Ford Pinto Research Paper
Running Head: ENGINEERING
Engineering Issues and the Ford Pinto
Major Walker, III Troy University
The Ford Pinto was first introduced to the North American market in 1970. The Pinto was introduced primarily to compete in the small car market with where Volkswagen dominated. The way the Ford Pinto was designed tragically left rear-ends accidents up in flames. This is because the gas tank was positioned in between the bumper and the axle. This was normal for small cars except the Pinto also had filler neck that was ripped out on impact which caused gas to spill out and eventually ignite. Ironically, years before, Arjay Miller, president of Ford at that time (1965), testified to Congress that Ford would lead the way with a fabric gas tank that would prevent fires in rear end accidents stating that the fabric gas tank “will be a feature you will see on our standard cars.”(Birch, 1994 p.16) Seven years later, a woman and her son were in one of these accidents. Sadly the woman died and the son was left with a scarred body. Ford upper …show more content…
management understood the engineering issues because they rushed through planning and production, conducted in house crash tests, and later formed cost benefit analysis on the human life. One way Ford’s upper management did understand the engineering issues involved is through the planning and production phase of this project. Ford did, however, had the option to place the gas tank above the axle but objected to this because it limited the trunk space in the extended models like the wagon and hatchback. This would have saved many lives. The Pinto was rushed through planning (which usually takes 43 months) in about 25 months from conception to production. This meant that all the components of producing a car had to take place at the same time including tooling. Tooling usually doesn’t take place until all other components of planning and production are done to make sure all the parts work together. When the problem with the gas tank was found it was too late. Ford was too far into the tooling process. It could not be possible to that upper management at ford did not understand the engineering issues involved producing the Ford Pinto. Another way that the Ford management was informed was the amount of crash tests that were conducted before the Pinto was rolled out for sales. The leadership at Ford was clearly irresponsible when it came to the safety of their customers and people lost lives because of it. With Lee Iacocca having an Industrial Engineering degree from Leigh and designing the Ford Mustang he clearly understood the problem but ignored it simply because of money. Engineers were under strict direction not to deviate from the production plan. When asked whether Lee Iacocca was informed about the safety issue, an engineer convincingly said “Hell no”. Safety was clearly put on the back burner at Ford at this time. Engineers were often referred to the “green book” where the product objectives were listed. Safety was clearly not listed as one of the product objectives. Ford was eager to get in the market and sell it product and any safety issues that were brought to the table were ignored and production continued. Lee Iacocca was fond of saying “Safety doesn’t sell” which implies that he did not care about the safety aspects of the business. His attitude toward the Pinto was to get it produced as fast as possible and get it into a market hungry for a sub-compact car. Although engineers may not have told Lee Iacocca about the hazards of the Pinto he clearly knew about the issue because of more than 40 crash test involving the Pinto. Eleven of these tests took place before the Pinto started leaving the factories. Three of these cars passed the test but only because they had a protective measure preventing the tank from igniting. Not one of these measures was added to the production of the Pinto which could have saved many lives. One of these preventive measures was a one dollar, one pound piece of plastic which prevented the puncture of the gas tank which prevented the fires accidents. Lee Iacocca and the upper management had the option to act but did not because they felt that they would lose money. Throwing the safety measure out because it cost the company more to produce was simply irresponsible and unethical. This takes us to the cost benefit analysis that the Ford Company conducted. The company estimated that it would be cheaper for them to settle in court any accidents rather than make the necessary repairs to the cars to save live. The price that was placed on an Human Life by the National Highway Traffic Administration was $200,000. Ford took that cost along with $67,000 for injury and $700 per vehicle and times that 180 for number of deaths and injury and 2100 for the number on burned vehicles. For the repairs, it was 12.5 million cars times the $11 per car. Clearly, It cost 88 million dollars more to repair the vehicle in which Ford took into account when they made the decision not to repair the cars. Ford was doing cost control and had people’s lives caught up right in the middle. We do know that companies are in the money making business but when it put lives at risk it is clearly unethical and the upper management knew the problems and did not act to fix it in a timely manner. In the end, Ford had to recall 1.5 million Pintos. This probably ended up costing the company more than it would have been to make the initial correction. Ford and other Companies should make the honest effort to do what is right both legally and morally. Companies today are in the business today to make money. Many businesses do it legally but their ethics can be put into question. Although many companies can ignore the topic of ethics, many businesses are revamping their ethical policies to cater to the consumer. Looking into the future, more stringent demands for social responsibility will be required from the consumer and the shareholders. Not only did Ford management understand the issues, they will never make a mistake of this magnitude again.
.
11 vs. a Burn Death (1977). [Electronic version]. Retrieved September 28,2008 from http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/1977/09/death.html. Ford Pinto Fuel-Fed Fires (2006) The Center for Auto Safety. Retrieved September 28, 2008 from http://www.autosafety.org/ford-pinto-fuel-fed-fires Pinto Madness (1977) Mark Dowie [Electronic Version] Retrieved September 28, 2008 http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/1977/09/dowie.html Shades of Pinto (1994) Fredric Tulsky. [Electronic Version]. Retrieved September 28, 2008 from http://www.motherjones.com/news/update/1994/01/tulsky.html The Ford Pinto Case (1994) Douglas Birsch, John H. Fielder [Electronic version] Retrieved September 28, 2008
http://books.google.com/books?id=qIlPURPTx30C
Engineering Issues and the Ford Pinto
Major Walker, III Troy University
The Ford Pinto was first introduced to the North American market in 1970. The Pinto was introduced primarily to compete in the small car market with where Volkswagen dominated. The way the Ford Pinto was designed tragically left rear-ends accidents up in flames. This is because the gas tank was positioned in between the bumper and the axle. This was normal for small cars except the Pinto also had filler neck that was ripped out on impact which caused gas to spill out and eventually ignite. Ironically, years before, Arjay Miller, president of Ford at that time (1965), testified to Congress that Ford would lead the way with a fabric gas tank that would prevent fires in rear end accidents stating that the fabric gas tank “will be a feature you will see on our standard cars.”(Birch, 1994 p.16) Seven years later, a woman and her son were in one of these accidents. Sadly the woman died and the son was left with a scarred body. Ford upper …show more content…
management understood the engineering issues because they rushed through planning and production, conducted in house crash tests, and later formed cost benefit analysis on the human life. One way Ford’s upper management did understand the engineering issues involved is through the planning and production phase of this project. Ford did, however, had the option to place the gas tank above the axle but objected to this because it limited the trunk space in the extended models like the wagon and hatchback. This would have saved many lives. The Pinto was rushed through planning (which usually takes 43 months) in about 25 months from conception to production. This meant that all the components of producing a car had to take place at the same time including tooling. Tooling usually doesn’t take place until all other components of planning and production are done to make sure all the parts work together. When the problem with the gas tank was found it was too late. Ford was too far into the tooling process. It could not be possible to that upper management at ford did not understand the engineering issues involved producing the Ford Pinto. Another way that the Ford management was informed was the amount of crash tests that were conducted before the Pinto was rolled out for sales. The leadership at Ford was clearly irresponsible when it came to the safety of their customers and people lost lives because of it. With Lee Iacocca having an Industrial Engineering degree from Leigh and designing the Ford Mustang he clearly understood the problem but ignored it simply because of money. Engineers were under strict direction not to deviate from the production plan. When asked whether Lee Iacocca was informed about the safety issue, an engineer convincingly said “Hell no”. Safety was clearly put on the back burner at Ford at this time. Engineers were often referred to the “green book” where the product objectives were listed. Safety was clearly not listed as one of the product objectives. Ford was eager to get in the market and sell it product and any safety issues that were brought to the table were ignored and production continued. Lee Iacocca was fond of saying “Safety doesn’t sell” which implies that he did not care about the safety aspects of the business. His attitude toward the Pinto was to get it produced as fast as possible and get it into a market hungry for a sub-compact car. Although engineers may not have told Lee Iacocca about the hazards of the Pinto he clearly knew about the issue because of more than 40 crash test involving the Pinto. Eleven of these tests took place before the Pinto started leaving the factories. Three of these cars passed the test but only because they had a protective measure preventing the tank from igniting. Not one of these measures was added to the production of the Pinto which could have saved many lives. One of these preventive measures was a one dollar, one pound piece of plastic which prevented the puncture of the gas tank which prevented the fires accidents. Lee Iacocca and the upper management had the option to act but did not because they felt that they would lose money. Throwing the safety measure out because it cost the company more to produce was simply irresponsible and unethical. This takes us to the cost benefit analysis that the Ford Company conducted. The company estimated that it would be cheaper for them to settle in court any accidents rather than make the necessary repairs to the cars to save live. The price that was placed on an Human Life by the National Highway Traffic Administration was $200,000. Ford took that cost along with $67,000 for injury and $700 per vehicle and times that 180 for number of deaths and injury and 2100 for the number on burned vehicles. For the repairs, it was 12.5 million cars times the $11 per car. Clearly, It cost 88 million dollars more to repair the vehicle in which Ford took into account when they made the decision not to repair the cars. Ford was doing cost control and had people’s lives caught up right in the middle. We do know that companies are in the money making business but when it put lives at risk it is clearly unethical and the upper management knew the problems and did not act to fix it in a timely manner. In the end, Ford had to recall 1.5 million Pintos. This probably ended up costing the company more than it would have been to make the initial correction. Ford and other Companies should make the honest effort to do what is right both legally and morally. Companies today are in the business today to make money. Many businesses do it legally but their ethics can be put into question. Although many companies can ignore the topic of ethics, many businesses are revamping their ethical policies to cater to the consumer. Looking into the future, more stringent demands for social responsibility will be required from the consumer and the shareholders. Not only did Ford management understand the issues, they will never make a mistake of this magnitude again.
.
11 vs. a Burn Death (1977). [Electronic version]. Retrieved September 28,2008 from http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/1977/09/death.html. Ford Pinto Fuel-Fed Fires (2006) The Center for Auto Safety. Retrieved September 28, 2008 from http://www.autosafety.org/ford-pinto-fuel-fed-fires Pinto Madness (1977) Mark Dowie [Electronic Version] Retrieved September 28, 2008 http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/1977/09/dowie.html Shades of Pinto (1994) Fredric Tulsky. [Electronic Version]. Retrieved September 28, 2008 from http://www.motherjones.com/news/update/1994/01/tulsky.html The Ford Pinto Case (1994) Douglas Birsch, John H. Fielder [Electronic version] Retrieved September 28, 2008
http://books.google.com/books?id=qIlPURPTx30C