Training of Police Force. The overall level of training, motivation and equipment of the police forces remains little more than basic. Training establishments being limited, training of recruits as well as serving policemen pose the biggest hurdle. Though 12 Counter-Insurgency & Counter-Terrorism Schools (CICTS) out of 15 sanctioned in various States have been raised, actually these are just add-ons to the existing State armed police battalion lines. Obviously, the training facilities are woefully inadequate in terms of quality as well as quantity. While announcing the intended measures to control the rebellion, realisation that it takes three years or so before a policeman may be considered to be adequately trained in counter-insurgency role, seems to be overlooked …show more content…
Curb Maoists Funding. Government must exploit all intelligence agencies to cut off their linkages through diplomatic initiatives. The CPI (Maoist) has close fraternal ties with many North-East insurgent groups, especially the RPF/PLA of Manipur. Most of these outfits have linkages with external forces inimical to India. The CPI (Maoist) has also frequently expressed their solidarity with the J&K terrorist groups. These ties are part of their ‘Strategic United Front’ against the Indian State. The CPI (Maoist) also has close links with foreign Maoist organizations in Philippines, Turkey etc. The outfit is also member of the ‘Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), which includes Nepalese Maoists . While attempting to cut off foreign support, part of the money generated from the mining and industrial projects undertaken in the affected areas, government must put some money aside for the progress and development of these areas. At the same time it should exercise caution that, money should not reverse flow back to Maoists in the form of percentage cuts, taxation or extortion by maoists as it happened in most of the NREGA