295). He also argues that Rachels overlooks what the person is prepared to do, and only focuses on what action he takes, and claims that this is faulty because "both are judged reprehensible for precisely the same reason, namely that they were fully prepared to kill for motives of personal gain" (295). Stating that both men in Rachels' scenario are guilty of the same moral offense, he claims that in order to modify the scenario to accurately represent the argument in favor of a moral difference, one must not be fully prepared to kill the cousin, while the other is not. In a society where there is in fact a moral difference between killing and letting die, one would prefer more people who are not prepared to kill, and as Nesbitt states, "[Jones] might save me as long as he doesn't think he will profit from my death" (p.
295). He also argues that Rachels overlooks what the person is prepared to do, and only focuses on what action he takes, and claims that this is faulty because "both are judged reprehensible for precisely the same reason, namely that they were fully prepared to kill for motives of personal gain" (295). Stating that both men in Rachels' scenario are guilty of the same moral offense, he claims that in order to modify the scenario to accurately represent the argument in favor of a moral difference, one must not be fully prepared to kill the cousin, while the other is not. In a society where there is in fact a moral difference between killing and letting die, one would prefer more people who are not prepared to kill, and as Nesbitt states, "[Jones] might save me as long as he doesn't think he will profit from my death" (p.