Enron, once one of the largest energy public companies globally, achieved a $65 billion asset volume but only took 24 days to go bankrupt. Initially, its main service is extracting natural gas and manufacturing energy-using products, but the excessively aggressive and benefit-oriented type of operation makes the company create lots of so-called "innovative" investment department and financial products. All these activities played as the foundation of its bankruptcy. Suddenly, all previous glory and pride fell to the ground tragically, and private and institutional investors lost more than 90% of their investment, and innumerable other business partners and stakeholders were drawn into the deceitful dealings, which seemed never to end. After a long period of federal investigation, the public finally found out the inevitable factors hidden behind the accidental factors from this, one of the world’s largest business scandal.
Superficially, Enron had already met or exceeded most governance standards, such as diversified functions of the board of directors, independent compensation and audit committees, etc. (Krishna Palepu, Paul. M Haley. The Fall of Enron) However, superficial prosperity offered sufficient opportunities for the management to reap private benefits; because of Enron’s complex reporting and accounting methods, outsiders were never able to detect this. It's reasonable for anyone to condemn the inappropriate ethical leadership of Enron's board, but changing the ethics of business behavior and the "sociology" of the boardroom cannot be accomplished through structural changes alone. (De Kluyver, Page 73) Culture, supervision, and participation: all of these should be the software to catalyze ethical leadership, sound practical execution, and the company's sustainable development.
To some extent, before figuring out the real purpose, employees and stakeholders were proud of having