How Did Joseph Mobu Change The Congo

Numerous long-term tremors rippled throughout the Congo for half a century after the CIA-organized coup against Lumumba. Above all, it established the rule of Joseph Désiré Mobutu, who ruled with an iron fist and exuded corruption. Concerning nationalist movements surfaced after the sloppy transition of power to Mobutu. He launched a full-scale “African authenticity” crusade that attempted to reinvigorate the Congolese identity. In 1971, he changed the name of the country from the Congo to Zaire (it would became the Democratic Republic of the Congo in (DRC) in 1997, as it remains to this day). He did the same with a number of other Congolese cities. Mobutu awarded contracts and security jurisdiction to officials within his own ethnic group—yet
Mobutu siphoned off the revenues from diamond mines into the personal accounts of public officials instead of general public coffers. That obviously came at the direct cost of the citizenry; education, healthcare, and innovation stalled. The so-called Binza Group—consisting of Mobutu and four of his cronies—controlled the key organs of the central government to maintain their grip: "the military, security police, foreign ministry, the central bank, and the internal affairs apparatus." With all these controls, Mobutu’s administration hampered any sort of meaningful advance in the Congo to enrich itself. The United States essentially turned a blind eye to his deals just to ensure that an anti-communist held the reins in the Congo. So important was that myopic goal that everything else—including the long-term health of the Congolese state—took a back seat. All told, Mobutu reaped more than $1 billion in American support, contributing to the enormous fortune of $4 billion at the time of his
Some do argue that the CIA’s influence was not all malicious, especially on the financial front. With decent management on the part of the CIA, and cooperation from Mobutu, they contend, the Congo performed well from 1965 to 1975. The IMF instituted a stabilization program that reduced inflation and increased production of consumer goods. The World Bank documents that the Congo endured a negative 10 percent GDP growth rate in 1961, which yo-yoed from positive 21 percent in 1962 and to negative 2 percent in 1963. All told, eight out eleven years in that period experience positive GDP growth. But those who took a more in-depth postmortem find that the growth was unhealthy, and masked greater issues. The revenues that shot in from the newly nationalized copper sector were spent on so-called "white elephant" projects that cost more than they contributed. For instance, the Igna 1 and Igna 2 dams built during Mobutu's reign are in a dismal today: five of their fourteen turbines do not turn, and it only produces 1,000MW of power. For a sense of scale, Western Europe produces a thousand times that amount, though the two are of roughly equivalent size. Moreover, Mobutu frequently endowed the political elite with agricultural and commercial businesses, stifling genuine economic progress and trapping the poor in their