Geach's Argument

In this paper, I will present the arguments of two philosophers about the definition of “good”. First, I will present Moore’s argument that “good” is indefinable. Then, I will present Geach’s response to this and how he can undermine Moore’s argument. Next, I will discuss in what sense Geach believes “good” can be defined. Finally, I will discuss my opinion on who has the correct definability of “good” and give reasons to defend my opinion. Moore sets the groundwork by first defining the province of ethics. He proposes the question, what is common and peculiar to all ethical judgements? He offers a suggestion that “what is good or bad in human conduct” will be the answer to this. He refutes this, however, based on the fact that good conduct
Moore notes that there are different senses of the question “what is good in general”. In one case, something distinct is being judged and the question “what is good” is answered by “this”. Moore says that this cannot be the correct sense to view the question because “ethics does not deal with facts that are unique, individual, or absolutely particular” (Moore $3). Another sense to view the question “what is good in general” is by answering “what” by classes of good things. You could answer the question by saying food is good, but this would be false. It may be true that many types of food are good, but some food is bad. Moore proposes that the question “what is good” may have another meaning. We may mean to ask not what thing or what things are good, but rather how is good to be defined. Moore concludes that this must be the fundamental question of ethics, since that which is meant by good is the only simple object of thought peculiar to ethics (Moore $5). Now that the fundamental question
Geach explains that there are two different kinds of adjectives, predicative and attributive. In a phrase “X is an AB”, A being an adjective and B being a noun, “A” is predicative if the phrase splits logically into “X is A” and “X is B”. “A” is attributive if the phrase does not logically split into “X is A” and “X is B” (Geach 34). For example, take the phrase “Sam is a small whale”. The adjective “small” is attributive because the phrase does not logically split into “Sam is small” and “Sam is a whale”. Sam could be a small whale but a big animal, therefore this is illogical. To determine whether “good” is predicative or attributive, take for instance the phrases “a blue boat” and “a good boat”. You could determine that an object far away in the ocean is a blue boat by observing that the object is blue and that the object is a boat. However, you cannot determine that a distant object is a good boat by observing that the object is good and that it is a boat. This shows that “good” is an attributive adjective, not predicative. Geach says there is no such thing as being just good, there is only being a good thing. X can be a good boat but X cannot simply be good. Moore’s claim that good is indefinable relies on the premise that “good” is a predicative adjective, or in other words,