War on the Taliban: British Forces Will Target Afghanistan’s
Brutal Leaders, THE DAILY MAIL, Sept. 26, 2001, at 1–4 (quoting Prime Minister Tony Blair’s remarks, echoing language used by President George W. Bush, that the Taliban’s failure to comply and to expel alQaeda meant that they “were choosing to be enemies of ours”).
123. See Patrick E. Tyler, A Nation Challenged: The Attack; U.S. and Britain Strike Afghanistan,
Aiming at Bases and Terrorist Camps; Bush Warns ‘Taliban Will Pay a Price’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/08/world/nation-challenged-attack-us-britain-strike-afghanistan-aimingbases-terrorist.html (describing the U.S. and UK strike against Afghanistan).