Is Semrau's Arguments Regarding The Legalization Of Selling Organs

In our capitalistic society, the free market system has been established to give everyone the equal opportunity to act in their best interest. Despite our free market approach, there are still certain goods and services that cannot be sold. Our government arrives at these decisions through analysis of the social and ethical issues surrounding commodification. Regulations are placed on certain items in an effort to do what they think is best for our society. Many of these restrictions are controversial topics that provoke constant discussion. The shortage in the supply of organs, for example, is an issue resulting in thousands of deaths a year and has led to scholars discussing the legality of selling organs. Simon Rippon’s argument is widely
Semrau includes these market regulations to show that having the option to vend would in fact not give way to the pressure to vend. He explains that under the Erin and Harris Proposal, the market would be geopolitically bound and therefore, would have a natural cap. He goes on to assert that there are around 35,000 people in need of kidneys annually which would allow for only 1 in 9000 people to sell their kidney each year. (Semrau 6). This empirical evidence is crucial in supporting his claim that the option to sell organs does not have to cause a negative pressure to do so. By showcasing how a market could prevent the option to vend giving way to negative pressure; Semrau reaffirms his claim. Rippon attempts to argue that having the option to vend would give way to negative consequences, however, Semrau successfully nullifies this claim by showing that this pressure can be combated under the proper conditions: “[t]his is because, in short, under a regulated market pressuring others to vend will not reliably result in their vending” (Semrau 6). He further states that, due to the fact that the market is geopolitically bounded, the compensation is substantial to more than just the poor, and proper medical care is guaranteed; the pressure to vend will not actually lead to vending (Semrau 6). Adding this insight on suggested market regulations is extremely powerful at this point in his article. For one, it suggests that in a properly regulated market, the pressure itself will not guarantee vendors. More importantly, it gives him a certain credibility for offering a real solution when no other scholar has. In terms of critical reasoning, it provides empirical evidence that supports his distinction between the pressure to vend and pressure with the option to vend. At this point, most scholars simply suggest that a regulated market could