Eisenhower's Containment Through "Action by Inaction" During the Suez Canal Crisis
Taylor Dukes
American Presidency
Richard Skinner
March 15, 2012
Eisenhower’s Containment Through ‘Action by Inaction’ During the Suez Canal Crisis
The 1950’s demanded a certain kind of American President: one tranquil enough to reside over a post-WWII society, and yet bold enough to propel the country through the Cold War. Though a description of “Ike” Dwight D. Eisenhower as a strong central leader heavily contradicts the construed image of a “kindly grandfather figure, a bit inarticulate and above politics, a man who enjoyed golfing and trout fishing over the routine chores of running the government’ (Neff 37), it is certainly apt. Eisenhower demonstrated a bold daringness in his time as President; one that was masked by a “combination of cunning and common sense” (Neff 58) that was crucial during the zenith of the Cold War. Eisenhower’s clever use of constrained, drawn-out diplomatic power came into light during the 1956 Suez Crisis, in which the President refused to work alongside its common allies of Britain, Israel and France in invading Egypt following the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Through exhibiting both a restraint of force (by refusing to send troops to Egypt) and a use of force (through diplomatic actions that would bend the involved powers to the will of the US), Eisenhower was able to establish not only the image of a moderate figure both in domestic and foreign respects, but the dominance of America as a peacekeeping power in the Middle East that rivaled other Western (and more importantly, Soviet) influence in the region. In both the events leading to and the events highlighting what is now known as the Suez Crisis of 1956, Eisenhower would subtly exercise full executive power through the repeated use of action by inaction; that is, refusing to act immediately in light of a crisis and instead using meticulous planning, close and informal consultation with cabinet members, and a blend of diplomatic pressure and placidity in order to
American Presidency
Richard Skinner
March 15, 2012
Eisenhower’s Containment Through ‘Action by Inaction’ During the Suez Canal Crisis
The 1950’s demanded a certain kind of American President: one tranquil enough to reside over a post-WWII society, and yet bold enough to propel the country through the Cold War. Though a description of “Ike” Dwight D. Eisenhower as a strong central leader heavily contradicts the construed image of a “kindly grandfather figure, a bit inarticulate and above politics, a man who enjoyed golfing and trout fishing over the routine chores of running the government’ (Neff 37), it is certainly apt. Eisenhower demonstrated a bold daringness in his time as President; one that was masked by a “combination of cunning and common sense” (Neff 58) that was crucial during the zenith of the Cold War. Eisenhower’s clever use of constrained, drawn-out diplomatic power came into light during the 1956 Suez Crisis, in which the President refused to work alongside its common allies of Britain, Israel and France in invading Egypt following the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Through exhibiting both a restraint of force (by refusing to send troops to Egypt) and a use of force (through diplomatic actions that would bend the involved powers to the will of the US), Eisenhower was able to establish not only the image of a moderate figure both in domestic and foreign respects, but the dominance of America as a peacekeeping power in the Middle East that rivaled other Western (and more importantly, Soviet) influence in the region. In both the events leading to and the events highlighting what is now known as the Suez Crisis of 1956, Eisenhower would subtly exercise full executive power through the repeated use of action by inaction; that is, refusing to act immediately in light of a crisis and instead using meticulous planning, close and informal consultation with cabinet members, and a blend of diplomatic pressure and placidity in order to
Bibliography: 1. Kingseed, Cole C. Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1995. Print. 2. Neff, Donald. Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East. New York: Linden/Simon and Schuster, 1981. Print. 3. Howard, Harry N. "The Regional Pacts and the Eisenhower Doctrine." The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Sage Publications. Web. 20 Mar. 2012. <http://ann.sagepub.com/content/401/1/85>. 4. Ambrose, Stephen E., and Stephen E. Ambrose. Eisenhower: Soldier and President. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990. Print.