Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (Fmri) and Phrenology
Essay Assignment II
Nov. 28th, 2012
Discuss whether the functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) is a new form of “phrenology”. Is it reliable enough to be used as evidence in court?
After fMRI was first introduced, it has been under criticism that it is not hard science. The most common technique, the BOLD (blood oxygen level-dependent) fMRI, measures the increase in regional cerebral blood flow in response to increased metabolism, which is to be caused from heightened activity of neuron firing (Menon & Kim, 1999). Some neurologists believe that this is an indirect way of measuring brain activity, and is not sufficient to support any idea.
By many scientists fMRI is often compared to phrenology, a study that once gained popularity in the 19th century. Phrenology is based on the concept that the brain is the organ of the mind, and that certain brain areas have localized, specific functions or modules (Fodor, 1983). This is similar to fMRI practitioners’ attempts to localize brain structure, matching the divided parts of the brain with certain functions.
Judging whether fMRI is a new form of phrenology concerns two points: fMRI’s similarities to phrenology, and fMRI’s significance to be admitted as the ‘new form’. This will also lead to the question of whether fMRI scan is meaningful to be presented as evidence in court.
The logic of fMRI is straight-forward. Brain parts that light up to a certain stimulus, is related to the function provoked by the stimulus. The fMRI machine measures increase in blood flow in brain regions. The regions with increased blood flow appear in brighter colors, in red or yellow (Dobbs, 2005). fMRI’s logic of relating higher blood flow and function is similar to that of phrenology, which relates size of lump to function. From this analogy we can say that fMRI can be considered some form of ‘phrenology.’
Another reason that fMRI is compared to phrenology is for its limitations (Menon & Kim, 1999). fMRI’s problem rise
Nov. 28th, 2012
Discuss whether the functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) is a new form of “phrenology”. Is it reliable enough to be used as evidence in court?
After fMRI was first introduced, it has been under criticism that it is not hard science. The most common technique, the BOLD (blood oxygen level-dependent) fMRI, measures the increase in regional cerebral blood flow in response to increased metabolism, which is to be caused from heightened activity of neuron firing (Menon & Kim, 1999). Some neurologists believe that this is an indirect way of measuring brain activity, and is not sufficient to support any idea.
By many scientists fMRI is often compared to phrenology, a study that once gained popularity in the 19th century. Phrenology is based on the concept that the brain is the organ of the mind, and that certain brain areas have localized, specific functions or modules (Fodor, 1983). This is similar to fMRI practitioners’ attempts to localize brain structure, matching the divided parts of the brain with certain functions.
Judging whether fMRI is a new form of phrenology concerns two points: fMRI’s similarities to phrenology, and fMRI’s significance to be admitted as the ‘new form’. This will also lead to the question of whether fMRI scan is meaningful to be presented as evidence in court.
The logic of fMRI is straight-forward. Brain parts that light up to a certain stimulus, is related to the function provoked by the stimulus. The fMRI machine measures increase in blood flow in brain regions. The regions with increased blood flow appear in brighter colors, in red or yellow (Dobbs, 2005). fMRI’s logic of relating higher blood flow and function is similar to that of phrenology, which relates size of lump to function. From this analogy we can say that fMRI can be considered some form of ‘phrenology.’
Another reason that fMRI is compared to phrenology is for its limitations (Menon & Kim, 1999). fMRI’s problem rise
References: Dobbs, D. (2005). Fact or Phrenology? Scientific American Mind, Vol.16, p.24-31. Jaffe, S. (2004). Fake Method for Research Impartiality (fMRI): behavioral Sciences bid for enhanced status falls short. The Scientist, Vol.18, p.64. Hughes, V. (2010, March 18). Head Case. Nature, Vol.464, p.340-342. Fodor, Jerry A. (1983). Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology. MIT Press. p.14-23 Hubbard, E. (2003). A discussion and review of Uttal (2001) The New Phrenology. Cognitive Science Online, Vol.1, p. 22-33. Menon, R., & Kim, S. (1999). Spatial and temporal limits in cognitive neuroimaging with fMRI.Trends in Cognitive Science, Vol.3, p. 207-216.