How Has War Changed over Time

Vietnam War
The North Vietnamese Communist leadership's ability to reassess and adapt during the Vietnam War was reflected in how well they combined guerilla and conventional operations to achieve their strategic goal of unifying Vietnam under communist rule. Throughout the conflict, the Viet Cong (VC) were employed to conduct guerilla operations while North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and VC "main force" units were used to transition to conventional operations. Guerilla operations enabled Hanoi to inflict a steady flow of casualties on US forces which increased anti-war sentiment in America. NVA and VC main force conventional operations reinforced the US Army's conventional approach to the fight which caused the Americans to alienate the people of South Vietnam. By alienating the South Vietnamese people, the Americans enhanced the VC's ability to conduct guerilla operations and control rural population centers which weakened the credibility of the Government of South Vietnam (GVN). The combined effects of guerilla and conventional operations supported the North Vietnamese strategy of a protracted conflict that was sure to weaken the resolve of the United States and eventually defeat the GVN. The relationship between conventional and guerilla operations was a key element of the Vietnamese communists’ “Dau Tranh” strategy to fight and win the Vietnam War. A brief description of the Dua Tranh (meaning struggle) strategy is appropriate since it was the basis for North Vietnam’s success. The strategy consisted of an armed struggle and a political struggle. The armed struggle began with Stage One hit and run guerilla tactics to “decimate the enemy piecemeal and weaken then eliminate the government’s administrative control of the countryside.” In Stage Two, “the war becomes less guerrilla-like and resembles a conventional small-scale war.” Finally, in Stage Three, the war becomes almost completely military and “the battle is between armies of troops, and in the battle is the decision.” Each stage of the armed struggle entails a transition between guerilla and conventional operations. The two kinds of Dau Tranh, political and armed, worked together during the war to ensure North Vietnamese and VC victory. (Pike, 224-225) As the Vietnam War progressed, People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) generals led by General Giap reassessed and adapted their strategy to fit the circumstances. This enabled the VC revolutionaries, supported by North Vietnamese regular forces, to achieve success without ever defeating US forces on the battlefield. For instance, the Tet Offensive in 1968 represented an operational failure in Stage Three of the Dau Tranh strategy but was considered a success for the North since it weakened American public support for the war. As a result the defeat on the battlefield, Giap adapted Dau Tranh to avoid concentration of forces and the effects of superior US firepower by transitioning back to Stage Two. The return to guerilla operations ensured sustained US casualties and the continued erosion of public support between 1968 and 1971. At the same time, main force units that were decimated during Tet could withdrawal and reconstitute. (Pike, 229) During this period another form of Dau Tranh was developed which called for a return to conventional operations. The revised strategy was tested in the 1972 Easter Offensive and the South Vietnamese again prevailed with aggressive fighting supported by US firepower. As a result of this setback, the communist leadership again reverted back to guerilla operations to continue the fight while their conventional forces prepared to fight another day. The communists were eventually successful in defeating the Army of the Republic Vietnam (ARVN) in another conventional offensive in 1975 that led to the fall of the Saigon. (Pike, 229) Although the communists suffered serious conventional defeats in 1968 and 1972, their ability to return to guerilla operations reflected their adeptness at transitioning from one form of warfare to another. They recognized their comparative advantage in guerilla warfare and their strategy enabled them to transition to conventional based on the circumstances. (Handel, 100) When faced with significant losses, the communist leadership proved flexible enough to recall their conventional forces. They left VC guerilla forces to continue the fight and bear the brunt of casualties for the North Vietnamese war effort. (Bergerud, 300) When necessary, front units in the South could be replenished with regular soldiers from the North. (Bergerud, 309) Their ability to constantly reassess and adapt during the conflict enabled them to prosecute the protracted conflict they believed could last as long as fifty years and would eventually defeat the US and GVN. (Pike, 220)
While the above examples highlight how well the North Vietnamese leadership adapted their strategy during the war, their approach also ensured the US Army remained committed to conducting conventional operations which hindered pacification efforts and alienated the South Vietnamese. The first major conventional operation with US forces occurred in November 1965 in the Ia Drang Valley. During this battle, the US Army 1st Cavalry engaged a regimental sized North Vietnamese force. The ensuing battle led to 1,200 communist and 200 US losses and was considered a major victory by US Army leadership. (Krepinevich, 169) Before the Battle of Ia Drang Valley, VC forces often combined to conduct successful attacks on ARVN units. These successful conventional operations even resulted in the capture of a provincial capital and the destruction of an ARVN battalion and the force sent to relieve it. (Krepinevich, 152) Successful VC conventional operations further confirmed General Westmoreland’s desire to “seek out and destroy the enemy’s main-force units, the VC/PAVN battalions and regiments.” (Krepinevich, 142) Other indicators such as rising guerilla attacks and increased VC battalion operations added to the belief that the North Vietnamese communists intended to transition to phase 3 (conventional operations) of insurgency warfare. Unfortunately, MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) leadership ignored the CIA’s assessment that the communists would continue to emphasize guerilla operations and weren’t prepared to “go all-out” into phase 3. (Krepinevich, 158) During this period, Giap’s goal “was to draw American forces away from pacification and engage them in inconclusive battles along the frontiers, inflicting US casualties in the process and sapping US will to continue the war.” (Krepinevich, 192) VC and NVA activity early in the conflict and the US response to it appears to have validated General Giap’s approach. Later in the conflict, casualties in the Tet Offensive and the ability of North Vietnam to mount such a large attack drained remaining support for the war amongst most Americans and sealed the US decision to gradually withdrawal forces from Vietnam. Before Tet, MACV and the GVN institutionalized instruments of pacification to quell the rebellion and enhance the credibility of the GVN. (Komer, 168) Although elements of the US Army still emphasized attrition of NVA and VC main force units, greater attention was placed on the population of South Vietnam to counter the VC fear and intimidation campaign. After Tet, the US Army believed an increase in conventional operations was needed. To the American people and President Johnson, “the Tet offensive provided the shock that led to their loss of faith in the Army’s strategy.” (Krepinevich, 237) To the Army it represented the need to continue conventional operations but at “higher level of intensity.” From the North Vietnamese perspective, Tet proved to be another operational defeat that still achieved their strategic aims. While they were beaten on the battlefield, they remained capable of conducting continued guerilla operations to inflict casualties on US and ARVN forces. Even though the offensive did not result in the mass South Vietnamese uprising the communists hoped for, it essentially halted the pacification effort and ran up US casualties. (Krepinevich, 249)
The conventional offensives by NVA and VC main force units that were considered operational defeats for the communists were consistent with their strategy of a protracted conflict of attrition. Put more bluntly, “Hanoi’s leaders knew that the single most valuable tool still in their hands to weaken US resolve was killing American soldiers.” (Bergerud, 284) To Ho Chi Minh, protracting the conflict served as a “trade-off for superior enemy size and strength” and enabled him to shape the world’s perception of the conflict. (Pike, 219) Each time VC and NVA forces conducted conventional operations, the US Army assessed that their conventional approach to the war was the correct one. The US reaction drew them away from the South Vietnamese people and caused them to emphasize conventional missions over pacification. (Krepinevich, 169) Operations included large scale offensive sweeps and the establishment of combat outposts such as Khe Sanh that occupied a significant portion of US forces who could have been used in pacification efforts. This left the VC and communist cadres free to conduct operations amongst the South Vietnamese peasants who were “vulnerable to persuasion and coercion.” (Yoshihara Lecture)
The US preoccupation with conventional operations also served to alienate the people of South Vietnam. Guerilla units operated from within hamlets and villages within South Vietnam to inflict casualties and provoke US retaliation with overwhelming firepower. The US emphasis on body counts increased their response to the guerilla attacks and, unfortunately, caused civilian casualties. This tactic “led to hatred between American soldiers and the population…” (Bergerud, 273) Additionally, this tactic further discredited the US and GVN’s legitimacy and their ability to provide security for those they were supposed to protect. The US response to North Vietnamese actions ensured the NVA and VC had access to critical resources during the war. Since allied forces were focused on conventional operations, the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) could “continue recruiting (or impressing) personnel, collecting taxes, and otherwise organizing the VC manpower and logistics base in the villages and hamlets of South Vietnam.” (Krepinevich, 227-228) Remarkably, VC and NVA forces received the vast majority of their supplies from within South Vietnam – a clear example of how effective they were. (Krepinevich, 187)
Because of their freedom to operate, the communists conducted political activity within the villages of South Vietnam where “cadres organized and staged demonstration after demonstration.” (Pike, 238) This is yet another example of the effectiveness of their ability to draw the US away from the people. It also represents the effectiveness of the political dimension of Dau Tranh strategy. Had the US Army not been enticed to emphasize conventional operations and body counts over pacification efforts, the communists within South Vietnam may not have been as effective. Although the “Army killed many VC, it never denied the enemy his source of strength—access to the people.” (Krepinevich, 197) The fact that the North Vietnamese communists and VC failed to win a single significant engagement during the conflict would seem to indicate that they were actually ineffective at combining guerilla and conventional operations. How could they have been considered effective if they never won a battle? Operational failures in the 1968 Tet Offensive and the1972 Easter Offensive may cast doubt on how well they combined both types of warfare. Countless NVA and VC losses would seem to support the argument that they were actually ineffective at conducting operations together. One could also argue that US and South Vietnamese operational and strategic failures had more to do with their defeat than the North Vietnamese’s ability to combine conventional and guerilla operations. First, the US failure to recognize the nature of the conflict prevented them from sufficiently emphasizing pacification and counter-guerilla operations. As detailed above, they remained focused on conventional operations. Another failure was the Army’s policy of individual instead of unit rotations with 12 month tour limits. This policy prevented any significant institutional memory and impaired unit effectiveness and cohesion. (Komer, 68) Lack of ARVN effectiveness and reliability also hindered the war effort and “bred tremendous resentment” amongst American forces. (Hackworth, 693) These shortfalls may be viewed as evidence that the US and GVN approach to the conflict contributed more to their defeat than the strategy developed in Hanoi. However, the combined effects of conventional and guerilla operations actually facilitated the protracted conflict of attrition the communist leadership envisioned. While US, ARVN, and GVN failures were present, the efforts of PAVN generals to direct and adapt the conflict according to their strategy ensured their victory. As Vietnam War expert R. W. Komer pointed out, “militarily, we [the US] underestimated the enemy’s guerrilla and terror potential, Hanoi’s ability to escalate, and the ability of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army to frustrate a much larger and better-equipped force…” (Komer, 5) The US, unfortunately, became an unwilling participant in their plan. Although the US eventually modified its strategy to focus more on pacification, it was not enough to win the war and some believe “this change was forced mostly by US disillusionment with the war and the gradual withdrawal of US forces...” (Komer, 67) While not all NVA and VC operations were coordinated at the tactical or operational level, the combined effects of their efforts were directed by Ho Chi Minh, General Giap, and the leadership in Hanoi. Following their Dau Tranh strategy, they prosecuted a protracted conflict of attrition which resulted in the loss of public and political support in America. Their ability to adapt and transition between conventional and guerilla operations based on the circumstances prevented their defeat while ensuring that of the United States and the GVN. Their effectiveness at conducting conventional operations ensured the US Army remained committed to its own conventional approach and distracted it from any serious pacification efforts until it was too late. As a result, VC guerilla forces and communist cadres controlled the population centers through fear and intimidation which provided them a source of supplies and recruits. By keeping the US focused on conventional operations, the communists ensured that the people of South Vietnam were alienated from US forces and GVN. Constant VC guerilla attacks which caused overreaction by US forces led to civilian casualties and further separated the US and GVN from the people. The Northern communists’ success in the Vietnam War is not unique in history. During the American Revolution, George Washington understood the relationship between conventional and guerilla operations and used it to his advantage. For example, after the Battle of Princeton in January 1777, “Washington led the Continental Army to winter quarters… [while] small militia parties took to the field... [and] attacked larger forces...” (Fischer, 346) This enabled the weary Continental regulars to rest while the militia continued their guerilla tactics. Continued ambushes and attacks in New Jersey during the spring of 1777 became known as the Forage Wars. Just as NVA soldiers were sent to replenish the VC, Washington’s Continental troops “were sent into the field to work with the militia.” (Fischer, 348) As experienced by the US in South Vietnam, British overreaction to the American attacks served to alienate the locals and discredit the British. Casualties inflicted on the British in 1777 “caused shock in London” and diminished their support for the war effort. (Fischer, 359-360) Like the North Vietnamese leadership nearly 200 years later, Washington recognized the importance of combining both types of warfare.
In retrospect, it’s clear that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese ability to combine both methods of warfare played a major role their victory. Their strategy provided them the tools they needed to win. In the end, they recognized that each type of warfare complimented the other to achieve their strategic goals.