Economic loss suffered by the C will be regarded as pure if they do not flow from any personal injury to the C nor form any physical damage to their property. The boundaries between pure economic loss and loss which is consequential upon physical damage to the C’s property were investigated by the CoA in Spartan Steel v Martin (1973) QB 27
Like psychiatric injury, pure economic loss is often described as a problematic form of damage. Although floodgates arguments are sometimes encountered in this area, there are other reasons why a duty to take care not to cause foreseeable economic loss to the claimant is not always appropriate.
Hale J, McLoughlin v Jones (2002) Psychiatric injury is different in kind from economic loss. It has restricted its scope of any duty to avoid causing purely economic loss.
It is not always appropriate to impose a duty of care to avoid causing foreseeable economic loss through negligence. Even proximity is unlikely to supply the necessary additional factors. It is an argument that cases of economic loss do not always require a remedy. Cases involving economic loss frequently share certain other features. The damage is often caused indirectly; the relationship between C and the D is sometimes remote, and the number of potential parties is sometimes large.
Categories of Economic Loss
The hallmarks of the Caparo approach included the reinstatement of proximity as a separate criterion which would restrict the operation of foreseeability; and the adoption of an incremental technique in which courts will turn to established categories of case rather than to broad universal principles in order to reach their decisions.
There is a distinction between ‘losses caused by words’ and losses caused by acts’ is not a reliable way to divide the case law. It is now clear that Hedley Byrne v Heller extends beyond losses caused by statements. Certainly, it extends to professional services more broadly. This is in itself a good