Euthyphro Piety Analysis

Piety is not composed of the same properties as being loved by the gods for the property of being loved by the gods fail to capture the nature of piety. Plato within the Euthyphro ponders if things are piety from their nature or from being god loved. In short it is a question of if the morality of good is external to god or if he commands it. Euthyphro argues that what is pious is loved by the gods because it is pious, however in doing so he forces the gods to appeal to an external force above themselves. For if the gods love something because it is pious then they are alluring to a higher standard than themselves, making morality and all things good exterior to themselves and not modeled after their supposedly all-encompassing being. Leading
Defining a meaning through a different meaning only creates a circular reasoning with no substance. The element used to link these definitions is only the word because, which not only shows little to no correlation between the means, but also that correlation does not equal causation. For using the word because infers the end of causation enforcing the issues above, leading to the basis that something is ‘because’ of itself. Causing one to concluded Euthyphro’s argument is invalid, which threatens to infringe on the effectiveness of the dilemma. However, Socrates saves this issue by changing the word ‘because’ to ‘make’ inferring that it is not the indefinite answer, but an attempt in defining pious and god loved. I believe the real issue here is in first defining what it means to be pious and god loved, which needs to be achieved before one can determine if they are of the same substance or not. However, defining a word in all its element is nearly impossible and so, I find the more realistic challenge to be where piety, and morality come from external to ones belief in