Ethics Behind Challenger and Columbia Disastors

C hallenger and Columbia disasters from a n Engineering Ethics standpoint
I ntroduction:
Very widely-used case studies in engineering ethics are the two failures of the space shuttles Challenger in 1986 during its liftoff and Columbia in 2003 during its reentry into the Earth’s orbit. What is interesting about the two space shuttle failures is that they had similar circumstances in them. Engineers recognized technical issues that might lead to the failures and communicated serious safety concerns in the two missions to their managers, and then managers outweighed engineers’ concerns and placed their management concerns above the safety concerns because engineers didn’t have conclusive data.

R eview of the space shuttle failures from an ethical perspective:
The case of Challenger:
On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded seventy-four seconds after launching. All the seven crew members lost their lives. Investigations showed that the catastrophe was due to a critical failure in the O-ring seals of the right Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) that prevents the leakage of hot gases from it. As a matter of fact, and since the start of
NASA’s Space Transportation System (STS), Morton Thiokol’s, the manufacturer of SRBs, engineers knew that there was a flaw in the design of the O-rings used in SRBs. (Boisjoly, 1987) According to Boisjoly, a mechanical engineer employed by Morton Thiokol, engineers found a severe O-ring damage in a joint of SRB during post-flight inspection in
1985. After investigating the issue, he suggested that low temperatures during the liftoff lengthened the period needed by
O-rings to move from their groove. Boisjoly informed a senior manager in Morton Thiokol that a new design was needed for the O-rings; otherwise there would be a risk for a disaster during any planned launches with O-rings of the old design.
As the program proceeded, NASA encountered many delays and difficulties. Also, the congress was becoming increasingly unhappy from the shuttle project and NASA’s performance. This raised concerns in NASA about the continued budget support to the shuttle project; this motivated NASA to plan a record number of launches for 1986 to convey the congress a message that a progress in the project is being made. Also, upon the fast progress of the European
Space Agency project of developing cheaper space missions, NASA had to prove that the US was still leading in the field of Space Exploration.
Several delays for the launching of Challenger took place in January 1986 due to low temperatures and mechanical problems many times, and because the president Reagen wasn’t present for launching when the temperature stalled one time. Also, the White House intervened so that Challenger launch occurs before the President’s State of the Union address scheduled on January 28th so that the President could refer to the liftoff, and maybe to have a live conversation with Challenger’s astronauts during the address. Under all this political pressure, NASA managers had to make publicrelations success, so these insisted on a launch on January 28th, holding paramount the shuttle program’s continued economic viability. Giving in under all the pressures made and insight of the technical risk of launching raised (to be discussed later), NASA’s management violated the most principle Professional Ethics canon of holding the public safety as their primary concern. Managers didn’t obey the canons of management professional ethics of “sound judgment” and

“communication, understanding and cooperation with employees at all levels”; they were informed about the hazard lying behind the launch at low temperatures; however they acted in recklessness and irresponsibility with the issue.
Thiokol engineers were very concerned about the O-ring’s failure observed in the coldest previous launch, especially that colder and worse weather conditions were expected at the day of planned launching of Challenger. Thiokol Vice
President Joe Kilminster said, “Thiokol can’t recommend launching if the temperature was below 53 F”. (Rossow, 2012)
With the serious concerns raised, NASA conducted a teleconference between engineers and manages from Kennedy
Space Center, Marshall’s Space Center and Thiokol. Roger Boisjoly and Arnie Tho mson, two of the engineers who worked on SRB, gave a presentation on how the low temperatures could affect the sealing objective of O -rings and alter their function. However, they didn’t have conclusive data. So at the end of the conference, Thiokol manage rs reversed the position of the company and recommended the launch contrary the views of its engineers. A final statement said by one of the managers, “take off your engineering hat, and put on your management hat” summarized how the final decision was made.
Before launching, Ice Team measured the thickness of the ice, and they recorded a temperature of 8 F far below the O rings tolerances. However, this information was never passed to the decision makes just because it is not the team’s responsibility to report anything but the Ice Thickness. If concerned engineers had known about this, the whole launch process would have been delayed and the disaster would have been avoided.
Engineers did abide by NSPE code of conduct by acknowledging their employers that there might be a failure of launching; however they acted with some sort of irresponsibility according to ASCE. ASCE They didn’t “blow the whisle” acknowledging external authorities when they knew that the managers were going for launching posing a direct threat to the safety, health, or welfare of the crew. ASCE code of conduct states, “If it becomes necessary to blow the whistle, the employee must advise the appropriate regulatory agency or a law enforcement agency“. Also managers were to be blamed for their recklessness, they knew the risk present; nevertheless they did nothing about it. Also, there were poor communication between NASA and Thiokol. Data presented by the engineers of Thiokel in the teleconference weren’t conclusive, and due to the absence of clarity in the data present, managers didn’t understand the real risk.
A last very important main ethical issue that can be raised in this case is the concept of “informed consent”. They crew didn’t know about the technical issues related to the flight. In the morning of the flight, the crew was informed about the ice on the launch pad, but wasn’t informed about the serious issues discussed in the teleconference the night before. So in practical, the crew agreed on being consent since they chose to be in the mission; however they weren’t an “informed consent” which violates the “informed consent” canon of professional ethics.
The Case of Columbia:
On February 1, 2003, the space shuttle Columbia exploded and disintegrated upon entering the Earth’s orbit above
Texas. The entire seven crew members were killed in the accident. Columbia was the second complete failure of a space shuttle that NASA had encountered during its 30-year Space Transportation System. Later investigations showed that a part of the insulation foam covering the external tank of the shuttle separated and stroke the leading edge of the left wing of Columbia. This caused damage in the insulation system covering the left wing which protects the shuttle’s body from overheating during reentry into the earth’s orbit, which the material of the body can’t withstand. So, during reentry, and

due to high temperature, a fire initiated in the left wing of the shuttle, and eventually the whole shuttle exploded and disintegrated. According to NASA’s space shuttle design specification, any loss of the insulation foam whether from the shuttle or from the critical zone of the tank during liftoff is a serious safety threat. However, almost in every shuttle mission to space, a part of the insulation foam is damaged because of the space debris. Yet, because of the success of missions with small damage in the insulation foam, NASA considered it as “in-flight anomalies”, and not something very serious.
There were some sort of critical recklessness in this issue; NASA should rather have development maintenance methods in the space to avoid catastrophes like that of Columbia of the shuttle into the Earth’s orbit.
In the case of challenger. The engineers were very concerned about what happened. Launch videos showed that the separated part was big in size and of high momentum. This led them to a doubt about the size of the possible damage in the insulation foam; so they asked for Satellite images for the shuttle’s wing. American Air Forces agreed on their demand, however, and because the incorrect request procedure followed; the manager of Columbia’s flight cancelled the request. By this practice, she acted with recklessness and violated the code of management ethics regarding “sound judgment”; maybe the engineers didn’t follow the right procedure, but she was to blame for being egocentric and reckless about why they would request such a thing.
Because of the bad communication between the engineers and the management, the engineers didn’t have the requested images and thus couldn’t make accurate estimation of the damage that occurred; yet, motivated by their engineering responsibility towards Columbia’s crew and using their microscopic eye, they gave a presentation on the possible damage that occurred and the possible scenarios to fix it. However, the inconclusive data that the engineers had

failed to convince the managers that it was a safety issue, and not only a maintenance issue as the managers believed. Indeed, once when the manager of Columbia’s flight was asked about the rejection of the engineer’s request, she said, “The time needed to correctly maneuver the shuttle for pictures will unduly impact the mission schedule”. (Kelly, 2004) The manager was very close-minded; she didn’t give any sort of attention to the safety concerns raised to her by engineers. Her mismanagement was very unethical and irresponsible.
Ethically, engineers are to blame too. They knew better than engineers about the seriousness of the risk present due to the technical errors in the shuffle; they didn’t blow the whistle asking for external authorities’ intervention when they felt that their managers are careless about a serious issue.
Conclusions:
Both shuttles of Challenger and Columbia although being disastrous to the human, they carried a lot of lessons within their leaves. In both cases, unethical management by managers led to poor communication with engineers. All what managers thought about was the funding to their programs and meeting the schedules despite the concerns raised to them in both cases. Engineers acted responsibly and abided by the codes of conduct of engineers of ensuring the safety of the shuttles and astronauts, however they were to blame for not blowing whistles. On the other hand, managers acted unethically but outweighing engineers’ fears and tending to favor historical trends over safety concerns in their decisionmaking.

References:
Rossow, M. (2012). Engineering ethics case study: The challenger disastor. Retrieved from http://www.cedengineering.com/upload/Ethics%20Challenger%20Disaster.pdf Boisjoly, R. (1987). Ethical decisions—morton thiokol and the space shuttle challenger disaster.

J. Kelly, “Confusion Hinders Photo Effort,” in Florida Today, 12 Oct 2004. [Online]. Available: http://www.floridatoday.com/Columbia/Columbiastory2A10309A.htm

References: Rossow, M. (2012). Engineering ethics case study: The challenger disastor. Retrieved from http://www.cedengineering.com/upload/Ethics%20Challenger%20Disaster.pdf Boisjoly, R. (1987). Ethical decisions—morton thiokol and the space shuttle challenger disaster. J. Kelly, “Confusion Hinders Photo Effort,” in Florida Today, 12 Oct 2004. [Online]. Available: http://www.floridatoday.com/Columbia/Columbiastory2A10309A.htm