Jane K. Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall Author Info: A. Trevor Thrall (corresponding author) Assistant Professor Department of Social Sciences and Master of Public Policy Program University of Michigan – Dearborn 4910 Evergreen Rd Dearborn, MI 48128 313-593-5282 atthrall@umich.edu Jane K. Cramer Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science University of Oregon Eugene, OR 97403-1284 (541) 346-4626 jkcramer@uoregon.edu Abstract The years since the invasion of Iraq have undermined the administration’s stated rationales for war. A majority of Americans believes the administration intentionally misled the public about Iraq. Among foreign policy scholars the question arises repeatedly: Why did the U.S. invade Iraq? Did the administration go to war based on an overly aggressive reading of the evidence? If so, why? Or did the administration go to war for unstated reasons that go beyond Iraq such as oil, Israel, and geopolitics? The central purpose of this paper is to spur and inform debate by surveying and organizing the recent thinking of foreign policy and international relations experts about why the U.S. invaded Iraq. The results reveal areas of surprising agreement about the influence of neoconservative ideology as well as lively debates about which factors and which actors played the most decisive roles in the decision to go to war.
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On March 22, 2003 President George W. Bush told America that, “Our mission is clear, to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam’s support of terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people” (Bush March 22, 2003). The years since have fully revealed that the WMD threat was not the urgent threat the administration declared and that Saddam Hussein was not involved with Al Qaeda or 9/11. At least in part because of these revelations a majority of Americans now believe that invading Iraq was a mistake and that the