Ferrarini, Guidici the Parmalat Case
Financial Scandals and the Role of Private Enforcement: The Parmalat Case
Law Working Paper N° 40/2005 May 2005
Guido Ferrarini
University of Genoa, Centre for Law and Finance and ECGI
Paolo Giudici
Free University of Bozen and Centre for Law and Finance
© Guido Ferrarini and Paolo Giudici 2005. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. This paper can be downloaded without charge from: http://ssrn.com/abstract=730403 www.ecgi.org/wp
ECGI Working Paper Series in Law
Financial Scandals and the Role of Private Enforcement: The Parmalat Case
Working Paper N° 40/2005 May 2005
Guido Ferrarini Paolo Giudici
This Working Paper is based upon a draft prepared for the EU Corporate Law Making Conference (Cambridge, October 29-30, 2004) organized by Harvard Law School and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich). The authors are grateful to Gerard Hertig, Mark Roe, Donald Langevoort, and other conference participants for helpful comments. Drafts of this paper were also presented at the Yale Law School Alumni Meeting on October 8-10, 2004; at a meeting of the Associazione Via Isonzo held in Milan on October 10, 2004; and at a seminar at the Institute of Law and Finance (ILF), University of Frankfurt, on January 18, 2005. The authors are grateful to Theodore Baums, Andreas Cahn, Carmine Di Noia, Jon Macey, Katharina Pistor and other seminar participants for helpful suggestions. Special thanks to Bruno Cova (General Counsel of Parmalat’s Extraordinary Administration), Lucie Courteau and Justin Rainey. The authors acknowledge research assistance by Liliana Emer, Gian Giacomo Peruzzo and Andrea Zanoni. This paper is part of a research project cofinanced by the “MIUR – Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca”, the University of Genoa and the Free University of Bozen. © Guido
Law Working Paper N° 40/2005 May 2005
Guido Ferrarini
University of Genoa, Centre for Law and Finance and ECGI
Paolo Giudici
Free University of Bozen and Centre for Law and Finance
© Guido Ferrarini and Paolo Giudici 2005. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. This paper can be downloaded without charge from: http://ssrn.com/abstract=730403 www.ecgi.org/wp
ECGI Working Paper Series in Law
Financial Scandals and the Role of Private Enforcement: The Parmalat Case
Working Paper N° 40/2005 May 2005
Guido Ferrarini Paolo Giudici
This Working Paper is based upon a draft prepared for the EU Corporate Law Making Conference (Cambridge, October 29-30, 2004) organized by Harvard Law School and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich). The authors are grateful to Gerard Hertig, Mark Roe, Donald Langevoort, and other conference participants for helpful comments. Drafts of this paper were also presented at the Yale Law School Alumni Meeting on October 8-10, 2004; at a meeting of the Associazione Via Isonzo held in Milan on October 10, 2004; and at a seminar at the Institute of Law and Finance (ILF), University of Frankfurt, on January 18, 2005. The authors are grateful to Theodore Baums, Andreas Cahn, Carmine Di Noia, Jon Macey, Katharina Pistor and other seminar participants for helpful suggestions. Special thanks to Bruno Cova (General Counsel of Parmalat’s Extraordinary Administration), Lucie Courteau and Justin Rainey. The authors acknowledge research assistance by Liliana Emer, Gian Giacomo Peruzzo and Andrea Zanoni. This paper is part of a research project cofinanced by the “MIUR – Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca”, the University of Genoa and the Free University of Bozen. © Guido