How Did Eisenhower's Decision To Endorse The Darlan Deal?

Eisenhower initially failed to communicate as a strategic leader and lacked the ability to handle the competing cultures in his command. The decision to endorse the Darlan deal and the selection of the SHAEF headquarters staff contributed to poor decision-making during the Mediterranean and European campaigns in WWII.
In his decision to endorse the Darlan Deal, Eisenhower did not engage or communicate his intentions to the American politicians or his French counterparts. Some leaders strongly value "getting the decision made" and “getting on with the job.” This is "decisiveness," an often valuable commodity at lower organizational-levels. However, premature closure can produce decisions that fail to consider the more subtle and difficult to envision contingencies, or some of the more obscure second- and third-order effects. An effective strategic
Eisenhower should have weighed other options that would have been a consensus with the other Allies leaders before he endorsed the Darlan Deal. This decision was very sensitive because Darlan was considered a traitor to the Allies. General De Gaulle stated that Eisenhower dishonored France by embracing Admiral Darlan. In the case of Jus In Bello, the moral weight of implementing the Darlan Deal should had laid with the political leadership and its military advisors. On the other hand, strategic military leaders, whether they are technically responsible for decisions to go to war or not, will often be placed in the position of justifying military action to the press and the people. In his opinion, Eisenhower endorsed the Darlan Deal because he wanted to use the French forces to capture Tunisia but he failed to communicate his actions to the Allies