Irving Janis Theory Of Groupthink

In the weeks immediately after the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, the nation watched anxiously as the Bush Administration declared war on terror. Following the invasion of Afghanistan to hunt down those responsible for this horrific incident, the U.S. swiftly changed its priority to invading Iraq and overthrowing its government by capturing its president, Saddam Hussein. In this mission, the U.S. scrambled to find a connection between Saddam Hussein and the terrorist organization al-Qa’ida. Since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, many scholars have focused on the effects of the Iraq War, speculating on the Bush Administration’s motives for the decision. While some within scholarly circles have attributed the invasion of Iraq to
In 1971, Irving Janis created the theory of groupthink following an examination of several U.S. foreign policy disasters, including the failure at the Bay of Pigs, the U.S. involvement with Vietnam, the Korean War, and the attack on Pearl Harbor. He then compared the commonalities between the events to a considerable extent, grouping them into a theory that he labeled ‘groupthink.’ Janis defined groupthink as a “psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses dissent and appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision-making groups.” In other words, groupthink is a theoretical concept that is intended to explain why apparently good, cohesive groups arrive at bad decisions. Moreover, it is an excessive form of agreement-seeking among individuals in closely knit policymaking circles, and is excessive to the extent that the individuals in the group have come to value the group above anything else. This factor causes individuals the need to achieve a quick and albeit painless unanimity on issues that are confronted by the group. Individuals within these groups tend to suppress personal doubts, seek to silence those that do not agree with the overall product, and strongly back the group leader’s suggestions. The idea of groupthink quickly became a catch-all
Studies by t’Hart argue that group cohesiveness can lead to the group solving problems more effectively, which is accomplished through examining a wide range of alternative solutions and through the quality of information retrieval. However, historical records highlight that this was not the case, as the invasion of Iraq and subsequent occupation were rife with cognitive errors, and there is no evidence that these errors were caused by seeking consensus from group members. There is little evidence of these effects in the Bush Administration. While several members of the group had known each other for years, meetings where infrequent. Had the effects of 9/11 made the core group more cohesive, meeting frequency would have increased. Evidence further suggests that the Administration maintained a high level of lack of cooperation and distrust. While some members of the group had in fact expressed doubt on invading the country, they continued to back Bush’s policy, and those that favored the invasion did so long before it became policy. Therefore, the core group does not fit the criteria for Janis’ group