Britain was very inconsistent in the way that they dealt with Italy’s full scale invasion of Abyssinia, now known as Ethiopia, on the 3rd of October 1935, after having vowed to completely erase Abyssinia from the face of the map. As a result of this lack of consistency, I disagree with this view.
It can be argued that one of the ways in which Britain was consistent in their policies towards Mussolini’s Italian invasion of Abyssinia; an act of revenge against Abyssinia after their defeat of the Italians in the Battle of Adowa, a small town in what is now to be known as Ethiopia, in which approximately 3000 Italian prisoners of war were tortured, castrated and humiliated after having tried and failed to secure a stronger Italian position within Africa by conquering Abyssinia; was by trying to maintain placated relations between Britain and Italy, so as not to antagonise Benito Mussolini (Leader of the National Fascist Party, ruling Italy as prime minister from 1922), threatening the safety of Britain. An example of this is how, despite what was thought to be a more effective solution in solving the crisis, it was agreed that the Suez Canal, an artificial waterway in Egypt that connects the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea, would be left open so as not to provoke Italy into declaring war on Great Britain in a ‘mad dog act’.
On the other hand, however, Britain’s policies can be considered to be fickle as they claimed they had wanted to adapt a policy of non-intervention, though quickly went against this in their involvement in the enforcement of sanctions and then, later, the Hoare-Laval Pact. In October of 1935 Abyssinian president, Hailie Selassie, appealed to the League of Nations, formed after the Treaty of Versailles to promote international peace, for help, asking them to arbitrate. The result of this, on the 19th