Gilbert Ryle's Theory Of Substance Dualism

Materialist accounts of the mind are often explicit rejections of the substance dualist or Cartesian theory of the mind. I will first present the core argument of substance dualism and lay out a series of phenomenon which substance dualism successfully explains, including first person experiences and the problem of qualia. Next, I will present how substance dualism’s solutions for these phenomena trump how materialist Gilbert Ryle’s theory of category mistakes attempts to solve them. Finally, in response to my comparison of the two differing resolutions for the phenomena I will present my argument for why substance dualism has the more convincing explanation for the experiences I used to examine each view of the mind. Substance dualism is
In his theory, Ryle asserts that substance dualists have made what he calls a category mistake in identifying the mind and body as two independent entities, a theory he calls, “the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine” (Ryle 252). Ryle argues that mental states are connected to and the same as specific physical states and that mental states can be reduced to entirely material occurrences. In the football example, Ryle would assert that the way my face stretches into a large grin and my claims of happiness and excitement are the same thing as a mental disposition of happiness and excitement. Witnessing those around me in the stands exhibiting the same physical behavior is directly indicative of their internal mental dispositions of the same temperament as their bodily actions. Ryle uses the example of a visitor to Oxford asking where the university is after touring the buildings and grounds of campus (253). For me to look around at the spectators of the football game and ask where each person’s mental state is would be a category mistake just like the Oxford example. Ryle would argue that each person’s mental state is being expressed in his or her behavior right before my very eyes. However, Ryle’s theory problematically does not address my first person feelings of consciousness and instead focuses entirely upon all mental dispositions as having exact physical expressions in behavior simply varying in degree. He asserts that even if I smiled widely and claimed I was happy with the outcome of the game, if my mental state was anger or dissatisfaction it would somehow show and be observable to those around me in my behavior and physical mannerisms. In this way, Ryle provides a weak solution to the problem of qualia in arguing that because mental states and behavior are the