How The Social Mindfulness: Skill And Will To Navigate The Social World

Social mindfulness: Skill and will to navigate the social world.
Authors:
Van Doesum, Niels J., Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, VU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands, [e-mail]
Van Lange, Dion A. W., Vossius Gymnasium, Amsterdam, Netherlands
Van Lange, Paul A. M., Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, VU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands, [e-mail]
Address:
Van Doesum, Niels J., Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, VU University Amsterdam, van der Boechorststraat 1, 1081 BT, Amsterdam, Netherlands,[e-mail]
Source:
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol 105(1), Jul, 2013. pp. 86-103
Publisher:
US: American Psychological Association
ISSN:
0022-3514 (Print)
1939-1315 (Electronic)
Language:
English
Keywords:
empathy, perspective taking, prosocial, social mindfulness, social value orientation, skill, will, decision-making, choice
Abstract:
Although one may not always see it, social life often involves choices that make people act in ways that are mindful of others or not. We adopt an interdependence theoretical approach to the novel concept of social mindfulness,
which we conceptualize in terms of other-regarding choices involving both skill (to see it, e.g., theory of mind, perspective taking) and will (to do it, e.g., empathic concern, prosocial orientation) to act mindfully toward another person’s control over outcomes. We operationalized social mindfulness in a new social decision-making paradigm that focuses on leaving or limiting choice options for others that we tested across 7 studies. Studies 1a through 1c showed that people with other-oriented mindsets left interdependent others more choice than people with self-oriented and/or unspecified mindsets. Studies 2a and 2b revealed that people developed more favorable judgments of a socially mindful than of a socially unmindful person. Study 3 revealed that unknown others with trustworthy (vs. untrustworthy) faces were met with more social mindfulness. Study 4 revealed that social mindfulness could be traced in personality by being positively related to Honesty-Humility and Agreeableness (HEXACO Personality Inventory-Revised) as well as to Empathy (Interpersonal Reactivity Index) and a prosocial value orientation (SVO). Together, these studies contribute to explaining how social mindfulness can help people to navigate the social world by aiming to maximize other people’s control over their situational outcomes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved) (journal abstract)
Subjects:
*Ability; *Prosocial Behavior; *Self Control; *Social Values; *Mindfulness; Choice Behavior; Decision Making; Empathy
Classification:
Social Perception & Cognition (3040)
Population:
Human (10)
Male (30)
Female (40)
Location:
Netherlands
Age Group:
Adulthood (18 yrs & older) (300)
Young Adulthood (18-29 yrs) (320)
Thirties (30-39 yrs) (340)
Middle Age (40-64 yrs) (360)
Tests & Measures:
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test(Revised Version)
HEXACO Personality Inventory–Revised- Dutch Version
Need to Belong Measure
Mindfulness Attention Awareness Scale
Interpersonal Reactivity Index DOI: 10.1037/t01093-000
Grant Sponsorship:
Sponsor: Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research; Netherlands
Grant: 022.003.040
Recipients: Van Lange, Paul A. M.
Methodology:
Empirical Study; Quantitative Study
Format Covered:
Electronic
Publication Type:
Journal; Peer Reviewed Journal
Document Type:
Journal Article
Publication History:
First Posted Date: May 6, 2013; Accepted Date: Mar 5, 2013; Revised Date: Mar 5, 2013; First Submitted Date: Jan 24, 2013
Release Date:
20130506
Correction Date:
20130701
Copyright:
American Psychological Association. 2013.
Digital Object Identifier:
10.1037/a0032540
PMID:
23647176
PsycARTICLES Identifier: psp-105-1-86 Accession Number:
2013-15119-001
Number of Citations in Source:
88
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Social Mindfulness : Skill and Will to Navigate the Social World
Contents
1. Socially Mindful
2. Skill and Will
3. Interdependence
4. Research Overview and Hypotheses
5. General Method: The SoMi Paradigm
6. Minding Me, Minding You
7. Study 1a
8. Method
9. Results
10. Study 1b
11. Method
12. Results
13. Study 1c
14. Method
15. Results
16. Discussion
17. Meeting Mindfulness
18. Study 2a
19. Method
20. Results
21. Study 2b
22. Method
23. Results
24. Discussion
25. Study 3: Mindfulness at Face Value
26. Method
27. Results
28. Discussion
29. Study 4: The Socially Mindful Person
30. Method
31. Results
32. Discussion
33. General Discussion
34. Process and Outcome Interdependence
35. Mindful
36. Alternative Explanations
37. Implications and Future Directions
38. Mindful Caution
39. Concluding Remarks
40. Footnotes
41. References
ListenSelect:
By: Niels J. Van Doesum
Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, VU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Dion A. W. Van Lange
Vossius Gymnasium, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Paul A. M. Van Lange
Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, VU University Amsterdam
Acknowledgement: The research was supported by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research Grant 022.003.040, awarded to Paul A. M. Van Lange as member of the Kurt Lewin Institute. Niels J. Van Doesum and Paul A. M. Van Lange contributed equally to this work.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to: Niels J. Van Doesum, Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, VU University Amsterdam, van der Boechorststraat 1, 1081 BT, Amsterdam, the Netherlands Electronic Mail may be sent to: [e-mail].
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to: Paul A. M. Van Lange, Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, VU University Amsterdam, van der Boechorststraat 1, 1081 BT, Amsterdam, the Netherlands Electronic Mail may be sent to: [e-mail].
Prosocial behavior comes in many flavors, and social mindfulness might well be one of them. Being socially mindful means to safeguard other people’s control over their own behavioral options in situations of interdependence. Recently, the concept of mindfulness has become a household term in both clinical and social psychology. Mindfulness-based psychotherapy, for instance, has shown to be an effective therapy for depression and anxiety disorders (e.g., Chiesa & Serretti, 2011; Greeson, 2009; Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt, & Oh, 2010), and everyday mindfulness as described by Langer (1989, 1992) allows for more openness to all the options and alternatives that life has to offer—even providing a feeling of empowerment ( Langer, Blank, & Chanowitz, 1978). However, contemporary discussions of mindfulness often overlook the original other-orientedness that is embedded in its Buddhist heritage ( Black, 2011; cf. Gergen, 2009). Other than the prevalent inward awareness and inner dialogue of modern mindfulness, s ocialmindfulness doubles back to its roots by incorporating a benevolent focus on the needs and interests of others.
General mindfulness starts with paying attention to the little things available to individual awareness; social mindfulness starts at a similar basic level. In daily life, it may sometimes be understood as simply being considerate or being polite. An example would be to deliberately not take the last peanut butter cookie from a plate that also holds a couple of chocolate chip cookies. Undoubtedly, various personal motivations and/or preferences may play a role in these kinds of decisions, but a readily available reason for refraining from taking the last single cookie is to leave a next person something to choose from—even if that is only the polite thing to do. Key factors in this decision process are to acknowledge the immediate or expected inclusion of someone else in a given situation, assess the effect of one’s actions on the remaining behavioral options for the other (i.e., interdependence is seen and established), and the level of positive regard given to this other (“Do I really care if uncle John can’t choose which cookie he wants, as long as he can still have one?”). Subtle but, as we argue, socially effective actions like leaving or limiting choice options for others requires a process of both perspective taking and empathic concern—uncle John might indeed get really upset and not want to play soccer anymore.
Perspective Taking and Empathic Concern are two of the four domains that Davis (1980, 1983) distinguished in the multidimensional concept of empathy—the other domains are Fantasy Scale and Personal Distress. Separately or in combination, these can be used to explain many other-oriented capacities and/or tendencies. Investigating socialmindfulness as a human capacity in which the cognitive component of perspective taking and the affective component of empathic concern work together to signal prosocial intentions offers a practical and concise method to look at an underinvestigated way of how people may balance a need for social inclusion with a need for individual differentiation ( Brewer, 1991, 2012). The mindful sequence of to see it (i.e., the perspective of the other person) and to do it (i.e., to make choices that leave room for that other) requires both skill and will.
Socially Mindful

Social mindfulness is minding the needs and interests of others in a way that honors the idea that most people like to choose for themselves (i.e., have a certain need for autonomy; Deci & Ryan, 2012). In terms of interdependence theory (e.g., Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Van Lange & Rusbult, 2012), social mindfulness seeks to maximize other people’s control over their own outcomes. The socially mindful person makes sure that he or she does not determine or close up situations for others as far as outcomes are concerned. In interdependence theory, situations that require suspension of immediate personal preferences for the sake of others have been relatively underexposed, and in our eyes deserve some attention. As mentioned, being socially mindful can be as simple as not taking the last peanut butter cookie when there are still other alternatives left. Situations like these make a good anchor point for any new measure of social mindfulness. Leaving or limiting outcome options for others will therefore constitute the core of the current investigation.
Skill and Will

Perspective taking is a well-researched phenomenon (e.g., Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; Ruby & Decety, 2004). Neural correlates of this human capacity for instance can be traced back to regions in the medial prefrontal cortex (see Amodio & Frith, 2006). Related to perspective taking is the concept of theory of mind (ToM), which enables people to attribute mental states—for example, beliefs, intentions, desires, knowledge—to oneself and to others, and to understand that those others have beliefs, desires, and intentions that are different from one’s own (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 1993; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). A basic ToM allows people to know that others have thoughts and feelings in the same way that they have, and thus recognizes the others as cognizant and sentient ( Decety & Batson, 2007). An advanced ToM extends this ability to more complex situations in which other people’s perspectives may require some effort to assess. Yet another approach to acknowledge the views and feelings of others, for example used in person-centered and experiential approaches to psychotherapy, is called mentalizing, or to become aware of the presence and quality of mental states in self and others (e.g., Allen, 2006; Allen, Fonagy, & Bateman, 2008). Building on this extensive body of research, we reason that the skill to process other people’s perspective will vary between people and between situations, thus laying down the affordance for social mindfulness.
Skill will set the perimeters, but the will to follow up is another issue. Early research has shown that especially affective perspective taking connects to a cooperative predisposition and altruistic behavior, rather than the ability to take the physical perspective of others (e.g., D. W. Johnson, 1975a, 1975b; Oswald, 1996; Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009). Affective perspective taking is part of the human faculty of empathy, mostly related to empathic concern. As the capacity to feel for and with others, one could expect empathic concern to play an important part in a benevolent approach to the needs and wishes of others, and therefore in social mindfulness. Motivating factors like these will bring the ability for perspective taking or mentalizing online. In other words: One needs the skill to assess for the will to address.
Interdependence

Our conceptualization of social mindfulness is deeply rooted in interdependence theory, which emphasizes the role of social orientations such as cooperation and fairness in settings of outcome interdependence ( Kelley & Thibaut, 1978).
Social mindfulness as we define and operationalize it extends the focus on outcome interdependence by including the notion that people’s behavioral choices and actions may codetermine the range of possible outcomes for others, rather than just the outcome itself (cf. Kelley et al., 2003; Van Lange & Rusbult, 2012). In order to investigate these specific instances of interdependence, we asked participants in our experiments to imagine being in a dyadic situation in which choices by the one would leave or limit outcome options for the
other.
The operationalization of social mindfulness we discuss in this article was inspired by the pen-choice paradigm initially used by Kim and Markus (1999) and further developed byYamagishi, Hashimoto, and Schug (2008; see also Hashimoto, Li, & Yamagishi, 2011). In this paradigm, people were asked to pick one among five pens that came in two colors. The ratio was always two to three pens of the same color, or one to four. This obviously made one color the majority and the other the minority. Both research groups framed their findings in terms of cultural differences, but Yamagishi et al. (2008; see also Hashimoto et al., 2011) argued that instead of being internalized cultural norms, which is the point of the Kim and Markus (1999) study, preferences for minority versus majority objects were driven by strategies that people follow as what may be called “cultural game players” ( Hashimoto et al., 2011, p. 140; cf. Yamagishi et al., 2012). They reached this conclusion by noticing that when by themselves or the last to choose, and thus without any social pressure, most people seemed to prefer the unique option regardless of cultural background. Picking the unique object therefore can be seen as the default choice in absence of other, extrinsically motivating factors.
Clearly, choosing one object rather than the other can be the result of a strategic choice. In order to transpose the pen-choice paradigm from unique versus majority choices to a measure of socialmindfulness, we limited the total number of choice options to three, with a standard ratio of one to two (e.g., one blue pen and two green pens). Also, we repeated similar choices by adding more objects than pens alone. Furthermore, the setting was always dyadic and the choices socially consequential: Choosing one object would remove it for the other person. In this set up, choosing the object of which there were two would leave the second person something to choose between (a blue or a green pen), whereas a first choice for the unique object would limit the options because there would only be two identical objects left to choose from.
In interdependence terms, we reasoned that the first person’s choice for the doubled object would count as cooperative/mindful, because it grants the second person control over the same amount and quality of options that were available to the first person. A first move for the unique object, however, removes this control. Granting this kind of control may have prosocial motives (cf. Magee & Langner, 2008) because it allows the other to have as much autonomous control over the outcome as the situation will allow. This reasoning also taps into self-determination theory (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2000, 2012), in which autonomy is regarded as a basic need. Providing someone with a certain degree of autonomy, or at least not taking it away, may be perceived as an action that honors the needs and the perspective of the other; in other words, as an act of social mindfulness.
In the same realm, social value orientations (SVOs) are conceptually related to social mindfulness. In past research, three major types of SVO have received most attention, including (a) a prosocial orientation that seeks to enhance own and other’s outcomes as well as equality in outcomes; (b) an individualistic orientation that seeks to enhance outcomes for self, and is largely indifferent to outcomes for another person; and (c) a competitive orientation that seeks to enhance the difference between outcomes for self and other in favor of the self ( Messick & McClintock, 1968; Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). Thus, relative to individualists and competitors, prosocials tend to be more other-regarding in that they are more strongly oriented toward helping others and pursuing equality in outcomes (Van Lange, 1999), expect others to be other-regarding as well ( Kuhlman, Camac, & Cunha, 1986), and tend to view various interdependence situations in terms of fairness and morality (for a review, seeBalliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009; Van Lange, Schippers, & Balliet, 2011). Prosocial more than individualistic or competitive orientations therefore can be expected to favor mindful behaviors that safeguard variation in options—or “choice”—for others.
Research Overview and Hypotheses

Social mindfulness seeks to maximize other people’s control over their own outcomes in situations of interdependence; this makes it an effective tool for signaling and estimating prosocial intentions. To introduce and investigate this novel construct, we conducted seven studies, with the concomitant goal of testing our new paradigm (the Social Mindfulness [SoMi] paradigm; see the General Method section below). Social mindfulness makes people leave choice for others out of other-regard. Being specifically other-oriented therefore should lead to higher levels of social mindfulness than being self-oriented (orientation hypothesis). For a clear test of concurrent validity, we designed an experiment in which we explicitly told our participants to mind either their own or another person’s best interest (Study 1a). Because the wish to gain more information about others might also influence whether to leave someone else a choice or not, we planned a replication with the additional instruction that participants would not be informed about the other person’s choices (Study 1b). Next to gaining information, choosing behavior may also arise from a self-serving wish to make a favorable impression on others. This possible alternative explanation we addressed in a second replication (Study 1c).
Our general argument holds that social mindfulness signals prosocial intentions. But for this signal to be functional, it must of course also be understood as such. We tested this in two studies. In a laboratory setting, Study 2a looked at how participants would react after witnessing various levels of social mindfulness. We expected to find that a socially mindful person would be liked better and trusted more than a socially unmindful person (i.e., someone who leaves the other with little or no choice; perceived mindfulness hypothesis). In Study 2b, we sought to replicate this in an online study using a different and U.S.-based population.
Because trust and trustworthiness make investing in social relationships a safer bet, one of our general expectations was that trust would play a role in social mindfulness; not only in the sense that socially mindful individuals will be trusted more than those who are not, but also to the extent that the mere appearance of being trustworthy will enhance the chance of being met with social mindfulness. In Study 3, we therefore explored whether seeing a stranger’s trustworthy—as opposed to untrustworthy—face would be enough to elicit higher levels of social mindfulness (trustworthiness hypothesis).
In Study 4, we sought further validation by tracing social mindfulness in underlying personality structures. We expected social mindfulness to be specifically associated with personality factors that are geared toward enhancing or maintaining the relationship with others, like Honesty-Humility and Agreeableness (personality hypothesis). We also tested our expectation that Empathy would be associated withSocial Mindfulness (empathy hypothesis), as well as a prosocial value orientation (SVO hypothesis).
General Method: The SoMi Paradigm

Inspired in part by past research on the pen-choice paradigm originally devised by Kim and Markus (1999) and extended by Yamagishi et al. (2008) and Hashimoto et al. (2011), we developed a paradigm forsocial mindfulness that for short we called the SoMi paradigm. The SoMi paradigm consisted of a computer-generated social decision-making task that let participants choose one among three objects in a series of different categories, for example, pens, baseball caps, water bottles, or wrapped gifts. Per category, two of the objects were entirely identical, and the third only differed in a single aspect (e.g., one yellow baseball cap and two green ones). The specific instructions and number of categories varied somewhat per study, but participants always had to keep in mind that they were playing the decision task together with one other person in a dyadic interaction. They were told to imagine that they both would get to take home one of the three objects. Furthermore, it was emphasized that the objects would not be replaced; once chosen by the one, an object would no longer be available to the other. This combination of a consistently interdependent setting with the use of multiple objects formed the conceptual and theoretical next step that allowed the pen-choice paradigm to evolve into a measure of social mindfulness. Two example screenshots are provided in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Screenshots from the Social Mindfulness (SoMi) paradigm.
The rationale behind this paradigm assumed that if the participant would choose the object of which there were two, the other person would still have something to choose between (a green or a yellow cap); this would be scored as mindful (1). If the participant, however, would pick the unique option, he or she would leave the other with no choice but to take or leave the other object (only two identical green caps would be left); this would be scored as unmindful (0). The various categories as well as the three objects per category were presented in random order. In all but Studies 2a and 2b, participants had to make another choice in a second round within the same category, but now in counterbalanced order (e.g., two yellow and one green baseball cap). A final score (i.e., a proportion of socially mindful choices) was computed by averaging the scores over all decisions in both rounds, resulting in a number between 0 (only unmindful choices) and 1 (only mindful choices).
Minding Me, Minding You

We tested the orientation hypothesis in three consecutive studies by asking participants to look after either their own or another person’s best interest, which in a first test of concurrent validity comes down to either being selfishly or socially mindful. The “other” in the decision task was to be imaginary and not specifically defined. This reflected the set up of the triple-dominance measure of SVO (e.g., Van Lange, 1999; Van Lange et al., 1997) that asks people to allocate points between themselves and an unknown other that they are not likely to meet in the future. A similar set up allowed us to assess socialmindfulness in a situation of generalized self- versus other-orientedness. In order to test whether leaving choice to others indeed comes from prosocial intentions, we hypothesized that the instruction to be other-oriented would result in higher levels of social mindfulness than the instruction to be self-oriented (orientation hypothesis) and that a predominantly prosocial value orientation would be associated with more social mindfulness than a proself orientation (SVO hypothesis; Study 1a). In Studies 1b and 1c, we tested whether our initial findings would replicate in different samples while exploring two possible alternative explanations.
Study 1a

Method
Participants
In this laboratory study, 41 men and 67 women participated ( N = 108; Mage = 20.75, SD = 2.25). They were recruited at the campus of VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands, by means of flyers distributed in two main cafeterias, and were compensated with €3.50 (about $4.57 U.S.) or study credits for their voluntary participation.
Procedure and materials
Upon arrival, participants were greeted and guided into separate cubicles equipped with computers. The experimenter then would start the computer program and leave the cubicle. All further instructions were provided onscreen. The experiment opened with the SoMi paradigm, as described in the General Method section above. In this case, it was played with five different object categories: jars of jam, baseball caps, pencils, wrapped gifts, and apples. Participants were told to imagine playing with someone else they did not know and were not likely to meet in the near future.
Instructing mindset
In randomly assigned conditions, participants were either asked (a) to keep the perspective of the other in mind, (b) to keep the other’s best interest in mind, or (c) to think of their own preferences. In a control condition, they did (d) not receive specific instruction as to where to put their focus. We included two instructions that were aimed to induce other-orientedness (using “perspective” and “best interest”) to ensure that the findings would be similar and not dependent on a specific kind of wording. This was considered to be especially important for the validation of a new paradigm that extends the traditional focus on “outcomes.”
Preliminary analyses revealed a significant main effect for condition on social mindfulness ( Moverall = .60; SD = .22), F(3, 104) = 3.93, p = .011, η p2 = .10. However, pairwise comparisons revealed no significant difference between the conditions of keeping the other’s perspective (1) versus best interest (2) in mind ( M = .63, SD = .24; and M = .69, SD = .18, respectively), F(1, 104) < 1, p = .329, in combination with a significant difference between those two conditions combined (1 + 2) and the instruction to mind one’s own best interest (3) ( M = .55, SD = .24), F(1, 104) = 5.30, p = .023. For the main analysis, we therefore decided to combine the two conceptually other-oriented conditions in a single condition for other-orientedness. This would then be contrasted with self-orientedness and no instruction (control) in a three-tiered variable called instruction.
Next, SVO was assessed by a computerized version of the nine-item triple-dominance measure of SVO ( Van Lange, 1999; Van Lange et al., 1997). Eleven participants could not be classified for making fewer than six consistent choices and were excluded from all analyses involving SVO ( n = 97). In this sample, we found 53 people with a prosocial orientation (55%), 37 with an individualistic orientation (35%), and seven competitors (7%). Because of the small amount of competitively oriented participants, and to match up to the self-/other-orientation of the experimental conditions, we combined individualists and competitors into a single category of proself orientation (cf. De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001; Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008); participants in this category ( n = 44) would then be pitted against those in the prosocial category ( n = 53).
Results
To examine the role of instruction and SVO, we conducted a 3 (instruction; self-oriented, other-oriented, control) × 2 (SVO; prosocial, proself) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the proportion of socially mindful choices. As predicted, this analysis revealed a main effect for instruction, F(2, 91) = 5.06, p = .008, η p2 = .10. In line with the hypothesis, pairwise comparisons revealed that under instruction of other-orientedness ( Mother-oriented = .66, SD = .21), participants scored higher on social mindfulness than under instruction of self-orientedness ( Mself-oriented = .55, SD = .24), F(1, 105) = 5.30, p = .023, or no instruction at all ( Mcontrol = .52, SD = .17), F(1, 105) = 8.89, p = .004. Being other-oriented differed from both other conditions together as well, F(1, 105) = 10.47, p = .002. There was no significant difference between self-orientedness and the control condition, however, F(1, 105) < 1, p = .558. Thus, other-orientedness differed in social mindfulness from self-orientedness and/or no instruction (i.e., other-oriented participants scored higher), whereas no instruction and self-orientedness did not differ in their effect on social mindfulness.
The main model also revealed a significant effect of SVO, F(1, 91) = 5.05, p = .027, η p2 = .05. This supported our hypothesis that prosocials ( Mprosocial = .64, SD = .20) would exhibit greater socialmindfulness than proselfs ( Mproself = .54, SD = .23; SVO hypothesis). The interaction between instruction and SVO was not significant, F(2, 91) < 1, p = .458, η p2 = .02.