George Bush's Military Strategy

One of the defining elements of George Bush’s presidency was his decision to invade Iraq in an effort to prevent the use of their alleged WMDs, even though no such weapons existed. While many analysts have heavily criticised this foreign policy, we can clearly see the rationale behind it in Bush’s The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Throughout, he routinely claims that the United States is unrivaled on the world stage in terms of power and influence, and that the US plans to use this to create decades of peace, prosperity, and liberty around the world. However, he concedes that while the US is undoubtedly the strongest state in the world, this strength is in traditional terms, and that many of the modern threats
facing the US are not from other states, but rather organized terror groups. And, many of these terrorists strike within Western societies by abusing the freedoms that are integral to the American way of life.
In turn, Bush argues that the defensive capabilities of the US need to be transformed. He argues that while the US should remain the world’s strongest military, they also need to invest resources into Homeland Security as well as their intelligence services so that they can better predict and foil terror attacks. The most important element of the Bush doctrine, however, is his belief that “the best defence is a good offense”, and that the practice of pre-emptive attacks is crucial to American success. But, given that many terrorists are stateless, this raises the question of how do you attack an intricate global network. To this, Bush’s answer is that any state that works with these groups will be deemed an enemy of the US, and a potential target of the US military. Because of the potential damage of WMDs, and a large number of unstable countries possessing these, Bush fears that it is quite plausible for a terrorist cell to obtain a WMD and use it against the US. Thus, according to Bush’s strategy, the invasion of Iraq was not only justified, but also integral to the protection of the
US.

As previously stated, many analysts disagreed with Bush’s foreign policy, one of which being Neta C.
Crawford. In her article The Slippery Slope to Preventive War, she establishes that she does indeed agree with Bush and his notion that warfare has changed over the past two decades, and that it is impossible to achieve complete invulnerability. But, she is strongly against Bush’s notion that self-defense and preemption are the same thing. Meaning, the idea that the only way to defend against terrorists is to take the fight to them before the US is attacked is in her mind flawed. She points to how the administration blurs the line between states that harbor terrorists, and the actual terrorists that reside there, a distinction that can label a preemptive strike either effective, or an international crime. Instead, she argues that preemption is legitimate if it meets four criteria: i) that it is strictly for self-defense ii) that there is enough evidence to prove that there will be an attack, as just having the capability does not count iii) that it will likely reduce or eliminate the threat iv) that all other measures either do not have the time to work, nor are they likely to. Crawford also disagrees with Bush’s notion of self-defense, as Bush argues that the defense of the US’s national interests count as self-defense. To counter, Crawford points to Richard Betts argument that when “self-defense” extends past one’s own borders, the line between offense and defense becomes
blurred. Therefore, according to Crawford, self-defense is only applicable if it applies to your own borders or citizens abroad. But, the issue of defence has to be from a viable threat, not just the fear of a potential attack. Accordingly, she argues that preemption is justified if a faction or state has the intent to attack, as well as the capacity and plans to carry through with their intention. Lastly, Crawford calls for preemption to be used as rarely as possible, as repeating these attacks could cause fear and hostility around the world, and thus raise more threats to the US. While one can understand the rationale behind preemption, it leads to conflict that in many cases would not have occurred if diplomacy had employed. Thus, preemptive attacks can be justified, but they should the option of last resort.

In my personal opinion, Crawford’s rationale is the much more logical solution to the dilemma of the merit of preemption on the world stage. While Bush is quite accurate when he states that the nature of threats facing the US has evolved over the past two decades, he omits that the solution to these modern problems cannot be the same methods employed during the Cold War. Bush routinely mentions throughout his article that terrorists thrive in unstable states, but the solution to this is not to destroy whatever form of government they have. Instead, we should do as Crawford suggests, where we attempt any and all potential solutions first. This includes methods such as foreign aid to boost their economies, arranging treaties with the (democratic) government of at-risk states to supply them with the tools to combat terrorists from within, and engaging in diplomacy with both our allies as well as struggling democratic governments in order to try and find as peaceful a solution as possible. In other words, Crawford is correct in her claim that preemption should be the last possible option. In addition, the nature of preemption should only apply to your own borders and people, not a nation’s interests. Otherwise, conflicts could be justified all over the world based on protecting economic interests. By changing the merit of preemption to being based solely on the protection of one’s own borders, we can establish a much more peaceful world, as well as work towards a more secure world too.