God's Foreknowledge and the Problem of Evil: a Proposal
God’s Foreknowledge and the Problem of Evil: A proposal
RG Heather (MA PT, 24689726)
Introduction
In his essay[1] on the possibility of God’s having middle knowledge of the actions of free agents and the relationship of that knowledge, if it exists, to the problem of evil,[2] RM Adams discusses two questions: firstly, whether middle knowledge is possible, even for God, and secondly, whether God could have made free creatures who would always freely do right. These questions highlight the importance of trying to understand how much God knows about the future and the relationship of the answer to that question with the problem of evil.
In the present essay I review four major possible views of God’s foreknowledge and highlight their strengths and weaknesses, paying particular attention to Adams’ arguments on Middle Knowledge which lead to his conclusion that there is reason to doubt its possibility. I then review Adams’ arguments about its impact on the problem of evil and, having concluded, as he does, that, middle knowledge being available or not, permitting some evil in order to allow creatures to have free will may contribute to a theodicy but not complete it, I consider how this situation might be improved by accepting that the future is at least partly open.
The problem
The problem of evil has been the subject of theological dispute for centuries. If God is, as the traditional Christian view would have it, omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good, how come there is evil in the world? Such a God, the argument goes, would not only wish to dispel evil from the world, but, since he can do anything, he would have done so. Since he clearly has not, either he is not able to do so or he does not care, or perhaps he doesn’t exist.
While arguments such as the above call into doubt the possibility of God’s being at once omnipotent and perfectly good, the problem of evil is also closely related to the issue of his omniscience, in particular to his
RG Heather (MA PT, 24689726)
Introduction
In his essay[1] on the possibility of God’s having middle knowledge of the actions of free agents and the relationship of that knowledge, if it exists, to the problem of evil,[2] RM Adams discusses two questions: firstly, whether middle knowledge is possible, even for God, and secondly, whether God could have made free creatures who would always freely do right. These questions highlight the importance of trying to understand how much God knows about the future and the relationship of the answer to that question with the problem of evil.
In the present essay I review four major possible views of God’s foreknowledge and highlight their strengths and weaknesses, paying particular attention to Adams’ arguments on Middle Knowledge which lead to his conclusion that there is reason to doubt its possibility. I then review Adams’ arguments about its impact on the problem of evil and, having concluded, as he does, that, middle knowledge being available or not, permitting some evil in order to allow creatures to have free will may contribute to a theodicy but not complete it, I consider how this situation might be improved by accepting that the future is at least partly open.
The problem
The problem of evil has been the subject of theological dispute for centuries. If God is, as the traditional Christian view would have it, omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good, how come there is evil in the world? Such a God, the argument goes, would not only wish to dispel evil from the world, but, since he can do anything, he would have done so. Since he clearly has not, either he is not able to do so or he does not care, or perhaps he doesn’t exist.
While arguments such as the above call into doubt the possibility of God’s being at once omnipotent and perfectly good, the problem of evil is also closely related to the issue of his omniscience, in particular to his
Bibliography: [1] Adams RM, Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil; American Philosophical Quarterly, 14 (1977), pp 109-17; also as Ch VI of Adams and Adams, 1992. [3] Hunt, D, The Simple-Foreknowledge View; Ch 2 of Beilby and Eddy, 2001, p65 [4] Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, 3.2; quoted in op cit, p73 [6] op cit p88 [7] Helm, P; The Augustinian-Calvinist View; Ch 4 of Beilby and Eddy, 2001, p161 [14] I draw on (Davison, 2010) for this part of the discussion as he explains middle knowledge more thoroughly. [15] Adams and Adams, 1992, p111 [16] Craig WL, The Middle-Knowledge View; in Beilby and Eddy, 2001. [27] Adams and Adams, 1992, p114. [31] op cit p119 [32] Adams and Adams, 1992, p123 [35] Boyd GA, The Open-Theism View; in Beilby and Eddy, 2001; p14 [36] Jeremiah 19:5