1. In the realm of media-military relations, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has become synonymous with the concept of ‘embedding’. The Pentagon defines ‘embed’ “as a media representative remaining with a unit on an extended basis”[i] and OIF represents the single greatest instance of embedding. The Pentagon offered 920 embed spots, and, from 775 acceptances, eventually managed about 600 positions from more than 250 national and international media agencies[ii]. The British Ministry of Defence (MOD) also authorized 128 embeds from British media outlets. Thus, a “global army of reporters, photographers, and television and radio crews” deployed to a conflict that would “be the most covered war in history”. Correspondents had “never…worked alongside U.S. military units…in such numbers [or] in such an organised fashion” and the magnitude of embedding was “unprecedented for a conflict involving the U.S.”
2. Nevertheless, embedding did not originate in OIF. The U.S. first embedded journalists in World War II and about 40 landed ashore with U.S. troops on D-Day. The MOD later embedded correspondents with British personnel in the 1982 Falklands War. Then in 1991, a Washington Post reporter advanced with the Marines, essentially as an embed, in Operation Desert Storm (ODS). Limited embedding also existed in Operation Applied Force (OAF) in 1999.
3. The supremacy of U.S. forces has perhaps aided the emergence and expansion of embedding programs. Indeed, since the Vietnam War, inferior adversaries have given Western forces significant latitude in developing press-military relationships. The implementation of wide scale embedding in OIF illustrates this point but GEN Mattis, Commanding General 1st Marine Division said: “Before we as a military society congratulate ourselves on the ‘overwhelming success’ of the embed program, we need to remember that we were both good and lucky. What would have been the headlines if the coalition lost a battalion of