How Does John Stuart Mill Define Happiness

The concepts of pleasure and happiness are integral pieces of the human experience, and have been discussed in depth by philosophies seeking to understand human behavior. What one defines as ‘pleasurable’ determines the very fabric of their existence; how people decide to live is based largely on what they enjoy. Consequently, traditions such as Shirttails form based upon the pleasures which communities deem valuable. In Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill argues for the existence of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ pleasures, intrinsically separated by value and accessibility (Mill 1863). Examples of John Stuart Mill’s ‘higher’ pleasures include the technical enjoyment of opera or the intellectual stimulation garnered during debate (Mill 1863). ‘Lower’
pleasures are simpler- often based upon the easement of pain or the fulfillment of an external need (Mill 1863). Other philosophers, such as Jeremy Bentham Benjamin Gibbs, have sought to understand pleasure by different means. These writers have defined methods of evaluating pleasure which challenge John Stuart Mill’s arguments. Comprehension of the variances between these theories provides the base for a unified understanding of how pleasures should be qualified. Both higher and lower pleasures are an integral part of the Shirttails tradition, and serve as the primary reason for its continuance. John Stuart Mill defines ‘higher’ pleasures as largely immaterial, which the most intellectually gifted among humanity prefer over ‘lower,’ physical pleasures (Mill 1863, 6).
He argues that this distinction exists due to the higher faculties of human beings when compared to other animals (Mill 1863, 5). These higher capabilities allow humans mental, emotional, and social pleasures that other living creatures cannot enjoy (Mill 1863, 5). John Stuart Mill asserts that these “kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others” and that those who have experienced both support this claim (Mill 1863, 6). He goes as far as to value these ‘higher’ types of pleasure over their counterparts in kind, arguing that their quality immensely outweighs any quantity of the ‘lower’ pleasures (Mill 1863, 6). People with the highest faculties are able to experience both types, and routinely choose elevated pleasures due to their longevity and dignity (Mill 1863, 6). John Stuart Mill believes this elite preference to be evidence of ‘higher’ pleasures’ intrinsic value (Mill
1863). Bentham believed the value of a pleasure to be based upon five characteristics. These qualities are the pleasure’s: intensity, duration, fecundity, purity, and extent (Gibbs 1986, 42). Bentham supposes that a pleasure’s value and its quantity can be linked, and refutes any assertion of intrinsic value (Gibbs 1986, 42). John Stuart Mill is famous for misquoting his assertion that “Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry” (Gibbs 1986, 43). Bentham’s critics revile his argument because it devalues the intellectual basis on which they have structured their lives. Bentham claims that the value of an activity’s pleasure is based upon its relation to the participant- not any moral, utilitarian standard (Gibbs 1986, 44). Simply stated, an activity’s value is determined independently of its nature or popularity. If one values a game of push-pin above poetry, the game and its pleasures are more valuable to that individual. This assessment of pleasure contradicts the natural superiority that Mill assigns to mental and emotional pleasures. Gibbs incorporates the arguments of both John Stuart Mill and Bentham to outline his discussion of pleasures and their value. He argues that John Stuart Mill’s valuation of physical pleasures as inferior to mental ones fails to account for the circumstantial nature of human existence (Gibbs 1986, 50). Even those with the highest faculties exist in varying states of hunger, tiredness, and other physical need (Gibbs 1986, 50). Gibbs, like Bentham, asserts that the value of a pleasure to an individual will fluctuate situationally without any change in the individual’s character or prejudices (Gibbs 1986, 50). Judging the value of a pleasure abstractly is as impossible as making a decision between two equally desired activities. Gibbs takes special interest in refuting John Stuart Mill’s ‘quality over quantity’ argument, determining both to be important in the calculus of one’s preferred pleasures (Gibbs 1986, 49). He also questions the validity of John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarian Calculus due to its reliance on morals and ethics (Gibbs 1986). John Stuart Mill attributes humanity’s occasional preference for physical pleasure to moral weakness; Gibbs acknowledges humanity’s need for a variety of mental and basic pleasures. Harriet Taylor Mill wrote that “all pleasures as well as all pains are of the senses,” but determines higher pleasures to be those which transcend “mere sensualism” (Mill 1998, 18). These positions both verify and challenge John Stuart Mill’s conception of pleasures, as he separates mental and physical pleasures as independent. Harriet Taylor Mill instead argues for a generalized understanding of pleasure as based in individual experience. However, it is important to understand that Harriet Taylor Mill determines the value of a pleasure based upon how it brings an individual happiness (Mill 1998, 18). According to her argument, ‘good’ pleasures are those which act upon the mind through the senses; ‘bad’ pleasures are those that focus on sensuality as the object of the pleasure (Mill 1998, 18). Harriet Taylor Mill’s philosophy allows one to understand how seemingly physical pleasures can provide humanity with higher-order happiness because of the various ways physical activity can result in intellectual stimulation. This is a perspective unexplored by John Stuart Mill, and one which runs parallel to the relatively open-ended arguments of Gibbs. My evaluation of a pleasure’s value is based upon a combination of the factors discussed by the Mills, Bentham, and Gibbs.
I, like John Stuart Mill, recognize the intrinsic value of behaviors which separate mankind from other animals (Mill 1863, 5). Undoubtedly, the pleasures gleaned from distinctly human activities are an important part of any life. John Stuart Mill’s ‘higher’ pleasures deserve their classification- they are, in fact, experienced because of the development of human intellect. However, I do not believe that these pleasures are intrinsically more valuable than physical ones. Harriet Taylor Mill’s discussion of the ‘higher’ pleasures available through physical activity has shaped how I view the nature of pleasures in general. Physical desires remind us of our reliance on our bodies; when we enjoy food or sex we fulfill the same needs as those of our distant ancestors. The pleasures derived from the satisfaction of physical desire are a natural and necessary piece of human existence, and might culminate in ‘higher’ order pleasure. Like Bentham, I believe that the value of a certain pleasure depends on many individualized variables (Gibbs 1986, 42). John Stuart Mill’s reluctance to explore his quantity versus quality rule is evidence enough that it falls short of perfection. Defining certain activities as worth more than others based upon a universal moral standard fails to account for the individuality of contemporary society. In addition, I agree
with Gibb’s ‘circumstantial’ argument. Pleasures are necessarily important based upon an individual’s situation (Gibbs 1986). A starving man will value eating food over reading Plato each time he is presented with the choice. This preference is natural, and rational. John Stuart Mill’s distinction between ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ pleasures is more accurately a separation of mental and physical pleasures and should not include intrinsic evaluations of either.