The goal of this research paper is to analyze plea bargain and discuss whether it complies with Constitution of United States. In order to accomplish this goal, conception of plea is explained in details, as well as its advantages and disadvantages for some of the participants and the system as a whole. Also Constitution is analyzed in terms of plea bargaining case in order to find out how it correlates with principal law. Besides cases of using plea bargaining and their results are explained in this research paper.
Before going into further discussion I would like to briefly explain the basic conception. Judicial system is designed to punish those people that committed crimes through the system of jury trials where criminal defendant is considered as guilty or not guilty. So, at first glance it looks unavoidable that all criminals are punished according and in proportion to their crimes. In fact, there is another way of judging and punishing criminals that does not include jury trials and fair judicial process that finds defendant guilty or not guilty. This system is called plea bargaining.
A plea bargain is an agreement in a criminal case whereby the prosecutor offers the defendant the opportunity to plead guilty, usually to a lesser charge or to the original criminal charge with recommendation of a lighter than maximum sentence. Plea bargains have its advantages and disadvantages.
First of all, plea bargain has benefits for criminals that really did the crime. It allows them to avoid the risk of conviction at trial and receive full term of punishment for their crimes. For example, they could be offered to plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge instead of felony charge. No wonder that this practice became very popular in United States.
Also most of the involved parties benefit from plea bargaining. Criminals receive lesser punishment and therefore they tend to plead guilty. The cases finish earlier with predicted results so
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