How Is Operation Anaconda Failing
Operation Anaconda: Joint Functions
Operation Anaconda kicked off on March 2nd, 2002 and was at the time the largest operation in Afghanistan (Naylor, 2005). In the simplest of terms, Operation Anaconda was a success due to the number of casualties sustained by the enemy, however, in almost every other way the operation failed to accomplish its most basic objectives. According to Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Functions are broken down into six categories Command and Control, Intelligence, Fires, Movement and Maneuver, Protection, and Sustainment (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011). It is within these functions that the failures of the operation occurred, specifically within their role in the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP). More specifically the areas of Command and Control (C2), Intelligence, Fires, and Sustainment at the Joint Task Force level bear the burden of failing to plan and prepare the battlefield in a manner that would have …show more content…
set the operation up for success. Command and Control
Command and control is essential to the success of any military operation. In the Joint environment, it refers to the ability of a Commander to exercise control over the various elements assigned to the Joint Command. Perhaps the most essential part of Command and Control is the communication that must occur between a Joint Headquarters and the subordinate commands. From the outset, the 10th Mountain Division Headquarters struggled with their ability to communicate effectively. This is evident even prior to the planning phase of the operation when the elements that fell under it were unsure of the communications process. The Task Force was initially not designated a Joint Task Force, which prevented them from conducting certain planning and coordination’s that would have otherwise taken place, perhaps easing some of the early burdens (Major Fleri, Colonel Howard, Huskill, & Searle, 2003). They would eventually be re-designated a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF Mountain) and would begin planning for the Operation.
The Command and Control function of the CJTF continued to struggle throughout the planning phase. It was during the final planning process that the CJTF HQs relocated from Uzbekistan to Bagram Air Base (13-20 February), which an initial D-Day set for 28 February (Major Fleri et al., 2003). Moving the entire CJTF HQ’s during the final planning resulted in the loss of critical planning time for members of the staff. The command and control function is in many ways the most critical function of the operation. It sets the tone for the rest of the functions and drives the operations process. Moving the HQ's during the planning phase is a tactical error that is visible throughout the rest of the functions
Intelligence
The intelligence function is responsible for receiving, analyzing, and distributing information about the enemy forces and the operational environment. The intelligence drives the operation and is crucial during the military decision-making process (MDMP). The intelligence community to that point had discovered that often ground force reporting’s were exaggerated, which resulted in a lack of confidence in those reports (U.S. Department of the Air Force, 2005). This would prove true during Operation Anaconda as well. Initial estimates placed the potential number of enemy fighters in the Shahi-Kot Valley and Arma Mountains upwards of a 1,000 personnel, however, intelligence officers felt that number was closer to 200-300 (Kugler, 2007). Reports would later prove that those initial estimates were accurate and that those fighters possessed heavy machine guns and mortars. This underestimate would prove problematic for both U.S. Forces and Afghanistan forces. General Zia Lodin would serve as the Afghanistan Commander on the ground for the operation. Due to security concerns prior to the operation, General Zia was not privy to the entire plan (Major Fleri et al., 2003). This led to a lack of situational understanding of the operational environment and the potential enemy situation. General Zia would encounter stiff resistance when his 450-man unit received small arms attacks and a mortar barrage while they were attempting to establish their defensive positions (Geibbel, 2002). This breakdown with General Zia is not only a failure within the intelligence joint function but highlights the struggles with command and control as well.
Fires
Fires as a joint function encompass all manners of indirect fire to include artillery, mortars, close air support (CAS), and rockets to name a few. It is the responsibility of the fires function to plan for and employ/control all indirect fires during the operation. During Operation Anaconda, traditional artillery was purposely unavailable. This is an interesting choice, being as General Franks was a Field Artillery officer by trade, however; he felt that they would be too big and slow to be of use (Naylor, 2005). Although the close air support provided by the Air Force would play a significant role, it pales in comparison to what artillery could have provided in shaping the fight early. The artillery would have been able to provide fires prior to the mission through seed missions; they would have also been able to employ artillery delivered minefields to help cut off avenues of escape. CJTF Mountain would instead rely on the short-range mortar teams attached to Task Force Rakkasan and the aerial support provided by a handful of UH-60’s and AC-130’s (McMaster, 2008). The communication failures did not end with command and control but extended through the fires function as well. Difficulty in communication and a lack of awareness by the fires function and CJTC would result in an AC-130 gunship accidentally killing one American Soldier and two Afghanistan Soldiers (Andres & Hukill, 2007). This fratricide is significant not only because of the loss of life but also because of the loss of confidence by ground commanders to continue to call for support from the fires function. Without air-support, commanders would have only their organic mortars to operate that function.
Sustainment
The sustainment function plays a critical role in any operation at all levels.
It is the responsibility of the sustainment function to ensure that the unit has what it needs (i.e personnel, equipment, food, and ammo). The issues with the sustainment occurred more during the planning phase of the operation, but the individuals working sustainment within the CJTF were able to adapt during the operation. The CJTF failed to reach out to the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) until nearly a week after the publication of the operations order (U.S. Department of the Air Force, 2005). With the move conducted by the CJTF and the fact that the CAOC was located in Saudi Arabia, this meant that many of the requests became far more difficult for the Air Force to fulfill. The move would also mean a buildup of troops and equipment in Bagram; however, the airfield did not have the storage capacity needed and was not yet clear of minefield making logistical delivery by the Air Force even more difficult (Major Fleri et al.,
2003).
The distance needed to be covered and the logistical issues that the Air Force would have to deal with would mean that much of the Air Support for equipment, CAS, and personnel services would be unavailable for the first two days of the operation (Andres & Hukill, 2007). With the difficulties already occurring within the fires function and other function, losing potential close air support put those on the ground at the significant disadvantage.
Conclusion
Operation Anaconda was initially planned to be a 3-day battle, but would eventually be terminated after 18 days and 8 military personnel killed in action and over 50 wounded (Kugler, 2007).Much of the failures that occurred during Operation Anaconda are a responsibility of the Joint Functions discussed here. The success and failures of Operation Anaconda have resulted in a number of professional reviews and papers. It has served as lessons learned for future operations and proved to be an invaluable lesson for future operations in not only Afghanistan but also helped lay a blue-print for how to operate in Iraq as well. One of the most amazing aspects of the operation was that despite these failures, the Soldiers on the ground were able to accomplish the mission by eliminating the enemy in the area.
Operation Anaconda kicked off on March 2nd, 2002 and was at the time the largest operation in Afghanistan (Naylor, 2005). In the simplest of terms, Operation Anaconda was a success due to the number of casualties sustained by the enemy, however, in almost every other way the operation failed to accomplish its most basic objectives. According to Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Functions are broken down into six categories Command and Control, Intelligence, Fires, Movement and Maneuver, Protection, and Sustainment (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011). It is within these functions that the failures of the operation occurred, specifically within their role in the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP). More specifically the areas of Command and Control (C2), Intelligence, Fires, and Sustainment at the Joint Task Force level bear the burden of failing to plan and prepare the battlefield in a manner that would have …show more content…
set the operation up for success. Command and Control
Command and control is essential to the success of any military operation. In the Joint environment, it refers to the ability of a Commander to exercise control over the various elements assigned to the Joint Command. Perhaps the most essential part of Command and Control is the communication that must occur between a Joint Headquarters and the subordinate commands. From the outset, the 10th Mountain Division Headquarters struggled with their ability to communicate effectively. This is evident even prior to the planning phase of the operation when the elements that fell under it were unsure of the communications process. The Task Force was initially not designated a Joint Task Force, which prevented them from conducting certain planning and coordination’s that would have otherwise taken place, perhaps easing some of the early burdens (Major Fleri, Colonel Howard, Huskill, & Searle, 2003). They would eventually be re-designated a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF Mountain) and would begin planning for the Operation.
The Command and Control function of the CJTF continued to struggle throughout the planning phase. It was during the final planning process that the CJTF HQs relocated from Uzbekistan to Bagram Air Base (13-20 February), which an initial D-Day set for 28 February (Major Fleri et al., 2003). Moving the entire CJTF HQ’s during the final planning resulted in the loss of critical planning time for members of the staff. The command and control function is in many ways the most critical function of the operation. It sets the tone for the rest of the functions and drives the operations process. Moving the HQ's during the planning phase is a tactical error that is visible throughout the rest of the functions
Intelligence
The intelligence function is responsible for receiving, analyzing, and distributing information about the enemy forces and the operational environment. The intelligence drives the operation and is crucial during the military decision-making process (MDMP). The intelligence community to that point had discovered that often ground force reporting’s were exaggerated, which resulted in a lack of confidence in those reports (U.S. Department of the Air Force, 2005). This would prove true during Operation Anaconda as well. Initial estimates placed the potential number of enemy fighters in the Shahi-Kot Valley and Arma Mountains upwards of a 1,000 personnel, however, intelligence officers felt that number was closer to 200-300 (Kugler, 2007). Reports would later prove that those initial estimates were accurate and that those fighters possessed heavy machine guns and mortars. This underestimate would prove problematic for both U.S. Forces and Afghanistan forces. General Zia Lodin would serve as the Afghanistan Commander on the ground for the operation. Due to security concerns prior to the operation, General Zia was not privy to the entire plan (Major Fleri et al., 2003). This led to a lack of situational understanding of the operational environment and the potential enemy situation. General Zia would encounter stiff resistance when his 450-man unit received small arms attacks and a mortar barrage while they were attempting to establish their defensive positions (Geibbel, 2002). This breakdown with General Zia is not only a failure within the intelligence joint function but highlights the struggles with command and control as well.
Fires
Fires as a joint function encompass all manners of indirect fire to include artillery, mortars, close air support (CAS), and rockets to name a few. It is the responsibility of the fires function to plan for and employ/control all indirect fires during the operation. During Operation Anaconda, traditional artillery was purposely unavailable. This is an interesting choice, being as General Franks was a Field Artillery officer by trade, however; he felt that they would be too big and slow to be of use (Naylor, 2005). Although the close air support provided by the Air Force would play a significant role, it pales in comparison to what artillery could have provided in shaping the fight early. The artillery would have been able to provide fires prior to the mission through seed missions; they would have also been able to employ artillery delivered minefields to help cut off avenues of escape. CJTF Mountain would instead rely on the short-range mortar teams attached to Task Force Rakkasan and the aerial support provided by a handful of UH-60’s and AC-130’s (McMaster, 2008). The communication failures did not end with command and control but extended through the fires function as well. Difficulty in communication and a lack of awareness by the fires function and CJTC would result in an AC-130 gunship accidentally killing one American Soldier and two Afghanistan Soldiers (Andres & Hukill, 2007). This fratricide is significant not only because of the loss of life but also because of the loss of confidence by ground commanders to continue to call for support from the fires function. Without air-support, commanders would have only their organic mortars to operate that function.
Sustainment
The sustainment function plays a critical role in any operation at all levels.
It is the responsibility of the sustainment function to ensure that the unit has what it needs (i.e personnel, equipment, food, and ammo). The issues with the sustainment occurred more during the planning phase of the operation, but the individuals working sustainment within the CJTF were able to adapt during the operation. The CJTF failed to reach out to the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) until nearly a week after the publication of the operations order (U.S. Department of the Air Force, 2005). With the move conducted by the CJTF and the fact that the CAOC was located in Saudi Arabia, this meant that many of the requests became far more difficult for the Air Force to fulfill. The move would also mean a buildup of troops and equipment in Bagram; however, the airfield did not have the storage capacity needed and was not yet clear of minefield making logistical delivery by the Air Force even more difficult (Major Fleri et al.,
2003).
The distance needed to be covered and the logistical issues that the Air Force would have to deal with would mean that much of the Air Support for equipment, CAS, and personnel services would be unavailable for the first two days of the operation (Andres & Hukill, 2007). With the difficulties already occurring within the fires function and other function, losing potential close air support put those on the ground at the significant disadvantage.
Conclusion
Operation Anaconda was initially planned to be a 3-day battle, but would eventually be terminated after 18 days and 8 military personnel killed in action and over 50 wounded (Kugler, 2007).Much of the failures that occurred during Operation Anaconda are a responsibility of the Joint Functions discussed here. The success and failures of Operation Anaconda have resulted in a number of professional reviews and papers. It has served as lessons learned for future operations and proved to be an invaluable lesson for future operations in not only Afghanistan but also helped lay a blue-print for how to operate in Iraq as well. One of the most amazing aspects of the operation was that despite these failures, the Soldiers on the ground were able to accomplish the mission by eliminating the enemy in the area.