Failure Of Operation Anaconda In The Task Army

Operation Anaconda consisted of different branches of the United States Military, Central Intelligence Agency operatives, as well as Afghan forces. This operation had some task organization failures before and during the battle that could have resulted in a much different outcome. Operation Anaconda was almost a complete failure due to lack of task organization that directly related to issues with loss of life, equipment shortfalls, and time of operation. Loss of Life As stated above the loss of life and wounded American and Afghan Soldiers during operation Anaconda was a problem that could have lost the battle for the United States and Afghan forces. The loss of American and Afghan Soldiers totaled eight killed in action and 72 wounded in action (Fleri, 2003). The amount of Soldiers killed or wounded in action came in a period of just two weeks and was a direct result as a task organization failure. If operation Anaconda’s task organization provided more intelligence sections, the amount of casualties could have been avoided based on accurate reporting of the amount of insurgents in the region.
Human Intelligence Analysts should have been included in the task organization instead of just satellite and drone intelligence imagines.
By including human intelligence, they would have got a more accurate count of insurgents that were in the area of operation. The drone and satellite imagines estimated around two hundred to three hundred Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters in the Shah-i-Khot Valley of Afghanistan. Insurgents were using tactics such as hiding next to trees when drone’s would fly by so they couldn’t be detected. As the battle started and progressed, the estimated number of insurgents was closer to around one thousand in the area of operation. If more intelligence units were included in the task, organization we would have had a more accurate accounting the amount of insurgents and prepared a different type of offensive
operation.
Equipment Shortfalls
Although intelligence assets were lacking in the task organization, another issue with the Operation Anaconda task organization was the amount of equipment shortfalls. One of the equipment shortfalls in the task organization was that there were no artillery or armored vehicles in Afghanistan (Geibel, 2002). This was a problem for coalition forces because this limited their ability to attack the insurgents with this type of equipment. Coalition forces had to rely on small arms and mortars along with air assets.
Having an artillery battalion in the task organization could have provided another aspect to the battle by allowing the coalition forces to be at less risk and farther away from the fighting which could have resulted in less U.S. casualties. It could have also provided more accurate target accusation with artillery rounds causing more damage to the insurgents hiding in the mountains then mortars or small arms fire that was used.
Although lacking artillery was a problem with anaconda’s task organization other issues coalition forces had were the lack of AH-64 helicopters assets. Task Force Rakkasan had eight AH-64 helicopters assigned to them while the majority of the task force was comprised of infantry. After the operation was under way, six of the eight AH-64 helicopters were shot and damaged leaving only two operational. With only two operational AH-64 helicopters it limited mission capabilities and troop movement with these aircrafts. The six AH-64’s were eventually repaired and were again mission capable allowing them to continue the operation. If these AH-64 were not able to be repaired, this could have seriously affected the operation by limiting troop movement and the ability to attack the insurgents.
Time of Operation
The time of operation was another challenge with the anaconda’s task organization. The start date of the operation was postponed due to the weather. Storms were in the forecast so the start of the operation was delayed a few days. The operation was supposed to last five days but ended up lasting fourteen due days because of the confusion with the task organization. The task organization had special forces operations reporting directly to United States Central Command located in Tampa, Florida. This was an issue because local commanders on the ground were not sure of the special operations mission or intelligence provided to them.
The task organization was confusing because the reporting chain of command was complex and sometimes commanders were not sure who could issue orders to troops on the ground in different units or task forces. Major General Hagenbeck was named the joint task force commander just a few days before operation Anaconda was supposed to start. Major General Hagenbeck’s inability to direct special operations forces on Takur Ghar mountain three days into Operation Anaconda where seven of the eight U.S. troops were lost meant he could not effectively plan the unforeseen events that normally occur in combat (Grossman, 2004). The lack of experience
Summary/Conclusion
Although there were issues with the Operation Anaconda task organization in loss of life, equipment shortfalls, and time of operation, the mission still carried on and was successful in the end.
The Army worked with other branches of service as well as the afghan troops to plan and execute a successful mission. This mission was mostly successful because the Soldiers in the battle stood their ground and fought a tough battle. Although military senior leadership were successful when the battle was won, just remember that Operation Anaconda was almost a complete failure due to lack of task organization that directly related to issues with loss of life, equipment shortfalls, and time of operation.