Economic Interdependence
Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations
Author(s): Dale C. Copeland
Source: International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring, 1996), pp. 5-41
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539041
Accessed: 12/10/2010 13:07
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Economic
DaleC. Copeland
Interdependence and War
A Theory of Trade Expectations
Does
economic inter-
dependence increase or decrease the probability of war among states? With the
Cold War over, this question is taking on importance as trade levels between established powers such as the United States and Russia and emerging powers such as Japan, China, and Western Europe grow to new heights. In this article,
I provide a new dynamic
Author(s): Dale C. Copeland
Source: International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring, 1996), pp. 5-41
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539041
Accessed: 12/10/2010 13:07
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mitpress. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Security.
http://www.jstor.org
Economic
DaleC. Copeland
Interdependence and War
A Theory of Trade Expectations
Does
economic inter-
dependence increase or decrease the probability of war among states? With the
Cold War over, this question is taking on importance as trade levels between established powers such as the United States and Russia and emerging powers such as Japan, China, and Western Europe grow to new heights. In this article,
I provide a new dynamic