In Part 1 of the Passions and the Interests, Albert O. Hirschman describes the philosophical climate of the 18th and 17th centuries in which how to the govern man’s passions was of primary concern. He attempts to demonstrate, from Machiavelli to Adam Smith, a continuity in thought regarding a possible solution, namely, the pursuit of material self-interest. However, there is a gap in which Hirschman fails to adequately address another important concern of political and economic thinkers of the time. While thinkers such as Hume, Hobbes, and Rousseau were concerned with how to pacify man’s more carnal passions, they were also concerned with how to foster man’s benevolent passions¬. This is only briefly passed over by Hirschman on pages 104 to 106, but it is obvious that this warrants more attention. This seems to stem from his one sided portrayal of “man as he really is”, narrowly focusing on the Machiavellian portrayal of human nature …show more content…
Granted, in the Contemporary Notes section, he gives more attention to the criticisms posed by Marx on pages 198-200 when he references Marx’s theory of alienation; but again, as with his reference to the benevolent passions, it is passed over too quickly. Here, unlike the former criticisms addressed by Hirschman, Marx is not voicing concern over the efficacy of capitalism’s implementation, but rather whether capitalism as a theory is ethical and thus desirable. Hirschman notes Marx’s argument that capitalism is “repressive” and “alienating”, and how it “inhibits the development of the ‘full human personality.’” (198) In other words, Marx was concerned with whether capitalism, even if implemented ideally, would suppress the benign passions, leading to isolation and alienation. This is the point of which I think Hirschman does not adequately address, and thus his ethical treatment of capitalism is left