Herrera V. Collins, 1924: A Case Study
Part A
Issue: What steps are necessary in terms of preserving or bolstering the existing evidence and helping our client – we have the letters, is that enough? If not, what should we do?
The letters alone are not enough to help Mr. Jamison. Herrera v. Collins says that, generally, a “free-standing” claim of innocence based solely on newly discovered evidence does not state a ground for federal habeas relief, unless it is coupled with an independent constitutional violation that occurred in the criminal proceedings. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1993). The Court seemingly left open the question of whether a very powerful showing of innocence would trump that rule, but we cannot simply rely on that, so this means that the letters …show more content…
. . or . . . expiration of the statute of limitations.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013). Thus, a court can consider the merits of a prisoner’s constitutional claim on the merits who would “otherwise [be] subject to defenses of abusive or successive” petitions if he can show that he is actually innocent. Id. at 1926. The Court in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995), and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537 (2006), held that a convincing showing of actual innocence trumps other procedural bars, including successive petitions. Furthermore, in the context of § 2255, actual innocence may overcome a prisoner's failure to raise a constitutional objection on direct review. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at …show more content…
New evidence showing innocence: The threshold question
A petitioner meets this “threshold requirement” and can have his claim considered on the merits by a federal habeas court if he shows that “in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329, 404).
To establish a credible claim of actual innocence, a petitioner must support his claim with “new reliable evidence . . . that was not presented at trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). See also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537 (2006). If a petitioner presents such evidence, the federal habeas court must “consider all the evidence, old and new, incriminating and exculpatory” and “make a probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do.” House, 547 U.S. at 537–38.
In House v. Bell, the Supreme Court found that House’s arguments based on new DNA and other evidence were sufficient to meet the Schlup standard. In House, DNA on the victim matched her husband, not the defendant, and witnesses came forward to say that her husband had confessed to the murder. 547 U.S. at
Issue: What steps are necessary in terms of preserving or bolstering the existing evidence and helping our client – we have the letters, is that enough? If not, what should we do?
The letters alone are not enough to help Mr. Jamison. Herrera v. Collins says that, generally, a “free-standing” claim of innocence based solely on newly discovered evidence does not state a ground for federal habeas relief, unless it is coupled with an independent constitutional violation that occurred in the criminal proceedings. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1993). The Court seemingly left open the question of whether a very powerful showing of innocence would trump that rule, but we cannot simply rely on that, so this means that the letters …show more content…
. . or . . . expiration of the statute of limitations.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013). Thus, a court can consider the merits of a prisoner’s constitutional claim on the merits who would “otherwise [be] subject to defenses of abusive or successive” petitions if he can show that he is actually innocent. Id. at 1926. The Court in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995), and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537 (2006), held that a convincing showing of actual innocence trumps other procedural bars, including successive petitions. Furthermore, in the context of § 2255, actual innocence may overcome a prisoner's failure to raise a constitutional objection on direct review. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at …show more content…
New evidence showing innocence: The threshold question
A petitioner meets this “threshold requirement” and can have his claim considered on the merits by a federal habeas court if he shows that “in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329, 404).
To establish a credible claim of actual innocence, a petitioner must support his claim with “new reliable evidence . . . that was not presented at trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). See also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537 (2006). If a petitioner presents such evidence, the federal habeas court must “consider all the evidence, old and new, incriminating and exculpatory” and “make a probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do.” House, 547 U.S. at 537–38.
In House v. Bell, the Supreme Court found that House’s arguments based on new DNA and other evidence were sufficient to meet the Schlup standard. In House, DNA on the victim matched her husband, not the defendant, and witnesses came forward to say that her husband had confessed to the murder. 547 U.S. at