Herbert Simon's Theory Of Bounded Rationality

This example is successful in demonstrating that politicians are utility-maximisers because, as Downs (2011) explains, it perhaps explains why they choose to act, or in this case "formulate to win elections, rather than winning elections to formulate policies" (Downs, 1957: 28). A plausible reason is that the reward, or end benefits, provides an incentive to do something.

Although the opposing scholarship does not seem to challenge the definition of rationality per se or the view that individuals intentionally seek to maximise their utility, Herbert Simon's theory of Bounded Rationality does however confront the realism of the individual's ability to maximise their utility; arguing that realistically they are only able to achieve satisfactory
Limitations and Criticisms
This section considers the limitations and core criticisms levied against rational approach to policy-making. Although numerous have already been examined, such as Simon's bounded rationality; Kahnerman prospect theory and Adam Smith's 'Invisible Hand', this section examines further assessments within the opposing scholarship.

A. INCREMENTALISM.
The most prominent argumentation against the rational approach is provided by Charles E. Lindblom (1959) and his pioneering article 'The Science of Muddling Through', who builds upon Simons 'bounded-rationality' to examine flaws within the process of policy-making. At the centre of his argument, Lindblom proposes that, given the bounds to which policy-actors are limited, they are prevented from establishing comprehensive changes to existing policies (root method); but instead adapt by "muddling through" by applying small incremental changes to existing policies (branch method) (Lindblom, 1959:
Lindblom argues that, as bounded rationality assumes the policy-actor is capable to differentiate between means and ends, it offers a "limited and narrow" perception of the policy-making process (Lindblom, 1959: 83). This is a reasonable because, by modelling the policy process as a series of isolated assessments instead as continuous cycle, it is susceptible to mistakes - due to the lack of constant re-evaluation of previous policies. Moreover the sequential process of rational approach may not consider the realism that objectives may change throughout the process - highlighting its inflexibility.

However 'Incrementalism' does accentuate a significant drawback. Dror (1964) argues that incremental policy-changes prevents original policies from being made therefore "limiting social scientists' ability to serve as sources of innovation" (Dror, 1964: 153-155; Gurtoo and Williams, 2015: 84). Although a credible assertion, Dror does not consider the possibility that it could entice conflict between rational policy-actors; whereas a key strength of incremental-model see's it avoid conflict as policy-change is grounded on previous knowledge and assumptions.

C. EMPIRICAL VALUE