Ee Wenyang, Jonathan
S8811568F
I. Introduction
The United States of America has a long history of support for international criminal justice that can be traced from the Nürnberg War Crimes Trial through to the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and Rwanda (“ICTR”).[1] Towards the close of the century, the United States proved itself as an ardent supporter for the creation of a permanent international criminal tribunal.[2] Yet in July 1998, when the vote on the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome Statute”) was called, the United States not only sided with Libya, Iraq, and Yemen against the International Criminal Court (“ICC”),[3] but even took active steps to oppose the court.[4]
This paper aims to understand the United States’ rejection of the Rome Statute in the context of its otherwise strong enthusiasm for the establishment of a permanent international criminal court. Such an enquiry is essential for a number of reasons: If the scathing criticisms of the court by the global hegemon are well-founded, then the continual opposition by America could rapidly erode the legitimacy of the court unless swift action is taken to address these concerns; this enquiry is also necessary if the international community is to attempt to bring the United States on-board the ICC. And it arguably should make such an attempt, due to the immense political, economic and military might which the United States current wields, and will continue to wield, at least for the next decade.[5]
This paper carries out its analysis of the United States’ behavior both on a practical and a normative level. A discussion of the United States’ concerns on a practical level alone is insufficient as practical concerns are invariably motivated by normative ideals. For example, the United States’ criticisms of the lack of accountability, and