Ethnic Conflict In Iraq

Upon marching into Iraq in 2003, American forces were tasked with deposing Saddam Hussein and imposing stability and security. The former was accomplished with stunning rapidity; the latter continues to elude Iraqis, regional interests, and the Western world almost fifteen years later. Why such chaos? Even the American “surge” of soldiers in 2007 did little to quell the violence. Ethnic conflict between the Kurds, Sunnis, and Shias, extant prior to American involvement, intensified post-invasion.
This paper posits that American mismanagement of the National Iraqi Army (NIA) contributed to the escalation of ethnic conflict and the insecurity that ensued.The National Iraqi Army, broken down in 2003 and reconstructed in the image of American officials, lacked legitimacy and cohesion because of the strategic errors made in dealing with deeply-rooted ethnic tensions between Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds.
Ambassador Paul Bremer’s decision to dissolve Iraq’s army in its entirety was unquestionably injurious to the creation of a viable, Iraqi-led security force, renewing animosity
They direct their criticism toward Iran’s constitution, a written incarnation of the principles of liberal accommodation. Nabil Al-Tikriti writes, “As if to institutionalize the newly sectarian face of Iraqi politics, the constitution included provisions allowing for governorates to band together… creating the potentiality of defacto regional partition.” Commenting on the formation of the US-backed Iraqi Governing Council, Tony Dodge argues, “ Criticism [from Iraqis] focused on the divisive nature of the selection process, arguing that it had introduced an overt sectarianism that had previously not been central to Iraqi political