Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters
In his article, “Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters[1]” by
Dr Colin Grey, he asserts “that the United States should undertake little irregular warfare. It would be a political and strategic mistake to identify irregular warfare, COIN especially, as America’s dominant strategic future (Grey 1).” I disagree, I would assert that due to the United States’ superior military power and technology, more stable political system (democracy), and globally dominate economy, we can and will, be successful in COIN operations. Examining each of these pillars of power will illustrate the advantage the United States has already demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how these pillars will give us the strategic advantage in irregular warfare or “COIN,” going forward.
Three pillars form the foundation of my argument of why the United States can and should engage in COIN operations in the future. The three pillars are; advanced military capability, a superior political system, and global economic dominance. Any of these pillars will dominate any adversary who would contemplate engaging in an insurgency against our country, but combined, no current state, individual or group has the capacity to overthrow or even successfully engage.
First, look at the pillar of military capability, as applied during our recent COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US execution of COIN in Afghanistan has achieved success by virtually all military standards. To prove it, in soviet invasion of Afghanistan it is documented that “On December 27, 1979, under cover of an ongoing Soviet military buildup, heavily-armed elements of a Soviet airborne brigade were airlifted into Kabul, Afghanistan, to violently overthrow the regime of President Hafizollah Amin (Giradet 2) ” which resulted in years of COIN engagements in that country by the Soviet Union. Bottom line, over a much shorter period of time (1979-1988), and with more soldiers on the ground (over 113,000), the USSR
Dr Colin Grey, he asserts “that the United States should undertake little irregular warfare. It would be a political and strategic mistake to identify irregular warfare, COIN especially, as America’s dominant strategic future (Grey 1).” I disagree, I would assert that due to the United States’ superior military power and technology, more stable political system (democracy), and globally dominate economy, we can and will, be successful in COIN operations. Examining each of these pillars of power will illustrate the advantage the United States has already demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how these pillars will give us the strategic advantage in irregular warfare or “COIN,” going forward.
Three pillars form the foundation of my argument of why the United States can and should engage in COIN operations in the future. The three pillars are; advanced military capability, a superior political system, and global economic dominance. Any of these pillars will dominate any adversary who would contemplate engaging in an insurgency against our country, but combined, no current state, individual or group has the capacity to overthrow or even successfully engage.
First, look at the pillar of military capability, as applied during our recent COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US execution of COIN in Afghanistan has achieved success by virtually all military standards. To prove it, in soviet invasion of Afghanistan it is documented that “On December 27, 1979, under cover of an ongoing Soviet military buildup, heavily-armed elements of a Soviet airborne brigade were airlifted into Kabul, Afghanistan, to violently overthrow the regime of President Hafizollah Amin (Giradet 2) ” which resulted in years of COIN engagements in that country by the Soviet Union. Bottom line, over a much shorter period of time (1979-1988), and with more soldiers on the ground (over 113,000), the USSR
Cited: 1. By Dr. Colin S. Gray, Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, UK. The author of 22 books, his most recent (published in 2007) are Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy; and War, Peace, and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History. This article was originally a paper presented at the Air Force Symposium on Counterinsurgency, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 24–26 April 2007. 2. See E. Girardet, Afghanistan (1986); A. H. Cordesman and A. R. Wagner, Lessons of Modern War, Vol. III (1989); A. Saikal and W. Maley, ed., The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (1989); A. Hyman, Afghanistan under Soviet Domination, 1964–1991 (3d ed. 1992). 3. Ten Technological Advances to keep our Soldiers Safer. By John Brandon, published September 16, 2010 at Fox News.com at http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2010/09/16/ten-ways-keep-soldiers-safer/ 4 . CIA Factbook, Published 2012 at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 5 . http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/j/jimmycarte130501.html#ET3J0k5Vkg0k1Aeb.99 6. Ben Connable and Martin Cilibicki, Published 2010 by the RAND Corporation at http://www.rand.org/ -----------------------