Human Value
Significance of Practices
The Problem
Much of our knowledge concerns the thoughts and actions of others
We often know what people are doing and why they are doing it in the light of propositional attitudes we know that they have. On the basis of known attitudes we
Often make reasonable predictions about what people will think or do in this
Or that circumstance. Having arranged to meet a friend at a particular time And place it is reasonable for you to expect this friend to be at that place at that time. It is part of the arrangement that each party to it takes the other to intend to meet at the agreed time and place and on that basis expects the meeting to take place. Such understandings and predictions of behavior are routine because we routinely know about what people believe, desire, or intend, or how they feel about this or that type of circumstance. Often they simply tell us about such matters. Yet there are countless occasions when we find people’s thought or action intelligible, or anticipate what they will think or do, or are at least unsurprised by what they think or do, despite our having little if any information about their attitudes other than what we can gather from their situation and non-verbal behavior. Watching a football match I see a player in one team trying to avoid being too close to two players in the opposing team. I understand that the first player is being marked by the others and wants to avoid being prevented by them from receiving the ball. This is despite having no specific information about any of the propositional attitudes of the players apart from what I may gather from their circumstances and their non-verbal behavior. Other examples easily reinforce the point. Suppose I receive an invitation to give a talk at some academic institution. All I receive is a brief email, from someone I do not know, telling me about the nature of an event that is being arranged and asking me to give a presentation. I reply saying that
I
The Problem
Much of our knowledge concerns the thoughts and actions of others
We often know what people are doing and why they are doing it in the light of propositional attitudes we know that they have. On the basis of known attitudes we
Often make reasonable predictions about what people will think or do in this
Or that circumstance. Having arranged to meet a friend at a particular time And place it is reasonable for you to expect this friend to be at that place at that time. It is part of the arrangement that each party to it takes the other to intend to meet at the agreed time and place and on that basis expects the meeting to take place. Such understandings and predictions of behavior are routine because we routinely know about what people believe, desire, or intend, or how they feel about this or that type of circumstance. Often they simply tell us about such matters. Yet there are countless occasions when we find people’s thought or action intelligible, or anticipate what they will think or do, or are at least unsurprised by what they think or do, despite our having little if any information about their attitudes other than what we can gather from their situation and non-verbal behavior. Watching a football match I see a player in one team trying to avoid being too close to two players in the opposing team. I understand that the first player is being marked by the others and wants to avoid being prevented by them from receiving the ball. This is despite having no specific information about any of the propositional attitudes of the players apart from what I may gather from their circumstances and their non-verbal behavior. Other examples easily reinforce the point. Suppose I receive an invitation to give a talk at some academic institution. All I receive is a brief email, from someone I do not know, telling me about the nature of an event that is being arranged and asking me to give a presentation. I reply saying that
I