Gay Rights and the Social Conflict Theory

correct when he called for more research in understudied areas (p. 614), but until such research is conducted, psychologists must consider carefully what standards to use in summarizing and communicating research findings. REFERENCES

Anderssen, N., Amlie, C., & Ytteroy, E. A.
(2002). Outcomes for children with lesbian or gay parents. A review of studies from 1978 to
2000. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology,
43, 335–351.
Conger, J. J. (1975). Proceedings of the American Psychological Association, Incorporated, for the year 1974: Minutes of the annual meeting of the Council of Representatives. American Psychologist, 30, 620 – 651.
Cummings, N. A. (2006, August 12). The APA and psychology need reform. Paper presented at the annual convention of the American Psychological Association, New Orleans, LA.
Herek, G. M. (2006). Legal recognition of samesex relationships in the United States: A social science perspective. American Psychologist,
61, 607– 621.
Patterson, C. J. (1992). Children of lesbian and gay parents. Child Development, 63, 1025–
1042.
Stacey, J., & Biblarz, T. J. (2001). (How) Does the sexual orientation of parents matter?
American
Sociological
Review,
66,
159 –183.
Wainright, J. L., Russell, S. T., & Patterson, C. J.
(2004). Psychosocial adjustment, school outcomes, and romantic relationships of adolescents with same-sex parents. Child Development, 75, 1886 –1898.
Correspondence concerning this comment should be addressed to Virginia M. Shiller, Yale
Child Study Center, 230 South Frontage Road,
P.O. Box 207900, New Haven, CT 06520-7900.
E-mail: [e-mail]

DOI:10.1037/0003-066X.62.7.713a

Psychologists’ Advocacy for the Legal Recognition of
Same-Sex Relationships
Bruce A. Thyer
Florida State University
Herek (September 2006) provided a useful overview of psychological research relevant to the legal recognition of same-sex marriages. Another avenue of advocacy that the American Psychological Association could undertake would be to take advantage of its status as an accredited nongovernmental organization at the United
Nations and aim to amend the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, originally approved in 1948 (see

October 2007 ● American Psychologist

http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm).
This document, noble in many respects, contains standards that limit the rights of gays and lesbians to legally marry. For example, Article 16(1) reads, “Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.” Article 16(3) reads, “The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the
State.” These articles could be construed as limiting the right of marriage to members of the opposite sex and justifying legal restrictions on same-sex marriage in the name of protecting the “family.” It is troubling that the very United Nations that advocates for human rights around the globe perpetuates these hetero-normative standards. Amending the United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights would be a positive step toward providing a legal rationale and international precedent for equal civil rights for gays and lesbians within the
United States and other countries.
REFERENCE

Herek, G. M. (2006). Legal recognition of samesex relationships in the United States: A social science perspective. American Psychologist,
61, 607– 621.
Correspondence concerning this comment should be addressed to Bruce A. Thyer, College of Social
Work, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL
32306. E-mail: [e-mail]

DOI:10.1037/0003-066X.62.7.713b

Science, Public Policy, and
Legal Recognition of SameSex Relationships
Gregory M. Herek
University of California, Davis
In their comments on my article discussing the social science data relevant to societal recognition of same-sex committed relationships (Herek, September 2006), Rosik and Byrd (2007) and Schiller (2007) criticized aspects of my analysis and raised questions about the role of psychology in policy debates concerning sexual orientation. In the limited space available here, I first respond to their specific criticisms and then briefly consider the broader policy question. To borrow a phrase from Rosik and
Byrd (2007), their comment contains many
“arguable contentions” (p. 711). One might

challenge their use of empirical data, pointing out that the statistics they attributed to
Michael, Gagnon, Laumann, and Kolata
(1994) concerning sexual exclusivity among male cohabiting couples are simply wrong (Michael et al. reported no such findings), or noting that the data on which they relied concerning cross-national gender differences in sexual desire came from convenience samples consisting almost entirely of college students (whose desire for sexual partners might not be generalizable to all adults) and including only 148 gay men (vs. 4,995 heterosexual men).
Or, because female–female relationships appear more likely to be sexually exclusive than male–female or male– male relationships, one might ask why Rosik and Byrd (2007) did not advocate for the right of lesbian couples to marry. Alternatively, one could question whether extra-relationship sex that occurs with the knowledge and consent of both partners (which appears to be a common pattern in sexually nonexclusive male couples) should be equated with sex that involves partner deception (which appears to be a common pattern in nonmonogamous heterosexual couples). One might even guess that many male couples’ honesty with each other could be considered a mark of being “civilized,” although that highly loaded term was never defined by Rosik and Byrd.
Or one might challenge their assumption that the right to marry is contingent on a couple’s sexual exclusivity, and their use of this assumption to argue that individual rights should be assigned or denied on the basis of group characteristics. Without recapitulating my original discussion, I note that such logic could justify outlawing marriage for many heterosexuals, including those who have low incomes, do not attend religious services frequently, are African
American, or have been separated or divorced. National survey data suggest that all of these groups have higher rates of sexual nonexclusivity in marriage relative to their counterparts (Smith, 2003, cited in
Herek, 2006).
Rather than elaborating on these or related points, I focus here on Rosik and
Byrd’s (2007) central argument, which is really about heterosexuals. They worry that if male couples are allowed to marry, and if some of those couples agree not to be sexually exclusive, heterosexual men will rebel against the institution of marriage— either demanding the right to have extramarital sex or refusing to marry in the first place. Among its myriad weaknesses, this prediction simply ignores important facts:

713

that sex is only one component of a committed relationship; that people have many reasons for getting married; that marriages remain intact as a result of multiple attractive forces and barriers to separation; and that many men are intrinsically motivated to remain sexually exclusive in their marital relationship (e.g., on the basis of their own moral values). Moreover, it is contradicted by the available data. An examination of five European countries that provide marriage or marriage-like benefits to samesex couples found that “divorce rates in these countries have not risen since the passage of partnership laws, and marriage rates have remained stable or actually increased, suggesting that heterosexual marriage has not been undermined by enactment of such legislation” (Badgett, 2004, p. 2).
Predictions like that made by Rosik and Byrd (2007) have been popular among conservative activists. As I noted in my article, another common assertion by such activists has been that “overwhelming scientific evidence” shows that “gay marriage presents a grave threat to children—study after study has found that boys and girls not raised by both of their biological parents are much more likely to . . . suffer abuse, perform poorly in school, abuse drugs and alcohol and wind up in trouble with the law” (Focus on the Family, 2004, quoted in
Herek, 2006, p. 612).
As I explained, the studies cited by individuals making this argument compared children from intact heterosexual families to those in single-parent households (e.g., due to divorce, separation, or death of a spouse). They did not address the parents’ sexual orientation and so cannot be used to draw conclusions about gay parents and their children. Thus, to say that empirical research shows that gay marriage is a grave threat to children is simply untrue. Schiller (2007) admitted that “opponents of gay parent rights have presented alarmist and misleading information to courts” (p. 712) and that “opponents make egregious statements about the unfitness of gay and lesbian parents and the pathology of their children” (p. 712). Nevertheless, she disputed my correction to those distortions, accusing me of (a) minimizing “the significance of the virtual lack of any research focusing on the overall adjustment of children of gay fathers” and (b) failing
“to clarify that findings about children raised by lesbians are being generalized to children of gay fathers” (p. 712).
Her first criticism is based on an inaccurate premise. Although most empirical studies on fathering by gay men have focused mainly on the fathers and their par-

714

enting styles and practices (Patterson,
2004), some have reported on the functioning, happiness, and well-being of the children of gay fathers, based on personal interviews or questionnaires completed by the parents or children (Crosbie-Burnett &
Helmbrecht, 1993; Erich, Leung, Kindle, &
Carter, 2005; Miller, 1979). They are preliminary studies and, like those conducted with children of lesbian mothers, must be considered in light of their methodological limitations, including those I discussed in my article.
It is true, however, that considerably more empirical research has been published on lesbian mothers than gay fathers, and important research gaps exist in the gay fathers literature. Contrary to
Schiller’s (2007) second assertion, I believe my article made this fact clear.
While pointing out that “policy debates about marriage and parenting . . . have generally not differentiated between female and male couples,” I explicitly cautioned that “empirical research on lesbian mothers is more extensive than that on gay fathers” (p. 612), that “studies [of parental ability and related qualities] examining gay fathers are fewer in number
[than studies of lesbian mothers]” (p.
613), and that “data [on gender identity and gender role conformity] have not been reported on the children of gay fathers” (p. 613). Contrary to Schiller’s intimation that my discussion of the
Wainright, Russell, and Patterson (2004) study obscured the sample’s composition, I clearly reported that comparisons were made between “44 adolescents parented by female couples and 44 adolescents parented by heterosexual couples”
(Herek, 2006, p. 613, emphasis added). I also commented that “More studies based on probability samples are needed on the children of sexual minority parents, especially the children of gay and bisexual fathers” (p. 614, emphasis added). Finally, having explained previously that a complete review of existing research was beyond the scope of my article, I referred readers to several relevant literature reviews, including Patterson’s (2004) extensive chapter, titled “Gay Fathers” (curiously, Schiller’s comment cites a 1992 review by Patterson instead of this more recent and clearly relevant work).
Recognizing that empirical studies of gay fathers and their children have indeed been published, one might nevertheless ask whether there is reason to expect that future research will show gay men to be unqualified for parenthood. As I noted in my article, if gay parents (fathers or mothers) were inherently unfit, even small-scale

studies with convenience samples would readily detect it. This has not been the case.
Moreover, there is no theoretical reason to expect gay fathers to cause harm to their children. For example, being raised by a single father does not appear to be inherently more disadvantageous to children’s psychological well-being than being raised by a single mother (e.g., Downey, Ainsworth-Darnell, & Dufur, 1998); homosexuality—male or female— does not constitute a pathology or deficit (Conger, 1975); and gay men do not pose a threat to children (Patterson, 2004). Thus, although more research is needed, the available data place the burden of empirical proof on those who argue that having a gay father is harmful to children.
Both comments raised questions about whether and how psychologists should address policy issues related to sexual orientation. Rosik and Byrd
(2007) advocated what they called a
“measured approach” that “would distinguish the social scientist from the social activist” (p. 712). In practice, however, their measured approach apparently allows for vague constructs (e.g., men’s
“uncivilized” sexual nature), accepts conservative social activists’ assumptions (e.g., about the necessity of marital
“gender complementarity”), and ignores data that contradict their predictions
(e.g., Badgett, 2004). Thus, it clearly is inadequate as a source for guidance.
Yet, it is appropriate to ask how psychologists might best decide when we can and should address public policy concerning sexual orientation. That we have something to say in this area seems indisputable in a general sense, given that psychological constructions of homosexuality as an illness throughout much of the twentieth century provided a justification for heterosexuals to denigrate, persecute, and discriminate against sexual minorities (and led many sexual minority individuals to hate themselves). It is in recognition of this history that the APA has repeatedly urged mental health professionals “to take the lead in removing the stigma of mental illness that has long been associated with homosexual orientations” (Conger, 1975,
p. 633).
In light of Schiller’s (2007) reference to Leona Tyler, it seems appropriate to consider the four criteria that Tyler (1969) outlined for guiding APA decision making about taking appropriate action on public policy issues: (a) the importance of the issue, (b) the extent of value agreement on it among APA members, (c) the amount of available research-based information, and
(d) the probability that action will be effec-

October 2007 ● American Psychologist

tive. Applied to the controversy about recognizing committed same-sex relationships, these criteria appear to be met. My article amply documented the issue’s importance and the fact that empirical data are available to evaluate the accuracy of assertions about sexual minority individuals made by both sides in the debate.
Value agreement on the issue within the
APA is attested to by the Council of
Representatives’ resolutions on same-sex relationships and families (cited in my article). As for Tyler’s fourth criterion, it is difficult to know if and how psychologists’ efforts in this arena will be effective. Regardless of the ultimate policy outcome, however, to the extent that we successfully communicate accurate information about the current state of scientific knowledge on sexual orientation and same-sex relationships, we will have remained true to our commitment to take a leading role in removing the stigma associated with homosexuality.
REFERENCES

Badgett, M. V. L. (2004). Will providing marriage rights to same-sex couples undermine heterosexual marriage? Evidence from Scan-

October 2007 ● American Psychologist

dinavia and the Netherlands. Sexuality Research and Social Policy, 1(3), 1–10.
Conger, J. J. (1975). Proceedings of the American Psychological Association, Incorporated, for the year 1974: Minutes of the annual meeting of the Council of Representatives. American Psychologist, 30, 620 – 651.
Crosbie-Burnett, M., & Helmbrecht, L. (1993).
A descriptive empirical study of gay male stepfamilies. Family Relations, 42, 256 –262.
Downey, D. B., Ainsworth-Darnell, J. W., & Dufur, M. J. (1998). Sex of parent and children’s well-being in single-parent households. Journal of Marriage & the Family, 60, 878 – 893.
Erich, S., Leung, P., Kindle, P., & Carter, S. (2005).
Gay and lesbian adoptive families: An exploratory study of family functioning, adoptive child’s behavior, and familial support networks. Journal of
Family Social Work, 9(1), 17–32.
Focus on the Family. (2004, May 17). Dobson laments “dark day” for traditional families.
Retrieved May 21, 2004, from http://www
.family.org/welcome/press/a0032039.cfm
Herek, G. M. (2006). Legal recognition of samesex relationships in the United States: A social science perspective. American Psychologist,
61, 607– 621.
Michael, R., Gagnon, J. H., Laumann, E. O., &
Kolata, G. (1994). Sex in America: A definitive survey. Boston: Little, Brown.
Miller, B. (1979). Gay fathers and their children.
The Family Coordinator, 28, 544 –552.

Patterson, C. J. (2004). Gay fathers. In M. E. Lamb
(Ed.), The role of the father in child development
(4th ed., pp. 397– 416). New York: Wiley.
Rosik, C. H., & Byrd, A. D. (2007). Marriage and the civilizing of male sexual nature.
American Psychologist, 62, 711–712.
Schiller, V. (2007). Science and advocacy in research regarding children of gay and lesbian parents. American Psychologist, 62,
712–713.
Smith, T. W. (2003). American sexual behavior:
Trends, socio-demographic differences, and risk behavior. Chicago: University of Chicago, National Opinion Research Center. Retrieved July 13, 2005, from http://www
.norc.org/issues/American_Sexual_Behavior_
2003.pdf
Tyler, L. (1969). An approach to public affairs:
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Public
Affairs. American Psychologist, 24, 1– 4.
Wainright, J. L., Russell, S. T., & Patterson, C. J.
(2004). Psychosocial adjustment, school outcomes, and romantic relationships of adolescents with same-sex parents. Child Development, 75, 1886 –1898.

Correspondence concerning this comment should be addressed to Gregory M. Herek, Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis, CA 95616-8686.

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References: Badgett, M. V. L. (2004). Will providing marriage rights to same-sex couples undermine heterosexual marriage? Evidence from Scan- Conger, J. J. (1975). Proceedings of the American Psychological Association, Incorporated, for the year 1974: Minutes of the annual meeting of the Council of Representatives Crosbie-Burnett, M., & Helmbrecht, L. (1993). Downey, D. B., Ainsworth-Darnell, J. W., & Dufur, M. J. (1998). Sex of parent and children’s well-being in single-parent households Erich, S., Leung, P., Kindle, P., & Carter, S. (2005). Focus on the Family. (2004, May 17). Dobson laments “dark day” for traditional families. Retrieved May 21, 2004, from http://www .family.org/welcome/press/a0032039.cfm Herek, G. M. (2006). Legal recognition of samesex relationships in the United States: A social science perspective Miller, B. (1979). Gay fathers and their children. Patterson, C. J. (2004). Gay fathers. In M. E. Lamb (Ed.), The role of the father in child development Rosik, C. H., & Byrd, A. D. (2007). Marriage and the civilizing of male sexual nature. Schiller, V. (2007). Science and advocacy in research regarding children of gay and lesbian parents Smith, T. W. (2003). American sexual behavior: Trends, socio-demographic differences, and risk behavior. Chicago: University of Chicago, National Opinion Research Center. Retrieved July 13, 2005, from http://www .norc.org/issues/American_Sexual_Behavior_ (2004). Psychosocial adjustment, school outcomes, and romantic relationships of adolescents with same-sex parents. Child Development, 75, 1886 –1898.