How Did Mussolini Affect The Economy

Mussolini’s economic ideas in the 1920s were mostly incoherent and designed purely to appease his supporters. Through the evaluation of the consequences of incessant government intervention in the economy, corporatism, the impact on Italian workers, as well as the impact on agriculture, it is clear that much of Mussolini’s policies were incoherent, in the sense that they were irrational, having more merit as propaganda than as functioning plans. Although limited successes in industry may be credited, it cannot be ignored that ultimately, Mussolini acted in the interest of his supporters, not his country.

The fascist government took excessive control in organising and controlling the economy with disappointing outcomes, which comments on
Theoretically, having all economic activity organised through corporations with state-sponsored trade unions seemed impressive, having coherence in that it hoped to achieve harmony between capital and labour. In reality, however, the worker’s syndicates were fragmented, rather as a large federation, so that it was incapable of defending the interests of their members, while corporations did not exist until 1934. As a result, it can be argued that corporatism, as an economic idea, was an illusion. Also considering the lengthy period before corporations were fully set up, it is irrelevant to assess its impacts on the economy – policy’s lack of economic significance makes it seem utterly incoherent. The corporate state, despite this, was useful as propaganda, seen as a middle way between an oppressive communist economy – to appease to the middle classes and industrialists – and the anarchy of capitalism – to appease to the working class. Ultimately, corporatism was incoherent and poorly instituted, its only real impact being the centralisation of control over the working classes. Additionally, by replacing De Stefani with Volpi as the new finance minister in 1925 resulted in tariffs on grain, sugar and milk. Historian Dennis Mack Smith believed that he was influenced by industrialists who would benefit from such policies, as it
The Battle for Grain, proposed in 1925, aimed to reduce the volume of foreign wheat imports as a result of high import duties, a consequence of the lira re-evaluation. The ‘Mussolini Law’ of 1928 outlined a land reclamation policy, also intended to support the self-sufficiency that the fascist regime strived for. It may be argued that such policies were coherent, in the sense that they adhered to what the fascist regime had promised, and though peasant farmers were not the main supporters of the fascist party, land reclamation and rising demand of grain would inevitably work towards their benefit by increasing supply. However, much like Mussolini’s other economic ideas, these policies were not wholly successes. Despite 40% increase in grain production in the late 1930s, Italian wheat yields were still relatively low when compared to neighbouring countries such as France, yet costs were higher. Also, by using the hot south for wheat rather than crops more suited for its climate – such as grapes or olives – the opportunity for export trade was lost. Thus, economic efficiency was again sacrificed for senseless political pursuits. In fact, those who benefitted from the Battle for Grain were also supporters of Mussolini – large grain formers of the Po Valley in the north, who profited from increased