George Norhoff On Personal Identity

Personal identity is the major issue in medical ethics for brain transplantation. The fundamental problem that arise from whole body transplantation is the discomfort and confusion about the personal identity of the patient. The sense of personal identity is essentially one of our own experience – remembering the past that we treasure, taking the present experiences, imagination that we have plan for the future and the continuity of consciousness – in spite of what has just been said we also identify with our body, within which and through which we have express our personalities and those we have experience. The very importantly matter is how we perceive the action and appearance of the body of the other person to think that you are not the person who donate the organ because some people think that if you transfer the one organ to another the recipient will act as
He does not assume that the personal identity is an either or matter but there is something that can change (cf Hansson 2005). There are three main views according to Norhoff on the relationship between the brain and personal identity. Some philosophers assume that “personal identity is slightly related to mental states where by themselves can neither be decrease to neurophysiological functions or psychological functions (Norhoff 1996, 179). If we want to learn more in changes in personal identity we should research the changes in mental states. According to Parfit what I have discussed above this paragraph, what matters is psychological continuity. As long as patients have the same psychological features before and after their personal identity in terms of this continuity remains untouched. The third one is based on the view of Thomas Nagel, he said that we are our brain. Inside this school of thought the insertion of brain can change our personal